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I. INTRODUCTION
John B. Anderson, an Independent candidate for the 1980 presidential
election, represents the model of the civic minded professional. Anderson
typifies what a powerful person's focus should be, social justice. He grounds
himself in participatory democracy and acts in a very collaborative manner.
His professional behavior exemplifies what many in the social sciences
would like to be the standard in the political and social scene. Instead, the
world, for the most part, is populated by professionals who have evolved into
technocrats and are basically driven by the markets and individualism closely
associated with the market place. This article will explore Anderson's "sto-
ry" to see what influenced him, as an "insider," to be a supporter of outsider
rights. The authors fully realize his story turns outsider jurisprudence on its
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head.' Regardless, and perhaps for this reason, the John B. Anderson story is
worthy of emulation.
The article will begin with an exploration of Anderson's fascinating life
story. Following that will be a look at Anderson from the point of view of
another great person, George McGovern, a long time friend of Anderson.
After that, begins an examination of the concept of civic professionalism,
which represents a new method to view behaviors that promote social justice.
That will be followed by a review of how Anderson's up-bringing and atti-
tudes might explain why Anderson became a civic professional. Lastly, out-
sider jurisprudence gives insight to Anderson's political and legal philoso-
phy.
1. Traditionally, an "outsider," in this context, is "someone who does not have access to
the channels of power and communication in this society" whereas, "an 'insider' is someone
who does have that access." Carolyn Grose, 'Once upon a Time, in a Land Far, Far
Away . . .' Lawyers and Clients Telling Stories About Ethics (and Everything Else), 20
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 163, 173 n.29 (2009). All too often, those outside the discourse are
not represented nor are their voices heard. See id. at 173. At its most basic form, Outsider
Jurisprudence describes the movement of nonwhite legal theory which essentially:
[lI]ncludes Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Critical Legal Theory, Critical Race Theory, Criti-
cal Race Feminism, Asian American legal scholarship and, more recently, QueerCrit and Lat-
Crit theory. These genres of outsider jurisprudence have in common an outsider, and often
times critical, perspective vis-A-vis law and society. These loosely related strains of outsider
scholarship have striven to: represent marginalized viewpoints; espouse critical, egalitarian,
progressive and diverse anti-subordination agendas; accept analytical inter-subjectivity; raise
political consciousness and social responsibility; recognize and work with postmodemism; fa-
vor praxis; and seek community.
Francisco Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American
Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377, 377-78 n.4 (2002) (citing Francisco Valdes, Aft-
erword, Theorizing "OutCrit" Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurispruden-
tial Experience-RaceCrits, QueerCrits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999)).
"[O]utsider scholarship is characterized by a commitment to the interests of people of color
and/or women, by rejection of abstraction and dispassionate 'objectivity,' and by a preference
for narrative and other engaged forms of discourse." Mary 1. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship:
The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 685 (1992). An outsider holds views not
held by the mainstream and, according to this theory, would not be part of the mainstream.
See, e.g., Rachel J. Anderson, From Imperial Scholar to Imperial Student: Minimizing Bias in
Article Evaluation by Law Reviews, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 197, 207 (2009); see also
Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 17, 26 (2008) (discussing how, in Outsider Jurisprudence, the consensus is that
"lawmaking reflects dominant ideologies"). As this article will explore, John B. Anderson-
though he does not fit the mold-breaks through these traditional notions and causes us to
reexamine that even a consummate "insider" can champion the outsiders' cause.
2010]
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II. JOHN B. ANDERSON'S BIOGRAPHY
A. Before He Was a Congressman
Anderson, the son of an immigrant father, was born in Rockford, Illi-
nois in 1922.2 With a younger sister in tow, Anderson's father, as a fifteen
year old, left their home country, Sweden.3 Eventually, the entire family was
united in Rockford.4 As Anderson's family tells the story, they took the train
from Chicago and ended in the farthest point west, which at that time was
Rockford, Illinois.5
The town would not have been considered small in 1922.6 With a popu-
lation of 65,651 people, Rockford was comparable to the slightly larger city
2. Transcript of John B. Anderson: An Oral History and Biography, at 29:4-5, 33:21-
23 (Rec'd. Apr. 2009) [hereinafter Anderson Transcript I]; Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress, John Bayard Anderson, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=A000195 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). Anderson's father became a natu-
ralized citizen who faithfully embraced his duties as a citizen and enjoyed his son's interest in
politics. Anderson Transcript 1, supra at 33:21-23.
3. Id. at 2:12-14; Transcript of John B. Anderson: An Oral History and Biography, at 5
(Rec'd June 2009) [hereinafter Anderson Transcript II].
4. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 2:14-16. According to Rockford Historian
Jon Lundin, "[T]he Swedes were a force to be reckoned with as early as the 1870s, when their
population was estimated to be ... 25 percent of the city total." JON W. LUNDIN, ROCKFORD:
AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY 67 (1989). According to the 1930 U.S. Census, Swedish immigra-
tion to Rockford would continue to peak for another fifty years, culminating at forty percent
of the total population of Rockford. See id. By that time, Rockford had acquired the identifi-
cation as a "Swede Town," as "Rockford Swedes occupied the office of both mayor and chief
of police... [and] controlled three national banks." Id.
5. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 2:17-23. Anderson says that his family's
settlement in Rockford was around the turn of the 20th century. Id. at 2:18. Since the town
was the farthest west the trains went from Chicago, "it was a logical place to stop and get off."
Id. at 2:20-23. Indeed, there is documented support for the Anderson family lore. Historian
Jon Lundin further explains, "[T]he truth is that the first immigrants landed in Rockford more
or less by accident, having decided to ride the train westward as far as it would go. When they
boarded the Galena & Chicago Union ... in 1852, the end of the line was [downtown Rock-
ford]." LUNDIN, supra note 4, at 68. However, as early as the mid 1850s, the Chicago and
Northwestern Railroad-constructed by the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad Company-
ran straight through Rockford as far west as Dubuque, Iowa. See id. at 67-68; Ruth Ann
Montgomery, Evansville's Railroads, http://www.evansvillehistory.net/RAILROAD.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010).
6. Rockford's population was 5332 people shy of making the U.S. Census' list of 100
largest Urban Places in America in 1920, falling to the city of South Bend, Indiana. See U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION OF THE 100 LARGEST URBAN PLACES: 1920, tbl. 15, available at
http://www.census.gov/populationlwww/documentationltwpsOO27/tab I 5.txt; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, PoPULAInON: 1920, tbl. 51, available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decenniall
documents/4 I 084484v I ch2.pdf.
[Vol. 34
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of San Diego, California during that time.7 Anderson certainly thought it
seemed quite large, but he admits he was pretty innocent in terms of what the
world had to offer.8 However, his trip to the 1933 Chicago World's Fair at
age eleven elicited a description of a "mad adventure." 9
His life revolved around his family, which he describes as close-knit.'0
Anderson was one of six children, only three of whom survived childhood
diseases.1" He characterizes his parents as "protective." 12 He said his early
7. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION: 1920, supra note 6, at tbl. 51. Anderson recalls
the population to be about 90,000 people. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 1:8-10.
However, the 1920 U.S. Census indicates that Rockford was inhabited by 65,651 people. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION: 1920, supra note 6, at tbl. 51. Perhaps Anderson was referring
to the population of Winnebago County, Illinois, the county seat of Rockford, which had an
indicated population in 1920 of 90,929 people. See id. at tbl. 50. Additionally, the City of
San Diego, California at that time had an indicated population of 74,683 people, making the
two cities comparable. Id. at tl. 51.
8. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 1:13-14. Anderson recalls only ever
making an occasional trip by train out of Rockford as a child. Id. at 1:14-16.
9. Id. at 1:14-18. As the story goes, in 1933 and 1934 the Chicago's World's Fair,
known as "A Century of Progress," was conceived as a 100 year anniversary commemorating
the city of Chicago and as a testament to the industrial and scientific achievements up to that
time. Chicago Historical Society, History Files: Century of Progress 1933-34, http://www.
chicagohs.org/history/century.htmi (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
The fair was opened on May 27, 1933, when the lights were turned on with energy from the
rays of the star Arcturus. The rays were focused on photo-electric cells in a series of astro-
nomical observatories and then transformed into electrical energy which was transmitted to
Chicago. Unlike any [other] fair before it, A Century of Progress... focused on scientific and
technological progress and the manufacturing processes behind them, [rather than on architec-
ture]. The "A Century of Progress Exposition" was a[n] unheralded success and hosted over
48 million visitors in [the] two years it ran. It provided an uplifting glimpse into a future em-
bodied by technology while honoring the achievements of past.
1933-1934 World's Fair, http://www.futurliner.org/fair.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
Thus, it is no wonder that Anderson perceived the experience to be a "mad adventure." An-
derson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 1:17-18.
10. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 1:24.
11. Id. at 1:25-2:3. Before Anderson was born in 1922, three of his siblings had suc-
cumbed to diseases, one of whom was a victim of the 1918 influenza pandemic that swept the
globe killing, by some accounts, 2.5% to 5% of the world's total population. See Anderson
Transcript 11, supra note 3, at 5; virus.stanford.edu, The Influenza Pandemic of 1918,
http://virus.stanford.edu/uda (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). Additionally in the 1920s, many of
the common childhood diseases, such as measles, mumps, and rubella, which today can be
readily inoculated, lacked a vaccine and thus were quite harmful or fatal during the pre-
immunization period. See MINISTRY OF HEALTH OF WELLINGTON, N.Z., IMMUNISATION
HANDBOOK 2006, at 207, 225, 230. It was not until the early 1970s that a triple vaccine for the
mumps, measles, and rubella (MMR) was introduced to U.S. pediatricians. Id. at 230. How-
ever, the more serious viral threat to children, both in the past and presently, continues to be
diphtheria. See id. at 142-43. Diphtheria is acquired almost exclusively in children under the
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life focused on three institutions: the family, the church, and the school. 3
His family life was impacted by what his father did to make a living.
14
Anderson's father owned a grocery store, and Anderson remembers the
extent of his own responsibilities as sacking potatoes, stocking shelves, and
carrying out bags of groceries for ladies.' 5 Financially wiped out during the
Great Depression, 6 his father moved the family to Wisconsin and switched
to owning a dry goods store. 7 After about a year of effort, that venture too
was unsuccessful and Anderson's father moved the family back to Rockford
and went back to owning a grocery store. 18
B. Early Role Models
Notably, Anderson's early role models were teachers and professors. 9
Miss Vincent, one of Anderson's grade school teachers, enabled him to skip
fifth grade because she considered him so intelligent.2' This allowed him to
graduate one year earlier than most other students. 21 In high school, Ander-
son looked up to his debate coach, John V. Berland, "as a kind of a father
12. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 2:4-6; Anderson Transcript I1, supra note 3,
at 5. Anderson proffers that the overly protective nature of his parents was likely a result of
the childhood deaths of three of his siblings. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 2:4-6;
Anderson Transcript II, supra note 3, at 5. He recalls that his father was particularly dis-
traught from the loss of three of his children and, being as devout as he was, would make
regular visits to their gravesites. Anderson Transcript H, supra note 3, at 5.
13. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 2:24-3:3. Anderson perceived these three
institutions to have been the most formative in his upbringing. Id. at 3:4-7.
14. Id. at 3:19-21. As a child, Anderson recalls that he "pretty much grew up behind the
counter in [his] father's store," as it "was the place to which [he] retreated after school and on
weekends." Id.
15. Id. at 3:21-24.
16. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 3:9-12. By 1930, approximately 11.4% of the
eligible male workforce in Rockford, Illinois was laid off or unemployed. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, FIFTEEN CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1930 UNEMPLOYMENT, VOL. 1, SEC. 3,
ILLINOIS, at 306 [hereinafter 1930 CENSUS].
17. Anderson Transcript I1, supra note 3, at 7. While Anderson's father was pursuing
every opportunity simply to make ends meet, Anderson himself admits that he was happy as a
clam moving to the little town of Genoa City, Wisconsin with virtually no concept of the
poverty that permeated through to the rest of his family. Id. During the year away from
Rockford, Anderson quickly made friends and remembers learning how to ride a horse. Id.
He even recollects stealing a cabbage or two from storage bins that lined the railroad tracks
where farmers would leave their intended shipments. Id. Anderson recalls the accompanying
naughty, but nice feeling of bringing home a few cabbages for the family. Id.
18. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 3:9-14.
19. Id. at 14:12-13.
20. Id. at 14:13-20.
21. Id. at 14:20-23.
[Vol. 34
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figure. 22 Anderson even remembers several of the specific debate subjects,
such as nationalizing the railroads and just as the war clouds were collecting
over Europe, whether to form an Anglo-American alliance.2 3 Mr. Berland
also taught government, Anderson's favorite subject. 24 At the University of
Illinois, his debate coach and political science teacher there, Professor A
Houston, served as his mentor.2 5 These two men inspired Anderson to be-
come a public servant, and he feels that the two deserve "a great deal of cre-
dit for steering [him] in that direction. 2 6 He says he learned from them to
see both sides of issues, and that you had "to put yourself into the shoes or
into the mind of the person who was taking the other side.
27
C. Years After High School
Much of Anderson's early life was spent in Illinois.28 When Anderson
graduated from high school,29 he went to the University of Illinois and then
began law school upon completion of his A.B. degree.30 Before he could
finish law school, World War II commenced. 3' He postponed his legal edu-
cation and joined the Army, fighting in four overseas campaigns in Europe.32
22. Id. at 14:24-15:2. These educators obviously had a profound effect on Anderson's
development as he remembers all their names with exceptional ease. See Anderson Transcript
I, supra note 2, at 14:14-15:2.
23. Id. at 15:5-12. Anderson recalls debating these issues in 1939. Id. at 15:5.
24. Id. at 15:13-15. Anderson would go on to major in political science while attending
the University of Illinois. Id. at 15:21-24.
25. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 15:19-21. Regrettably, Professor Al Houston
"lost his life as an artillery officer in World War II." Id. at 15:20-21.
26. Id. at 15:25-16:5.
27. Id. at 16:10-16:17.
28. Id. at4:25-5:2.
29. Anderson graduated from Rockford High School in 1939. Biographical Directory of
the United States Congress, John Bayard Anderson, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/
biodisplay.pl?index=A00195 (last visited Feb. 24, 2010) [hereinafter Biographical Directory,
John Bayard Anderson]. Anderson remembers that his high school had 789 students in his
graduating class, and that there was only one black student enrolled in the entire high school.
Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 32:22-25. As Anderson explained it, while the occur-
rence was not a result of de jure segregation, Rockford High School "was certainly de facto
segregat[ed]." Id. at 33:1-2.
30. Id. at 5:1-3. Anderson attended the University of Illinois located in Urbana, Illinois
and received his A.B. degree in 1942. Biographical Directory, John Bayard Anderson, supra
note 29.
31. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 5:3-4.
32. Id. at 5:3-5. One of the campaigns Anderson remembers most vividly was the Siege
of Bastogne in Belgium as part of the larger Battle of the Bulge. Anderson Transcript II,
supra note 3, at 8. As the story goes, German forces had been marching west into the Allied
territory toward Antwerp, Belgium so that the Germans could halt supply shipments between
20101
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After the war's end, he finished his law degree 33 and practiced in a small firm
in Rockford. 4
Eventually Anderson, dissatisfied with practicing and perhaps a bit
"restless" at that time of his life,35 decided to study more law so that he could
perhaps become a law professor.36 With that goal in mind, he applied to
Harvard's LLM program and was admitted.37 When he completed his LLM,
American and British forces; the small Belgian city of Bastogne was an area where many of
the supply roads to Antwerp came to a junction. COLONEL S.L.A. MARSHALL, BASTOGNE:
THE FIRST EIGHT DAYS 15-18 (1946). Thus, Allied protection of the city was necessary to
prevent the supply line from being compromised and, from the German perspective, securing
the city was essential to reaching and destroying the Allied supply lines. Id. As Anderson
explains his experience,
[I] was driving a command car, a huge cumbersome vehicle that was a gas-guzzler if you ever
saw one ... with a major who was the chief liaison officer between the Third Corp Artillery
Headquarters Battery ... [however,] the only occasion in the ten months that I spent overseas
where I actually saw the ultimate horror of war [was at Bastogne], displayed in the form of
dead soldiers, German soldiers lying on the frozen ground as we would go in and out of the
city where they had been killed by enemy fire-the allied fire.
Anderson Transcript I1, supra note 3, at 8.
33. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 5:6-7. Anderson returned from the European
Theater and finished his legal education at the University of Illinois College of Law in 1946.
Id. at 5:4-7.
34. Id. at 5:8-9. In fact, when he finished law school, Anderson claims he was sought
out by the firm Large, Reno & Champ, now Reno & Zahm. Anderson Transcript II, supra
note 3, at 8. According to Anderson, he had been noticed by the firm while speaking at a
Lion's Club luncheon during the time he was still a student at the University of Illinois. Id.
The senior partner at the time, Guy Reno, had been so impressed that, upon learning Anderson
had returned to Rockford, called him in for an interview. Id.
35. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 17:16-19. Anderson soon "found the practice
rather dull and mundane." Anderson Transcript II, supra note 3, at 9. The principal job he
was given was to read abstracts of title and research transfers of title. Id. at 8. Incessant visits
to the County's Recorder of Deeds office were not the activities Anderson found to be con-
gruent with the skills he perceived he possessed as a lawyer. Id. at 8-9. As it would turn out,
Anderson's flair for public speaking would enable him to convince many juries later on as the
State's Attorney for Winnebago County. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 7:17-19,
18:20-19:2.
36. Id. at 17:16-19. Anderson recalled pondering whether "[he] would find law more
satisfying to teach than to practice." Id.
37. Id. at 5:13-19. While Anderson was attending Harvard, he had Archibald Cox, a
very famous figure in American history, as a law professor. Id. at 5:13-17. Cox is most well
known as the special prosecutor during the Watergate proceedings, who was eventually fired
by Robert Bork at President Richard Nixon's request during an event known as the "Saturday
Night Massacre." U.S. Dep't of Justice: Archibald Cox, Solicitor General, http://www.
justice.gov/osg/aboutosg/a_coxbio.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). Further, Cox had earned
distinction "as one of the leading law educators of the 20th century" during his teaching career
at both Harvard Law School and Boston University School of Law. Id. It was also during
Cox's tenure as a Harvard law professor that he became an advisor and speech writer for then-
Senator John F. Kennedy. Id.
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his only teaching offer came from Missoula, Montana.38 After some re-
search, and after looking at a map, Anderson decided Missoula would be a
lonely place.39 Anderson declined the offer.4n Instead, Anderson reluctantly
chose to stay and open up a law practice in Rockford: Anderson and Hal-
leck.4 ' However, Anderson was still not satisfied with merely practicing
law.42
Because of his dissatisfaction, another phase of Anderson's careers be-
gan. 43 He took the Foreign Service exam, was accepted and went to Wash-
ington D.C. to study at the Foreign Service Institute for three months.44 He
was promptly commissioned as a Foreign Service Officer Class VI and sent
to West Berlin. 5
At this juncture, it is best to take a bit of a side trip because it impacts
his future decisions: how Anderson met his wife, Keke.
In Anderson's words, "that's a very interesting tale. And it was by her
design, I'm sure. 4 6 Keke Machakos, at age eighteen, was working for the
38. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 5:20-22. The University of Montana Law
School is located in Missoula. University of Montana School of Law, http://www.umt.edu/
law (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
39. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 5:22-23.
40. See id. at 5:24-6:2. Anderson quipped, "even though [it was] the home of Mike
Mansfield." Id. at 5:24-25. Mike Mansfield, a Democratic Representative and Senator from
Montana, was the longest serving Senate Majority leader in U.S. History from 1961-1977.
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Michael Joseph Mansfield,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=MOOO 13 (last visited Feb. 24,
2010). Known for his dedication to and promotion of U.S. and Asia relations, President Jim-
my Carter appointed Senator Mansfield to be the United States Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to Japan, where he also became the longest serving in that position from
1977-1988. id.
41. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 6:3-5.
42. See id. at 6:6-7.
43. Seeid. at 6:8-12.
44. Id. The subject-matter of the three-month course Anderson attended at the Foreign
Service Institute was "[H]ow to be a Foreign Service Officer." Id. at 50:12-15.
45. Id. at 6:11-12. Berlin was arguably the prime international center of the Cold War,
which lasted from 1949 to 1990. See ALEXANDRA RICHIE, FAUST'S METROPOLIS: A HISTORY
OF BERLIN, 604, 674 (1998). The city was divided into East and West sections with American,
French and British Sectors occupying the westernmost part of the city, and with the Soviets
occupying the easternmost half of the city. See id. at 628. It is suggested that Berlin's politi-
cal status and geographic position have provided the continuous opportunity for conflict lo-
cated within the city to be capable of starting a world war. See id. at 659-60, 674. Thus,
Anderson's role as an American, and likely also true of any British, French, or even Soviet
soldier, was likely to ensure stability in what was perceived at the time as the world's most
violent and volatile city. See id. at 631-32, 635-36.
46. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 50:11-12.
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State Department in Washington D.C. as a photographer.47 One day she saw
Anderson at the bus stop and somehow found out that he would be visiting
the department in which she worked in order to get his Foreign Service Of-
ficer photo.48 As suspected, Anderson went to have his photo taken, but he
did not really pay much attention to Keke.49 So, according to Anderson, she
later called to inform him that his photo had not turned out well and he
would have to come back for another sitting.5" This time he noticed who was
behind the camera, asked her where she lived, and discovered that they lived
in the same neighborhood. 1 He asked her out to dinner and "she accepted
[his] invitation with great alacrity and the romance blossomed and flowered
from that moment forward. 52
Unfortunately, Anderson was assigned to go to West Berlin soon the-
reafter. 3 Thus, the romance "was reduced to a frantic exchange of overseas
mail and letters. 54 He even admitted in one of his letters that he "was so
desperately lonely that [he] could not survive unless she would come over., 55
However, Keke told him she was "not about to invest her own paycheck in
buying a ticket. ' 56 Anderson quickly wired her the money.
57
The moment she stepped off the plane, he proposed and she accepted.58
According to Anderson, he married Keke three times.59 The first marriage
was by the German Standesampt, the governmental agency where he ob-
tained the license and had to make a declaration of marriage, then by a "fal-
len" Presbyterian minister, who worked in the same office as Anderson, and
finally, with Keke's mother in attendance, in a Greek Orthodox Church in
Munich which was 400 miles away.6 °
47. Id. at50:16-18; 51:3-7.
48. Id. at 51:3-7.
49. Id. at51:15-17.
50. Id. at 51:17-19.
51. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 51:20-23.
52. Id. at 51:23-52:1.
53. Id. at 52:2-4.
54. Id. at 52:9-10.
55. Id. at 52:11-12.
56. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 52:13-14. Keke had replied to Anderson's
plea with, "well, in that case, send the money." Id. at 52:13.
57. Id. at 52:15.
58. Id. at52:16-18.
59. Id. at 52:25-53:2.
60. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 52:24-53:15. As Anderson described his
fellow Foreign Service Officer who married him to Keke, he "was an ordained Presbyterian
minister who had kind of fallen away from the church . .. but he still had his license, so he
could marry us." Id. at 52:20-23.
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The first of their five children, Eleanora, was born in Berlin. 61 Ander-
son completed one tour of duty in the Foreign Service, but then financial
concerns made them decide to return to the United States. 62 He was receiv-
ing $5093 per year, which was not enough to raise a family. 63
The growing Anderson family moved back to Rockford where he once
again began the private practice of law. 64 As luck would have it, shortly after
arrival, the incumbent State's Attorney for Winnebago County, Robert R.
Canfield, decided to run for the state senate leaving an open seat.65 Even
though Anderson had not tried that many criminal cases,66 he, with his wife's
approval, decided to run for the position.67 To his surprise, he beat out five
other candidates, including a former star football player.68
61. Id. at 6:20-21. Eleanora now lives abroad in Holland with her husband, who is also
from Holland. Id. at 6:21-24. Anderson believes that the reason his daughter is now married
to a European might be because she was born abroad. Id.
62. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 6:25-7:6.
63. Id. at 7:1-4. Anderson's assessment that his annual income was too low to sustain a
growing family is quite accurate, as his 1952 income of $5093 would become the poverty line
for parents of five children by 1963. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES:
WEIGHTED AVERAGE POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR FAMILIES OF SPECIFIED SIZE 1959 TO 2006 tbl.
1, available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/histpov/hstpovI.html.
64. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 7:5-6.
65. See 11. Mun. League, Municipal Problems' Commission Meets in Rockford, 37 ILL.
MUN. REV. 149, 149 (July 1958).
66. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 7:9-11.
67. Id. at 54:6-8. Anderson describes his wife, because of her support in his past endea-
vors, as "a wonderful partner in whatever [he] did." Id. at 54:2-3. Not only did she have no
objections to Anderson's involvement in public life, but further, Anderson thinks she tho-
roughly approved of and enjoyed politics as much as he did. Id. at 54:12-15. Anderson fur-
ther observes that, though she had "an independent mind of her own," both he and his wife
were "pretty much of a mind on everything from... gay rights to women's rights ... and all
the other. .. classic issues that sometimes couples may divide on." Id. at 54:19-24.
68. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 7:12-16. Anderson defeated John T. "Jack"
Beynon in the 1956 race for State's Attorney of Winnebago County getting 42,944 votes to
Beynon's 31,017 votes. Illinois State Board of Elections, Winnebago County Election Re-
sults: 1956. Beynon had been the former star quarterback for the University of Illinois foot-
ball team during the mid-1930s. Illinois Names Greatest Signal Callers in School History,
May 30, 2008, http://www.fightingillini.com/sports/m-footbllspec-rel/053008aaa.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2010). Earning All-American selections in 1933 and 1934, Beynon is still
considered among the ten best quarterbacks in history to play for the University of Illinois
football team. ALL AMERICA SELECTIONS 84 (2008), available at http://graphics.fansonly.
comlphotos/schools/il lsports/m-footblauto-pdf/FBHist-AlI-AmericaSelections.pdf. At the
time of the 1956 race, Beynon had been serving as the first assistant prosecutor under State's
Attorney Robert R. Canfield, and because of his post and "his prowess on the football field,"
was considered the favorite. Anderson Transcript 1I, supra note 3, at 9. After the upset, An-
derson would go on to serve a four-year term as the new Winnebago County State's Attorney
from 1956-1960. Biographical Directory, John Bayard Anderson, supra note 29.
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Anderson "enjoyed the give and take of the courtroom,"69 and suspects
that was so because of his debate experience in high school and college.7 °
However, he only served one term as the Winnebago County State's Attor-
ney because, unexpectedly, the longtime United States Congressman from
his district announced his retirement.71
Anderson decided to enter that race.72 Keke encouraged him to do so,
and friends in the community urged him on by forming a committee to pro-
mote his cause.73 His experience of being a county official and having al-
ready been elected to office helped convince voters he was a serious candi-
date.74 Again, in another field of five, he won.75 Thus in 1961, Anderson
began his twenty year career as a Congressman.76
D. Political Legacy in the House of Representatives
"[Y]ou are such a tiny cog in this giant machinery that seems to move
very, very slowly" is how Anderson describes his introduction to the U.S.
69. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 18:11-12. While serving, Anderson was able
to obtain the conviction of a notorious hotel burglar, Jefferson Snow, and recalls being satis-
fied that Snow was "put away long enough to protect the public." Id. at 18:20-19:2. Around
this time, Anderson experienced great anguish over losing a murder case where the female
defendant had stabbed her lover, ending his life rather abruptly. Id. at 19:3-7. However, in
retrospect, he believes the case was decided correctly, and that her conduct, given the victim's
atrocious behavior, was probably self defense, justifying the homicide. Id. at 19:8-18.
70. Id. at 18:13-16. Anderson believes serving as the County's State Attorney returned
him back to his high school debating days, because it placed him in challenging, adversarial
conflict regarding important issues. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 18:13-17.
71. Id. at 7:19-22. Representative Leo E. Allen was Anderson's predecessor in Congress
and served Illinois 13th and 16th Congressional Districts from 1933-1961. Biographical
Directory of the United States Congress, Leo Elwood Allen, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=A000138 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
72. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 24:7-10.
73. Id. at 24:7-20. Anderson recalls apprehension about whether to begin a bid for Con-
gress, as he "had merely been a candidate on a local county basis" and had not spent much
time in other areas of the Congressional District. Id. at 24:12-17.
74. Id. at 24:21-23.
75. Id. at 8:7-9.
76. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 8:7-13. Anderson admits that his life was not
well planned and, in fact, most of the time he "seized" the moments that fortuitously presented
themselves to him. Id. at 20:8-10. Anderson had a good grasp on when to "seize," as he
handily defeated his Democratic opponent, Edwin M. Nelson, for the open seat with just over
sixty percent of the vote. See CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIvES, 87TH CONG.,
STATISTICS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL AND CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS OF NOVEMBER 8TH, 1960 11
(1961), available at http://clerk.house.gov/member-info/electionlnfo/ 960election.pdf. Addi-
tionally, Anderson was sworn in as a Congressman at the same time John F. Kennedy was
inaugurated as President. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 8:9-11.
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Congress. 77 "[T]he seniority system was much more sacrosanct when [he]
entered Congress in that first congressional election than . . it is today. 78
The only way to move up the ranks was for the other Congressmen to die,
retire, or run for a higher office.79 If a Representative was unlucky enough to
be there only for a term or so, they probably could never get anything done
that they specifically wanted. 80 Fortunately, that was not what happened to
Anderson. Voters continuously re-elected him and finally he made it on to
the prestigious House Committee on Rules where he could have "a more
significant role."'"
1. Fair Housing Act
Certain legislation stands out in Anderson's mind as highlights of his
career. He gives as an example the Fair Housing Act of 1968.82 Despite it
being before the mid-point in his career, Anderson was able to be the decid-
77. Id. at 25:5-7.
78. Id. at 25:7-9.
79. Id. at 25:10-14. Anderson noted, in regards to the seniority system, the general ma-
laise of being a freshman congressman as, "you just were expected to wait your turn." Id.
80. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 25:14-17. This statement must be
couched in terms of how Anderson observed the seniority system as "a disabling and discou-
raging factor [to those who served briefly in Congress] in trying to get anything done." Id.
81. Id. at 25:18-21. At the time Anderson joined the House Committee on Rules near the
end of the 1960s, the Committee had become much more cooperative with the majority lea-
dership than it had been under Chairman Howard W. Smith (D-VA), mainly because of the
elevation of Rep. William "Bill" M. Colmer (D-MS) to the chairmanship following Chairman
Smith's electoral defeat in 1966. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Rules, 2010,
http://www.rules.house.gov/l 10/commhistory.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). Chairman
Smith had used the Committee on Rules to further the conservative Democratic agenda irres-
pective of the majority position, rather than as an arm of the majority leadership in scheduling
legislation for the floor. Id.
82. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 25:21-23. The genesis of Fair Housing was
in the Senate when then Senator, Walter "Fritz" Mondale, a Democrat from Minnesota, pro-
posed Senate Resolution 1358 in August, 1967. Jane Eberhart Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A
Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L.J. 149, 149 (1969). According to Ms.
Dubofsky, the legislative assistant to Senator Mondale at the time, Martin Luther King's as-
sassination propelled the adoption of Mondale's legislation by the House Committee on Rules
which incorporated it as H.R. 1100, an amendment to H.R. 2516, better known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. Id. at 160. Prior to King's assassination and following the passage of
Mondale's legislation, the Senate had been quite concerned that the amendment would never
be reported out of the House Committee on Rules. Id. As is momentarily discussed in the
article, the Senate would soon find they had a friend in Representative John B. Anderson. See
Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 26:11-13.
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ing factor in the passage of the Act.83 While the Fair Housing bill was under
review in the Committee on Rules, there were other members on the Com-
mittee who were opposed, both of them conservative Democrats: Chairman
Bill Colmer, an "archconservative" from Mississippi, and Bernie Sisk, "a
wobbly Democrat from California, who was afraid of offending his conserva-
,,84tive... constituents.
Their defection, caused because the bill made it illegal to discriminate
against persons on account of race when a member of a minority class
wanted to buy or rent a house, enabled him to cast a deciding vote for the
Fair Housing Act in the Committee on Rules.85 Minutes before the final vote
was to be taken in the Committee, a motion was made to send the legislation
back to a House-Senate Conference.86 Fearing that the legislation would get
too watered down if sent back to a conference committee, Anderson crossed
party lines to join the Democrats in an eight to seven vote, thereby prevent-
ing this fate from occurring. 87 Thanks to Anderson's heroics, a motion to
report the bill was soon made, where it passed moments later by a vote of
nine to six, commanding the legislation to reach the full membership of the
House.88
83. Id. at 25:23-24. Anderson, though only a Congressman for seven years in 1968,
perceives his key role in the ultimate passage of the Fair Housing Act to be the highlight of his
congressional career. Id. at 25:21-23.
84. Id. at 25:25-26:4 (emphasis added). Chairman Bill Colmer was actually praised in
House floor speeches by other members for his efforts to "hold up" the Fair Housing legisla-
tion in the House Committee on Rules. 114 CONG. REC. 9528 (1968). Though Representative
Bernie Sisk ultimately voted to report the bill out of the Committee on Rules, he had initially
voted unfavorably to delay consideration of the legislation when it first appeared on the
Committee docket a month earlier. 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
85. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 25:25-26:10.
86. Marjorie Hunter, Rules Panel Clears Rights Bill for Vote in the House Today, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1968 at 1.
87. See 24CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
88. Hunter, supra note 86. The legislation containing the fair housing provisions, H.R.
1100, was reported out of the Committee on Rules with the recommendation that the full
House of Representatives do so pass. H.R. REP. No. 90-1289 (1968). "Voting to report the
resolution were eight Democrats: Madden (Ind.), Boiling (Mo.), O'Neill (Mass.), Sisk (Cal.),
Young (Tex.), Pepper (Fla.), Matsunaga (Haw.), Anderson (Tenn.)," and lone Republican:
Anderson (I1.). 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968). Those voting against reporting the
resolution were Democrat and Committee Chairman William M. Colmer (Miss.), Democrat
Delaney (N.Y.), "and four Republicans: Smith (Cal.), Martin (Neb.); Quillen (Tenn.), and
Latta (Ohio)." Id. The Fair Housing provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 were called
up to the floor the very next day and passed by the House of Representatives by a vote of 250
to 172. 114 CONG. REC. 9620-21 (1968) (statement of Rep. Ford).
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As Anderson observed, it is "not often that a single vote makes a differ-
ence. ' 89 But on the Fair Housing bill, his vote did count and it got him na-
tional press coverage. 90 Naturally, this did not sit well with some in his par-
ty. Because of his vote in the Committee on Rules, the Republican conserva-
tive leadership would not recognize Anderson on the floor of the House so
that he could participate in the debate.9' His Democratic friends saw what
was happening and allowed him "five minutes to make the ... best speech
that [he has] ever made. 92
In that speech he told a "true" story.93 A young African-American man
had come to Anderson while he was practicing in Rockford.94 The man told
him that he had been offered a job, but when he looked at housing and the
school system he wanted to be in, there was "always a roadblock." 95 The
man told Anderson that he wanted to live in the same community that Ander-
son lived in, but was prevented from doing so.9 6
In order for the Fair Housing legislation to be voted on by the entire
Congress, it had to be voted out of the Committee on Rules. 97 After Ander-
son cast his ballot, the very next day it was voted on and passed.98 Anderson
got a personal phone call from President Lyndon B. Johnson who wanted to
89. Anderson, Transcript I, supra note 2, at 27:1-2.
90. Id. at 27:1-4. Indeed, Anderson's tie-breaking vote made the front page of the New
York Times the following morning, labeling him the "hero" of a "landmark civil rights bill."
Hunter, supra note 86.
91. Id. at27:6-10.
92. Id. at 27:10-14. Anderson remembers "sitting until midnight the night before at [his]
desk ... thinking about what [he] would say." Id. at 27:20-22. In his usual self-depreciating
manner he opined, "I'm not suggesting that it swung that many votes, but it made me feel
good." Id. at 27:22-23.
93. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 28:24.
94. Id. at 29:3-4.
95. Id. at 29:3-9. The transcript of Anderson's floor speech was, in pertinent part, as
follows:
I am seeking to afford an advantage to and to benefit the young engineer who finally found a
position commensurate with his educational abilities and then sadly confessed to me, "I am
going to have to leave the community because I cannot find a place suitable for my family in
which to live."
114 CONG. REC. 9551 (1968) (Statement of Rep. John B. Anderson); see also 114 CONG. REC.
9557-58 (Statement of Rep. John B. Anderson) (elaborating on statement from previous cite).
96. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 29:9-12. Anderson admits that he might have
"embellished somewhat ... for dramatic effect," but he believed it had a ring of truth and
sincerity. Id. at 29:13-21. Anderson further recalls that his constituents were somewhat
critical of the proposition of "fair housing," yet he successfully convinced them to be fair
minded. Id. at 29:24-30:4.
97. Id. at26:14-16.
98. Id. at 26:16-23.
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come down and shake Anderson's hand.99 He did so and the President per-
sonally thanked Anderson for his work and for breaking the "logjam.' °
Anderson says it was one of the most useful pieces of legislation he
helped pass while in Congress.'0 ' He also remembers that Representative
John Conyers, Jr. "came striding over from the Democratic side of the aisle
and shook hands and embraced [him] and thanked [Anderson] for the help
that [he] had given."'' 0 2 Anderson considers Conyers as "emblematic" of the
"restlessness of minorities in this country, at how slow we have been to
gradually progress toward the goal of equal rights, of true equality, regard-
less of race and color and background and national origin."'0 3 According to
Anderson, Conyers has fought the "good fight" for so long that he has
reached a position of power within Congress; he is now the Chairman of the
House Committee on the Judiciary.' °4 Anderson observes that Conyers sym-
bolizes somebody who just does not give up "despite the odds."'0 5 Conyers,
according to Anderson, represents the "hope of the future."'" It is also very
possible that certain Congressmen knew that Anderson felt obligated to vote
how he did because he felt that the "country was way behind on the issue of
99. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 26:17-19. President Lyndon B. Johnson was
a fervent supporter of civil rights for African Americans both as President and as a United
States Senator. See The White House, Biography of Lyndon B. Johnson, http://www.white
house.gov/about/presidents/LyndonBJohnson (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). Like Anderson,
Johnson himself, while in Congress, had been instrumental in the creation and passage of the
1957 Civil Rights Act. See RANDALL B. WOODS, LBJ: ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN AMBITION
330 (2006). Later as President, Johnson would continue to tackle prejudice where it lay
through the heavily supported passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act of
1965, and of course, the Fair Housing Act of 1968. See id. at 478, 586, 840. While President
Johnson did great things for the Democratic Party by engineering these anti-discriminatory
bills, he became instantly unpopular in the South and in his home state of Texas. See id. at
330. Much like President Johnson, Anderson's role in the forward-thinking Fair Housing
provisions of the 1968 Act made him initially unpopular among his constituents. Anderson
Transcript I, supra note 2, at 29:24-30:4. Regardless, both of these great statesmen have
come to be praised for their vision amidst the political retrenchment.
100. Id. at 26:19-20.
101. ld. at 30:16-18.
102. Id. at 27:24-28:3. Evidently, Rep. Conyers Jr. continues to remember Anderson
fondly because if Anderson arrives at an event that Conyers Jr. attends, Anderson is asked to
speak. See id. at 28:4-10.
103. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 171:15-20.
104. Id. at 171:20-23. Rep. Conyers, serving the 14th District of Michigan, has been
serving in Congress since 1965, having just been reelected to his 22nd term in Congress. U.S.
Congressman John Conyers, Jr., About: Biography, http://conyers.house.gov/index.cfm?
FuseAction=About.Biography (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). He has served as Chairman on the
House Committee for the Judiciary for the 110th and I I Ith Congresses. See id.
105. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 171:24-172:1.
106. Id. at 172:6-7.
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civil rights and human rights."' 7 In his eyes, the country was "not living up
to [its] Democratic heritage . . . with respect to housing and discrimination
[in] employment" with regard to minorities. 8
Anderson had also established himself on a "solid foundation" of prin-
ciples on which he intended to stand with regard to his constituents. '° They
were already aware of his stance on civil rights. It° However, Anderson knew
that landlords, property owners, and the real estate business in his constitu-
ency who refused to rent, sell, or buy from minorities were not persuaded by
his principles."' Thus, he was not surprised when a few voters made it clear
they did not like which side he supported."
12
2. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Anderson confesses that the worst mistake he made while in Congress
was to vote in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.'13 This 1964 resolution
was introduced when President Johnson requested that troops be sent into
Southeast Asia (Vietnam) over an incident in which U.S. naval forces were
attacked by the Vietnamese Navy without provocation. 14 Actually, Johnson
had already dispatched troops and was merely asking Congress to approve of
his actions."l 5 They did so, and in effect, wrote Johnson a blank check allow-
ing him to have a war without actually declaring one. 16 Anderson, along
107. Id. at 104:23-105:1.
108. Id. at 105:1-4.
109. See id. at 105:5-7. Anderson posits this approach as advice to the aspiring politician.
See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 103:21-22, 105:5-8. As Anderson puts it, the
"solid foundation" approach means that a public servant ought to make it "crystal clear...
that there are certain irreducible principles on which" he stands, such that there are certain
programs that one can support and others that one cannot. Id. at 104:6-10.
110. See id. at 104:23-105:4.
111. Id. at 105:6-13. Anderson further states, however, that having a "solid foundation"
allows an elected official to "more easily deal with the problems that arise when [one must]
cast a controversial vote." Id. at 105:6-9.
112. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 103:8-15.
113. Id. at 45:8-11, 15-16. On August 7, 1964, the 88th Congress passed H.R.J. Res.
1145, known as the Southeast Asia Resolution but better known as the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
tion. 110 CONG. REC. 18555 (1964); Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat.
384 (1964). Later in his Presidential campaign of 1980, Anderson made a public apology for
voting for the Resolution. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 44:16-17.
114. VIETNAM AND AMERICA: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY 248 (Marvin E. Gettleman et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1995).
115. Gulf of Tonkin Measure Voted in Haste and Confusion in 1964, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
1970, at 3.
116. Id.; VIETNAM AND AMERICA: A DOCUMENTED HISTORY, supra note 114, at 248. The
Gulf of Tonkin resolution specifically authorized the "President, as Commander in Chief, to
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with all his other colleagues in the House, unanimously voted in favor of the
resolution." 7 Later, Anderson, in his own eyes, redeemed himself by voting
to cut off funds for the war.118 At this time in his career, he was among the
Republican leadership with Gerald R. "Jerry" Ford who was the House mi-
nority leader." 9 Ford went to Anderson and said, "John, you're a member of
the leadership and I've just gotten through rawhiding these freshman Repub-
licans to vote down this resolution to cut off money for Vietnam and then
you, [a] member of the leadership, vote for it.' 120 Anderson responded that
he was sorry, but he had been mistaken for a long time about being at war in
Vietnam, and he was not going to change his mind.'
21
take all measures necessary to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States
and to prevent further aggression." 78 Stat. at 384. Thus, it is believed by some that the Gulf
of Tonkin Resolution is "the closest approximation to a [Congressional] Declaration of War..
• during all the years of U.S. combat in Vietnam." VIETNAM AND AMERICA: A DOCUMENTED
HISTORY, supra note 114, at 248.
117. See 110 CONG. REC. 18555 (1964). The resolution passed the House by a vote of
416-to-0 and then the Senate 88-to-2 with the only negative votes cast by Senators Ernest
Gruening of Alaska and Wayne Morse of Oregon. Id.; VIETNAM AND AMERICA: A
DOCUMENTED HISTORY, supra note 114, at 248.
118. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 45:16-17. On July 9, 1970, the House of
Representatives voted on the Cooper-Church Amendment, defeating the legislation by a vote
of 153-to-237, which would have effectively ended U.S. military operations in Vietnam by
requiring Congressional authorization for any such action. See 116 CONG. REC. 23525 (1970).
As Anderson reflected, he deeply regretted his lack of foresight in recognizing that such a
resolution might accelerate the war, which it did. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at
45:10-16. Thus, when the Cooper-Church Amendment to cut funding for the Vietnam War
was introduced, though it was not adopted, Anderson voted in the affirmative. Id. at 45:16-
17; 116 CONG. REC. 23525.
119. See Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Gerald R. Ford, Jr.,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000260 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
120. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 45:22-46:1. This is as Anderson remembers
the conversation, yet his characterization of Ford appears consistent with popular opinion at
the time. See id. at 45:17-21. As Time magazine published the week following the House's
rejection of Cooper-Church,
Two weeks ago, the Senate administered a mild rebuke to President Nixon when it passed
the Cooper-Church Amendment cutting off funds for U.S. operations in Cambodia. The leng-
thy Senate debate embarrassed the Administration, and when the matter came before the
House last week Republican Minority Leader Gerald Ford was determined that the embar-
rassment would not be repeated.
Neil MacNeil, How Ford Put the Lid on Cooper-Church, TIME, July 20, 1970, available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877067,00.html.
121. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 46:2-4. Anderson recalls that the House
minority leadership was very strong at that time, that they had a club over the heads of those
in the minority and if each member went their own way the leadership would shred them
completely. Id. at 46:10-17. Thus, there is "a lot of in-house pressure to go along" if you
want to survive, and this is so particularly if a Representative is in the minority. Id. at 46:18-
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Anderson says one of the best experiences he had while in the House
was befriending Morris K. Udall, Representative from Arizona. 12 2  They
were best friends both on and off the floor. 123 Anderson credits Udall for
bringing him "quite a ways down the road toward a more progressive view of
the role of government than [he] had cherished up until [his] linking up with
[Udall] on campaign finance [reform] and on the natural resources bills and
[the] Alaska National Interest Lands bill."' 24 In Anderson's words, this later
22. Of course, Anderson was never in the House when the Republicans had control of Con-
gress. Id. at 46:22-24.
122. See id. at 49:11-12. Anderson honored his friend Rep. Morris K. Udall by having a
fundraiser for his son, now Sen. Mark Udall (D-CO), when Mark first ran for a congressional
seat in Colorado during his 1998 campaign. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at
49:14-17. Anderson felt he was paying back a debt to Morris K. Udall, who inspired him. Id.
at 49:17-18.
123. Id. at 49:20-22.
124. Id. at 22:15-20, 49:22-50:2. Though Anderson and Udall had partnered on many
natural resources bills, arguably the most influential partnership was in 1979 on House Reso-
lution 39, better known as the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, in what
would be Anderson's final congressional term. See Alaska National Interest Lands Conserva-
tion Act of 1979: Hearing on H.R. 39 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
96th Cong. (1979); 125 CONG. REc. 8107 (1979) (Mr. Udall and Mr. Anderson introduced
H.R. 3636 "to provide for the designation and conservation of... public lands in the State of
Alaska."). According to its legislative text, it was a bill "[t]o provide for the designation and
conservation of certain public lands in the State of Alaska, including the designation of units
of the National Park, National Wildlife Refuge, National Forest, National Wild and Scenic
Rivers, and National Wilderness Preservation Systems, and for other purposes." Alaska Na-
tional Interest Lands Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2371, 2371 (1980).
Though Alaska preservation legislation had been repeatedly introduced since 1973 with other
bill sponsors, it was heavily opposed by the Alaskan congressional delegation, particularly
Alaska Senator Mike Gravel. See 126 CONG. REc. 21873-76 (1980); see H.R. 1887, 93rd
Cong. (1973); see H.R. 1888, 93rd Cong. (1973); see H.R. 1893, 93rd Cong. (1973). Despite
the odds, the Anderson-Udall partnership on conservation was impervious to the opposition's
attacks and the two successfully pushed the legislation through the House on May 16, 1979
with an overwhelming majority vote of 360-65. 125 CONG. REc. 11459 (1979). The legisla-
tion would then sail through the Senate by a vote of 78-14 on August 19, 1980 and then was
signed into law by President Carter on December 2, 1980. 126 CONG. REC. 21891; see Alaska
National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 94 Stat. 2371.
Anderson is such a strong supporter of public campaign financing reforms because of
his beliefs regarding proportional representation. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at
100:4-6. Anderson supports providing better direct representation by having a public finance
program that would financially support three or more political parties. See id. at 100:11-12.
Anderson offers the rationale that, "in the spirit of trying to broaden the electoral base and
encourage people to believe that it's not simply big money and big money donors that are
going to ... control . . .[a] [c]ampaign, you've got to have that public financing." Id. at
100:7-12. His experience of running for president as a third-party candidate in 1980 was that
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piece of legislation "took a lot of land away from Sarah Palin's developers..
and put them in national parks and forest preserves in protected status
where they couldn't be developed."' 25
E. Thoughts on Religion
No doubt, some of Anderson's ideas came from his up-bringing. His
father was very "prominent" in the Swedish Free Church, as it was known at
the time Anderson was growing up.'26 His father was the chairman and a
deacon of the church.'27 As John noted, "the salvation was free, but you had
to pay a little when they passed the collection plate to pay for the piping of
the water of salvation."'' 2 8 Along with other members, the children ritualisti-
cally went to Sunday school and then to morning services, which were con-
ducted in Swedish.129 Somewhere along the line, the services became Angli-
cized, and the church became the First Evangelical Free Church of Rock-
ford. 130
As Anderson remembers the religious messages, the basic belief was in
salvation, which could only be achieved through a person's faith in Christ."'
"[T]o achieve that required a public confession [of faith], and... [to live] by
a very strict code," which included not attending movies.132 However, the
people would not contribute to his campaign because they thought it was a lost cause, hence
the need for public campaign financing. See id. at 100:1-12. Unfortunately for Anderson, he
predicts, that "in view of the success that Barack Obama had in raising money in" the most
recent presidential election, that the country is going in the opposite direction of public cam-
paign financing. Id. at 100:12-18.
125. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 22:21-24. Anderson rather comically notes
that he never campaigned in Alaska in 1980 because he knew he "would be hung in effigy if
[he] appeared on the scene," given his co-sponsorship of the Alaska National Interest Lands
legislation which had been vehemently opposed by Alaskan residents. Id. at 22:25-23:4.
126. Id. at 11:11-12, 17-18.
127. Id. at 11:12-13.
128. Id. at 11:19-21.
129. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 11:13-16. Anderson attributes this to the fact
that his "church was a Swedish denomination." Id. at 11:17.
130. See id. at 11:22-24. Anderson's childhood church became Anglicized through a
gradual process beginning in the mid-1920s. A Brief History of First Evangelical Free
Church, http://www.firstfreerockford.org/history.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). Prior to the
Anglicization, not only were all services conducted in Swedish, but also all official meetings
and meeting minutes were recorded in Swedish. Id.
131. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 11:25-12:1.
132. Id. at 12:1-7. As Anderson recalls, movies were considered "worldly pleasures,"
which were pleasures his admittedly "fundamentalist" church expected its followers to eschew
through strict rules of conduct. Id. at 12:5-7, 13-18. Thus, he remembers being "encouraged
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code was not so strict as to prohibit them from listening to the radio.'33 An-
derson remembers the radio series of "Little Orphan Annie."
'' 34
At the church services, however, the minister focused on words in the
Bible, selecting several verses each week and expounding on them. 35 He
did not incorporate any ideas from the Social Gospel movement and thus
never preached a so-called social gospel. 36 It was thought doing so would
lead the congregation to focus on worldly matters and, consequently, not
focus on what the Bible said.1 37 But, as Anderson matured, he came to be-
lieve that the teaching "lodged in [his] soul somehow differently."', 38 He
believes now that he has always interpreted what was said from the pulpit
differently from what the minister intended.139 Anderson does not believe
that his religious upbringing gave him the ideas that human beings should be
treated equally. 14° It is Anderson's belief that he came to those ideas "a little
bit apart and aside from [his] religious convictions."1 4 1
to find [alternative] ways of amusing [himself] other than attending the theater." Id. at 12:18-
20.
133. See id. at 13:1-5.
134. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 13:1-5. The radio program, "Little Orphan
Annie," was based on a comic strip by Harold Gray portraying "Annie, her dog Sandy and her
pal Joe Corntassel [who were] often ... battling gangsters, pirates and smugglers, receiving
occasional assistance from business magnate Oliver 'Daddy' Warbucks and his sidekick Pun-
jab." Radio Hall of Fame, Little Orphan Annie, http://www.radiohof.org/adventuredrama/
littleannie.htm] (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). According to the Radio Hall of Fame, Little Or-
phan Annie debuted on Chicago's WGN in 1930 and was quickly nationally syndicated, airing
until 1942. Id.
135. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 32:1-4.
136. See id. at 32:4-8. Thriving toward the end of the 19th and early 20th centuries, the
Social Gospel movement was a new theological outlook that encouraged Christians to fuse
existing Christian principles with the social problems of industrialization such that they may
be avoided. See WALTER RAUSCHENBUSCH, A THEOLOGY FOR THE SOCIAL GOSPEL 1-2 (The
Macmilian Co. 1922) (1917). This liberal theological movement challenged existing indivi-
dualistic theology by showing that social problems like poverty, hunger, and war were the
result of man's collective sins, which could be avoided if Christians began to view their salva-
tion in terms of the collective rather than individualistic. See id. at 5. In the words of Rau-
schenbusch, one of the early founders of the movement, "The social gospel is the old message
of salvation, but enlarged and intensified.... to bring men under repentance for their collec-
tive sins and to create a more sensitive and more modem conscience." Id. at 5. Thus, the so-
called social gospel encourages church goers to become impassioned by worldly issues and
apply their faith to halt the progress of modern social problems. See id. at 4-5.
137. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 32:6-12.
138. Id. at32:19-20.
139. Id. at33:3-6.
140. Id. at 33:6-10.
141. Id. at 33:15-17.
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In addition to his own personal experiences, Anderson edited a book
about the impact of religion in the political arena. 142 In this book, Anderson
personally states that religious values do make a difference on how a politi-
cian "mold[s] and shape[s] the institutions of [our] democracy." 143 His ex-
amination of American history reveals that the founding fathers believed in
separation of the church from the state and individualism. 144 Moreover, he
explores the impact of the Social Gospel movement which led to an unfortu-
nate division into two camps both religiously and politically. 145 According to
Anderson, Americans tend to be either conservative or liberal, although he
doubts that we have an accurate picture of what those words truly mean po-
litically or religiously.
146
Anderson identifies himself as between the two religious camps, both
liberal and conservative, and hence, as he analyzes it, a spiritual moderate.
47
Further, he says his outlook on religion impacts his outlook on politics. 48
While some of what he claims may seem very liberal, he exposes what he
notes as a liberal trap.149 For instance, he believes that people have a "basic
human right to decent housing and access to food and jobs."'' 50 Further, as he
puts it, "we may not be able to legislate love between different colored child-
ren of God-but certainly civil rights ought not to be denied any man be-
cause of his race."' 5' Naturally, those ideas are associated with a political
liberal. However, as Anderson notes, what the liberals fail to understand is
that "no matter how well-intentioned or how sweeping, [the laws and institu-
tions we create] can never make human society any better collectively than it
is individually."'152 Anderson's statement exemplifies his belief that humans
are fallible, and often times act sinfully.
Anderson illustrates this by considering the environment and what the
Bible says about it. 153 It is true, he notes, that the Bible tells us that God
142. See generally John B. Anderson, Forward to CONGRESS AND CONSCIENCE (John B.
Anderson, ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1970).
143. Id. at 5-6.
144. See John B. Anderson, American Protestantism and Political Ideology, in CONGRESS
AND CONSCIENCE (John B. Anderson, ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1970) [hereinafter Anderson,
American Protestantism and Political Ideology].
145. Id. at 166-67.
146. See id. at 176-78; see also RAUSCHENBUSCH, supra note 136, at 5.
147. Anderson, American Protestantism and Political Ideology, supra note 144, at 179.
148. See id. at 177.
149. See id. at 179.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Anderson, American Protestantism and Political Ideology, supra note 144, at 179.
153. Id. at 180.
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created the earth for man, and to go out and "be fruitful and multiply."'
5 4
However, as Anderson points out, the Bible also says that the earth, as
created, was "good."'155 Thus, we have no right to despoil it, but rather an
obligation to return it to its rightful state: a garden.' 56 According to Ander-
son, what is desperately needed are "Christians who will begin to consider
seriously each political issue on its merits in light of their religious convic-
tions. We must stop using religion as an implicit justification for our politi-
cal biases, and learn instead to give our faith new expression in our poli-
tics."
, 157
When asked how his religion specifically influenced his legislative ef-
forts, Anderson replied,
to put it somewhat simplistically, [religion] encourages the belief
that we are all one, we are all God's children. And I can't con-
ceive that the savior whom I worship would have turned someone
away from his door or refused to minister to the needs of someone
because of race or because of color.
158
F. 1980 Presidential Election: The Brass Ring
The most rewarding part of his career from his own perspective was the
presidential campaign of 1980."59 The high point of his life was being able to
speak to people across America.' 6 He made the decision to run because he
found Congress to be too frustrating in that it took so long to get anything
accomplished. 6 ' He made this decision despite the fact that he would have
likely been re-elected to the House of Representatives. 16 He knew from the
beginning that he had one strike against him; his only major experience was
in the United States House of Representatives. 63 He started in a field of nine
154. Id. at 180 (quoting Genesis 1:28 (King James)).
155. Id.
156. Anderson, American Protestantism and Political Ideology, supra note 144, at 180-
81.
157. Id. at 182.
158. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 31:7-21.
159. Id. at 38:16-19. Anderson adds however, "I'm not saying that [the presidential cam-
paign of 1980] rewarded mankind or even my fellow countrymen," but it was free of the con-
servative restrictions placed upon him as a congressman, and he thus enjoyed the experience.
Id. at 38:17-21.
160. Id. at 39:7-9.
161. Id. at22:11-14.
162. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 23:15-22.
163. Id. at 23:19-22.
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Republicans, George H.W. Bush and Howard Baker among them.' 6  Of
course, the chief candidate was Ronald Reagan) 65  Anderson ran in nine
primaries and left the Republican Party after the primary in Illinois.166 He
did well early on in the East Coast primaries, coming within 800 votes of
beating Reagan in Vermont.167 On the same day in Massachusetts, he beat
164. Id. at 8:13-25. The 1980 Presidential Republican Primary "field of nine" candidates
included: Governor Ronald W. Reagan (R-CA), former CIA Director and former Representa-
tive George H.W. Bush (R-TX), Senator Howard Baker (R-TN), Representative John B. An-
derson (R-IL), Former Secretary of the Treasury and former Governor John B. Connally (R-
TX), Representative Philip Crane (R-IL), Senator Bob Dole (R-KS), former Minnesota Gov-
ernor Harold Stassen (R-PA), and former Special Ambassador to Paraguay Benjamin Fernan-
dez (R-CA). Our Campaigns, U.S. President-Republican Primaries Race, Feb. 17, 1980,
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RacelD=51805 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010)
[hereinafter Our Campaigns, Republican Primaries]. Senator Howard Baker, Jr. was then the
minority leader in the Senate. Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, Howard
Baker Jr., http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=B000063 (last visited Feb.
26, 2010). According to Anderson, George H.W. Bush "was trying to resurrect his political
career by running for president." Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 8:19-23.
165. Id. at 9:2-3. Anderson recalls that while the candidates were campaigning in his
home state of Illinois, "Reagan claimed he was born above his father's grocery store in White-
side County, Illinois," which was located within Anderson's congressional district. Id. at
21:6-9. According to a PBS Documentary, "[a]fter the [Reagan] family settled in Dixon,
Illinois, Reagan spent his summers working as a lifeguard on the Rock River and was credited
with saving seventy-seven people from drowning." The American Experience, Ronald Rea-
gan: Program Description, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reagan/filmmore/descfiption.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010). However, Anderson remembers thinking that Reagan "exagge-
rated as to how many people he'd actually pulled out" of the local Rock River and saved their
lives. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 21:10-13. Needless to say, Anderson believed
that Reagan certainly played "on his kinship with the state, even though he'd gone to Holly-
wood and become an actor." Id. at 21:13-15.
166. Id. at 59:24-60:1. Although Anderson claims to have abandoned the quest for presi-
dent after the March 18th primary in Illinois, he continued to perform modestly in the follow-
ing three Republican primaries of Connecticut, Kansas, and Wisconsin until he left the Repub-
lican Party on April 24, 1980. Id. at 59:25-60:1, 21:24-22:2; Our Campaigns, Republican
Primaries, supra note 164. Once Anderson parted ways with the GOP, he picked little-known
Patrick Lucey, a former Democratic governor of Wisconsin, as his vice-presidential running
mate. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 74:6-11. However, among Anderson's short
list had been the renowned and cherished national news anchor, Walter Cronkite. Aaron
Barnhart, News Legend Walter Cronkite, 92, Dies, KANSAS CITY STAR, July 18, 2009, at Al.
More striking are Cronkite's quoted remarks during Anderson's brief consideration of him as
a running mate, implying his willingness to accept if Anderson had offered: "I wouldn't turn
[the offer] down." Id. Given the inferably vast disparity in public notoriety between the two
men, it seems more than probable that an Anderson-Cronkite campaign would have been
better funded and would have received a substantially greater percentage of the national popu-
lar vote. See id.
167. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 20:14-16. Indeed, Reagan won the primary
by just one percentage point or by about 690 votes over Anderson. Our Campaigns, U.S.
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Reagan and came within 1100 votes of beating George H.W. Bush, who won
that state.'68
Since it was obvious to Anderson that the GOP was going to nominate
Reagan, he decided to jump ship and form a third party called the National
Unity Party. 169 As far as Anderson was concerned, Reagan was far too con-
servative, and he was making the party that way too.' According to some,
the National Unity Party platform was considered to have the "best written
platform of any of the candidates."'' However, the first major hurdle An-
President-1980 Vermont Republican Primary Race, Mar. 4, 1980, http://www.ourcampaigns.
com/RaceDetail.html?RacelD=36160 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
168. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 20:16-18. Anderson came within one-third of
a percentage point of defeating George H.W. Bush and winning the Massachusetts primary.
Our Campaigns, U.S. President-I 980 Massachusetts Republican Primary Race, Mar. 4, 1980,
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RacelD=36158 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
Although the elder Bush now claims Texas as his home state, according to Anderson, at the
time Bush claimed Massachusetts his home state, likely lofting him to victory. Anderson
Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 20:18-21.
169. Id. at 42:5-14. Anderson reflected that one criticism of the new political party was
that it sounded like some kind of religion. Id. at 42:14-16. As Anderson explained however,
the philosophy behind the National Unity Party "was the idea that people ought to ... forget
about party lines for this particular election and get together and unite for the purpose of elect-
ing us." Id. at 42:16-19. One of the first issues Anderson encountered on the campaign trail,
prior to forming the National Unity Party, was his affirmative vote on The Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution. Id. at 44:13-17. During the first Republican Party presidential debate in Des
Moines, Iowa on January 6, 1980, Mary McGrory, a distinguished columnist from the Wash-
ington Post, asked Anderson what the worst mistake was that he made while in Congress.
Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 44:17-21, 45:6-9; see also Des Moines Register,
Caucus History: The Register's Presidential Debates, http://www.desmoinesregister.com/
article/99999999/NEWSo9/7 1119049 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). Anderson, true to his na-
ture, owned up to the "yes" vote on the Resolution and, unlike many other politicians, imme-
diately apologized. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 44:16-17, 45:10-16.
170. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 60:10-15. In Anderson's eyes, the reason that
the GOP was so conservative was that "their main support came from those bastions of con-
servatism in the business community, [like] the U.S. Chamber of Commerce." Id. at 47:16-
18. Those types of business organizations wanted government to be totally absent from the
private business sector, as though the "government was simply out to get them." Id. at 47:19-
20. They believed that the government, by raising taxes, was stealing hard-earned money
from their pockets. Id. at 47:20-23. However, to be fair, Anderson also noted that the Demo-
crats suffered from a disturbing degree of corruption in the form of big city bosses, such as the
Daley machine in Chicago. Id. at 48:14-17.
171. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 37:16-18. This observation was one held by
David Broder, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist for the Washington Post. Biography of
David S. Broder, WASH POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/opinions/biographies/
david-s-broder.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). Broder has worked for the Washington Post
since 1966, and his twice-weekly column on American politics is globally syndicated. Id. In
addition to Anderson's platform being so highly thought of in the media, he credits his wife
for being an excellent campaigner. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 54:9-10. "She
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derson had to face was how to get on the election ballots in all fifty states. 172
"[It] was a matter of really... grave concern," Anderson recalled. 173 To get
on the ballots meant getting people to sign petitions. 74 Anderson, true to
form, took on part of that project himself as he remembers standing "in the
hot, broiling sun out in barren spots in Oklahoma," and asking people to sign
the petitions.75 In the course of campaigning, he ran into some difficulties in
Ohio and finally had to sue the State to get on the ballot.'76 Ohio claimed
that the deadline had passed, but the United States Supreme Court, with Jus-
tice John Paul Stevens writing for the five-to-four majority, held that Ohio
had to let Anderson on the ballot. 77 The only state Anderson remembers not
going to was Alaska.1
78
could out Hillary [Clinton] as far as ... going out and meeting folks and speaking." Id. at
54:11-12; see also id. at 54:19-24 (Anderson elaborating on his wife's role in his political
activities).
172. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 60:22-61:1.
173. Id. at61:l-2.
174. Id. at61:3-8.
175. Id. As Anderson sums up the petitioning process, "going around with people with
petitions, trying to get them to sign it. What a chore it was." Id. at 61:7-8.
176. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 61:13-16. This litigation involved the Ander-
son campaign challenging the constitutionality of an Ohio statute which set an early filing
deadline only for Independent Party candidates of seventy-five days in advance of the Ohio's
June primary election, which in 1980, was March 20. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
782 (1983). Anderson, having become an Independent candidate on April 24, after the dead-
line, was thus denied ballot access in November by the Ohio Secretary of State because he had
not filed his statement of candidacy as an Independent prior to the March 20 deadline. Id.
Anderson brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio and
was able to obtain an injunction against the Ohio Secretary of State, thereby permitting him to
be listed as an Independent candidate on the November ballot. Id. at 783. After the Novem-
ber election, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, upon review of the
district court, found the state statute constitutional, reversing the injunction order in Ohio's
favor. Id. at 784. The Anderson campaign then appealed its decision to the United States
Supreme Court which granted his petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 786.
177. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 62:2-5; see Anderson, 460 U.S. at 805-06.
The legal issue facing the Court was whether Ohio's statute unconstitutionally interfered with
the fundamental voting and associational rights of Ohio registered voters favoring Anderson
such that the Ohio early filing statute, by denying Ohio voters the right to vote for Anderson
in November, was in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780-81.
The Court sustained Anderson's constitutional challenge to Ohio's early filing statute, finding
that it infringed on the rights of Ohio registered voters to vote for and associate with Ander-
son. Id. at 780, 792-94, 805-06. The Court opined that the statute effectively made it too
burdensome for a voter to associate with or cast a vote for Anderson, for the voter would, with
the statute in effect, have to go through the trouble of "writing in" Anderson's name on the
ballot to vote for him. See id. at 794. Thus, the interference caused by the statute was deemed
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Anderson convinced David Garth, a "prominent Democratic politico"
who was effectively blacklisted by the "powers that be in New York" at that
time to be his professional campaign manager, likely for that reason. 79 Or-
dinarily, Garth's up-front fees were very expensive, but by joining Anderson,
he did not get paid until after the election was over.' 80  Most of the other
positions were filled by volunteers.' 81 The people who helped were there
because they believed in Anderson's platform. 182 Anderson's energy pro-
posals and a fifty cent tax on gas, attracted lots of attention. 183 Anderson's
unconstitutional, resulting in the reversal of the Sixth Circuit's ruling and thereby reinstating
and staying the injunction issued by the district court. Id. at 806.
178. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 22:25-23:2; see also id. at 22:25-23:4 (An-
derson explaining why he avoided the State of Alaska).
179. Id. at 68:11-16. It is believed that David Garth's presence in the campaign gave
Anderson's candidacy a substantial boost. EDWIN DIAMOND & STEPHEN BATES, THE SPOT:
THE RISE OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON TELEVISION 269 (3d ed.1992). Though Garth had
never run a presidential campaign, he had "a deserved reputation as the tough-talking, take-
charge media man." Id.
180. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 68:17-20. Though Anderson did not sign up
Garth until May of 1980, it is perceived that Garth's focus was largely, and wrongly, on the
money. DIAMOND & BATES, supra note 179, at 269. Indeed, "[slome of Anderson's staff,
especially those displaced when Garth arrived, later publicly complained that Garth had cut
himself in for a lucrative share of Anderson's money .... " Id. However, this view of Garth's
role in the campaign is not shared by Anderson, for he was proud to have recruited the profes-
sional talent in the person of Garth. Id. at 270; Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 68:24-
69:1. While Anderson posits that Garth received a half million dollars, "Federal Election
Commission records indicate that Garth [only received] $229,000 in the six months he worked
for the campaign." DIAMOND & BATES, supra note 179, at 269-70; Anderson Transcript I,
supra note 2, at 68:20-23.
181. Anderson Transcript [, supra note 2, at 69:14-15. Anderson recalls that the cam-
paign "was essentially very much a volunteer effort. [The campaign] wasn't run, really, ex-
cept at the top by someone with professional qualifications." Id. at 69:14-16.
182. Id. at 69:17-22. Other volunteers, Anderson remembers, joined his campaign "just
for the fun of it." Id. at 69:20-21.
183. Id. at 69:23-24, 70:2-8. During the September 21, 1980, presidential debate in Bal-
timore, Anderson was quoted indicating that "the price of gasoline, which [had been] $.80 [ in
June of 1979,] ha[d] gone up to about $1.30 [per gallon at the time of the debate]." Commis-
sion on Presidential Debates, The Anderson-Reagan Presidential Debate Transcript (Sept. 21,
1980), available at http://www.debates.org/index.phppage=september-21-1980-debate-
transcript (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). In his opinion, and as a product of the Persian Gulf
crisis, Americans needed to be encouraging conservation. Id. His plan was to add this fifty
cent tax on gasoline and, in his words, "[r]ecycle those proceeds ... back into the pockets of
the American workers by reducing . . . their Social Security tax payments by 50%." Id.
Moreover, he thought that more emphasis on public transportation would have been a step in
the right direction; he had plans for an inter-city rails system. Anderson Transcript I, supra
note 2, at 143:24-144:3. Unfortunately, the opposition said such a tax would impose too
much of a burden on the American people. Id. at 144:4-7.
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positions were quite distinct from Reagan's, who was only pitching an
across-the-board thirty percent tax cut.184
Money was the other nagging problem.' 85 During the campaign, both
Reagan and Carter received $29.4 million from the Presidential Election
Campaign Fund, notwithstanding the tens of millions raised through individ-
ual donor contributions.186 Anderson's National Unity Party was only able to
raise $14 million, and thus they were outspent more than five to one. 87 For-
tunately, after the election, Anderson's party was eligible for funds from the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund. 188 Even if they could not raise enough
money, Anderson said he was pretty fatalistic about it, and his campaign
spent the money as it came in.' 89 The lack of funds caught Anderson's new
party somewhat off guard because, in the final weeks of the election, they
could not execute the massive advertising they desired; Anderson thinks that
this certainly made a difference on the outcome.190
On the campaign trail, Anderson was in his element. He liked meeting
the people and expounding on his ideas. 191 He admits that the "appreciation
184. Id. at 70:9-11. According to Anderson, the thirty percent tax cut "was [Reagan's]
prime plank in his 1980 platform." Id. at 70:11-12. On the other hand, Anderson "wanted to
[simply] limit the tax cut to the poorest of the poor ... and forget about the fat cats." Id. at
70:12-14.
185. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 62:20-21.
186. L. PATRICK DEVLIN, Campaign Commercials, in TELEVISION IN SOCIETY 17, 17 (Ar-
thur Asa Berger ed., 1987); see Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 62:22-24.
187. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 62:11-12, 62:24-63:1. Records indicated that
Reagan spent eighteen million or sixty percent of his federal funds on advertising alone.
DEVLIN, supra note 186, at 17. Given that Anderson would have to wait until after the elec-
tion to determine whether he would be eligible for federal funds, his total campaign revenues
of fourteen million-which of course had to go to every facet of the campaign-were thus
vastly insufficient to rival the media presence which Reagan's campaign could afford. Ander-
son Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 62:11-19.
188. Id. at 62:14-16. Anderson implies that several million dollars had to be borrowed,
inferredly due to a lack of campaign contributions. Id. at 62:16-19. After the election, be-
cause Anderson received more than five percent of the national popular vote-he actually
received 6.65%-he was entitled to just over four million dollars from the Presidential Elec-
tion Campaign Fund. Id. at 62:16-19; Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, U.S.
Presidential Elections 1980, http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/elections/presidential/presiden
tialelection_1980.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). According to Anderson, it was this eligi-
bility which enabled him to repay his loans and other related debts that had been acquired
during the campaign. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 62:16-19.
189. Id. at 63:4-7.
190. Id. at 63:10-12.
191. Id. at 39:22-24. Reflecting on the experience, Anderson recalls that he "could go out
in that campaign and crisscross the country and talk to very good-sized audiences in public
squares." Id. at 39:1-3. On one very sentimental occasion, Anderson told of his joy about a
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and the adulation" would flatter anyone.' 92 It was not "just the smell of the
grease paint and the roar of the crowd, but there's a little bit of that in all of
us," but rather the ability to reach so many Americans directly that kept him
vitalized. 193 He got most of his support in the more "liberal" part of the
country, such as the northeast, and somewhat in California.' 94 He wished
that he had gained more support from the conservatives, but, as he put it,
"you take your support where you can find it."' 95
1. Sample "Outsider" Speech: African Americans
Anderson's campaign speeches embody his concern for "outsiders."
For instance, in a September 1980 speech given at the Memorial United
Church, a largely African American congregation in Oakland, California, he
started out with a quote from the prophet Micah who said, "'[a]nd what does
the Lord require of you, but to act justly, to love mercy, and to walk humbly
with your God."", 96 He calls on everyone to act justly and respect every per-
son because no man "or woman stands higher than any other."'
97
Anderson acknowledged that "lasting and well-paying jobs" are of great
concern for Black Americans.198 He said that they "make the difference be-
tween security and fear, between opportunity and closed doors, between
journey from San Jose to San Francisco on the back end of a railroad car which was destined
for a huge rally. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 39:3-6.
192. Id. at 39:21-25.
193. Id. at 39:25-40:3.
194. Id. at 40:21-25. Anderson fondly remembers meeting with Barbra Streisand during
the campaign at her home in Beverly Hills. Id. at 41:1-2. "You know, you don't forget about
that right away," Anderson remarked. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 41:2-3. Ac-
cording to Anderson, there was "a very ambitious plan" to have Streisand perform in a series
of concerts and have the proceeds funneled into his campaign. Id. at 41:4-7. Though "she
never quite signed on the dotted line," Anderson received very generous support from one
Norman Lear. Id. at 41:8-12. At the time, Lear was a movie producer and Anderson recol-
lects that Lear contributed a couple hundred thousand dollars toward advertising for the cam-
paign. Id. at 41:15-18.
195. Id. at 42:22-43:3.
196. Remarks by John B. Anderson to the Memorial United Methodist Church of Oakland,
California I (Sept. 14, 1980) (transcript available at Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Re-
marks]; Micah 6:8. In much the same way that Anderson spoke this phrase to his followers,
the Jewish prophet Micah would have first orated these immortal words to the people of his
day over 2700 years ago. See id.
197. Remarks, supra note 196, at 1. This approach is consistent with Anderson's feelings
on race, as he believed that no race stood any higher than another. See Anderson Transcript I,
supra note 2, at 31:15-21.
198. Remarks, supra note 196, at I.
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hope and despair. '' 99 Anderson recognized that people want respect, bread
and justice.2°° "Above all, it means that we should strive unceasingly for a
society in which all enjoy genuinely equal opportunity to develop their gifts
and to go as far as their talents and energies will allow.,
20
'
2. Sample "Outsider Speech": Women's Rights
In a speech before 1000 potential voters,202 Anderson explicitly praised
the women's movement for publically addressing rape, incest and wife abuse
203 H oeamong other issues. He noted that research frequently focuses on men and
ignores the particular needs of women.204  His bravery was demonstrated
when he talked about teen pregnancy and access to birth control.20 5 Ander-
son acknowledged that rape was under reported and the legal system failed to
correct the problem.20 6 His words must have shocked many. For instance,
the following quote regarding the Equal Rights Amendment is not something
the general public usually heard, especially from male politicians:
The resistance to freeing women from the legal shackles, which is
just a beginning, is very strong and to a large extent emotionally
based. I am afraid that too many state legislators share John
Adam's sentiments expressed in his response to Abigail's plea to
"remember the ladies" in the Constitution. John [Adams] replied,
"depend upon it, we know better than to repeal our masculine sys-
tems."
, 207
199. Id. Anderson ultimately attributes the concern over livelihood to the failure of public
education in a modern economy. Id. Noting that to hold a job, or even be trained for one,
requires basic reading and writing skills, Anderson propounds the education system's failure
to impart such training is an "absolute disgrace." Id.
200. Id. at 3. Hoping to strike a chord with the minority crowd, Anderson explicated that
justice means "the even-handed application of our laws," such that housing opportunities on
the basis of race are equal, such that application of taxes are equal, and such that the affliction
of unemployment is equal. Remarks, supra note 196, at 3.
201. Id. Anderson explains this measure as "the kind of justice the Preamble of our Con-
stitution commands us to establish." Id.
202. John B. Anderson, Women in Crisis 1-2 (June 6, 1980) (transcript available in the
Nova Law School Library and Technology Center) [hereinafter Anderson, Women in Crisis].
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 3.
205. See id. at 3-4. Anderson exposes the human tragedy "that two million sexually ac-
tive teenagers have no access to birth control." Id. at 3.
206. Anderson, Women in Crisis, supra note 202, at 4.
207. Id. at 6.
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As can be expected, Anderson was an early front-and-center supporter
of the Equal Rights Amendment.20 8 He gave a lot of credit to his wife, Keke,
and his daughters. 20 9 But, in his own words, he said that he "felt that women
need to be more adequately represented both in elected office and in ap-
pointed positions, and that they had an important role to play in govern-
ment.,' 210 Similar to other stands he took as a congressman, being a supporter
of the Equal Rights Amendment was controversial. 21 ' There were those who
opposed amending the Constitution to accomplish the goal.212 The conserva-
tives believed the Constitution was a "sacred document and that you ought to
think not once, but twice, and [Anderson did not] know how many more
times than that, before you change the language and add to it."' 213 Anderson
believed that perhaps those who were against the ERA thought "women were
overreaching in asking for that kind of constitutional protection. 2 4 Regard-
less, Anderson believed that an amendment was proper, and he voted to ex-
tend the amount of time it took each state to ratify the Amendment.2 5
208. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 55:11-16. In 1972, the 92nd Congress passed
House Joint Resolution 208, better known as the Equal Rights Amendment, which, pursuant
to Article V of the Constitution, required ratification by three-fourths of the state legisla-
tures-thirty-eight states-to become an amendment to the United States Constitution. Pro-
posed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, H.R.J. RES. 208, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess., 86 Stat. 1523 (1972); 117 CONG. REc. 35815 (1971); 118 CONG. REc. 9598 (1972). As
passed by Congress, the Equal Rights Amendment prescribed a seven-year state ratification
period, which if not met, would cause the Amendment to fail. See State v. Freeman, 529 F.
Supp. 1107, 1114 (D. Idaho 1981) (mem.), vacated, 459 U.S. 809. By 1978, one year before
the ratification deadline, thirty-five of the required thirty-eight states had ratified the Amend-
ment. Allison L. Held, Sheryl L. Herndon, & Danielle M. Stager, The Equal Rights Amend-
ment: Why the ERA Remains Legally Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 113, 117 (1997). Worried that the Amendment may fail, Representative Eliz-
abeth Holtzman of New York introduced House Joint Resolution 638 to grant states a three-
year extension to ratify the Amendment, which received only a simple majority, not the two-
thirds supermajority that was required to extend the ratification period. See H.R.J. RES. 638,
95th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 Stat. 3799 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. 26264-65 (1978); 124 CONG.
REC. 34092 (1978). Anderson says that although he "fought very hard" for the Equal Rights
Amendment, not enough other members would vote for House Joint Resolution 638 to
achieve the two-thirds majority, ultimately causing the Amendment to fail. Anderson Tran-
script 1, supra note 2, at 55:11-14.
209. See id. at 135:18-22.
210. Id. at 135:25-136:3.
211. Seeid. at136:4-11.
212. Seeid. at 136:18-23.
213. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 136:18-23.
214. Id. at 136:24-137:4.
215. See id. at 136:12-16. On August 15, 1978, the measure to extend the ratifying period
for the Equal Rights Amendment passed the House, with Anderson casting one of the 233
Yeas to 189 Nays. 124 CONG. REC. 26264-65 (1978).
2010]
33
: Nova Law Review 34, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2015
NOVA LAW REVIEW
His remarks before another crowd of women were also remarkably out-
sider-sensitive. He said he was proud of the fact that twenty-one of his state
coordinators were women.216 He said he supported the women's movement
during the 1970s because it was "a vital force in our society" despite the
great opposition.217 He told the crowd about all the particular laws that treat
21women in a disparaging manner. 18 For instance, Anderson said that it was a
national disgrace that approximately 3.5 million women were beaten by their
husbands each year, and further, that women were only receiving fifty-nine
percent of what men earned.2t 9
What would Anderson have done differently for women if he had be-
come President? He listed ratification of the ERA as a top priority, followed
by freedom of choice and making sure that poor women are able to get fund-
ing for abortions, among other things.220 Anderson wanted to have women
216. John B. Anderson, Address in Portland, Oregon: Justice for American Women I
(Sept. 15, 1980) (transcript available at Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Anderson, Justice for
American Women Address]. Anderson additionally cites the great gains of the women's
movement to include, most notably, the passage of anti-discriminatory legislation in employ-
ment on the basis of gender, the freedom of the right to choose, improvements in laws affect-
ing marital property and divorce, the building of shelters for victims of domestic violence, and
the increased role of women in politics. Id. at 1-2.
217. See id. at 1. Importantly, Anderson stressed to the crowd that "[i]n spite of the im-
pressive victories already won, women are far from achieving full partnership in any of our
institutions, including the family." Id. at 2. Thus, Anderson urged the continued stride toward
additional progress in the areas of women's rights. See id. at 6.
218. See Anderson, Justice for American Women Address, supra note 216, at 2-4. For
instance, the State of Georgia had a law on its books-and still does-which commands that
the "husband is the head of the family and the wife is subject to him," notwithstanding other
statutory enactments. Id. at 2; GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8 & cmt. ed. note (2004), invalidated in
part by Jones v. Jones, 376 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ga. 1989). More staggering is Georgia's binding
legal precedent that
the husband is head of the family, and ... has the right to fix the matrimonial residence with-
out the consent of the wife; [who] is bound to follow her husband, when he changes his resi-
dence, [if] the change is made by him in good faith, and not from whim or caprice, or as mere
punishment of the wife, or to a place where he did not intend to reside, or to a place where her
health or comfort will be endangered.
Carver v. Carver, 34 S.E.2d 509, 510-11 (Ga. 1945) (quoting Pace v. Pace, 115 S.E. 65, 65
(Ga. 1922)).
219. Anderson, Justice for American Women Address, supra note 216, at 3. Additionally,
Anderson cites the disheartening truth in the field of domestic relations noting that "[t]hree
quarters of the divorced women are supporting their children," and only 4.6% of these women
received alimony. Id.
220. Id. at 4-5. Anderson observed that when the conservatives had said the Equal Rights
Amendment would destroy marriage because it would cause women to leave the homemaking
role, it was most certainly a "dreary view of marriage." Id. at 6. Thus, Anderson was exactly
the political opposite of what Reagan proposed. Id. at 5. Reagan was against the Equal
Rights Amendment, was against the right to choose an abortion, and certainly did not believe
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treated as equals.22' While he opposed the draft, he thought that if men were
going to be drafted, women should also be subject to the draft.222
3. Sample "Outsider" Speech: Native Americans
In Anderson's address before the Council of Energy Resource Tribes, a
group of Native Americans, he assured them that he would see to it "that the
federal government scrupulously [met] all its obligations under existing trea-
ties, executive orders, and judicial decisions. ' '223 He wanted to make sure
that the tribal voices at the Bureau of Indian Affairs were heard and promised
to address the special concerns regarding education and health.2 4 His main
focus was on the intelligent utilization of energy-largely coal, uranium, and
natural gas-by the Native American community.225  Anderson said he
would make sure that neither the government nor private industry would
"exploit [the community] in a manner detrimental to [its] interests. 226 In
addition, he promised that he would support and sign the "Tribal Govern-
mental Tax Status Act, which [would] allow tribes to issue tax free bonds
which [could] aid in funding their energy development., 227 Anderson prom-
ised that there would not be a "Camp David" energy conference without tri-
228bal presence.
in using government funds to help poor women obtain abortion services. Anderson, Justice
for American Women Address, supra note 216, at 5.
221. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 55:11-16; Anderson, Women in Crisis,
supra note 202, at 6-8.
222. Anderson, Justice for American Women Address, supra note 216, at 5.
223. Congressman John B. Anderson, Address to the Council of Energy Resource Tribes I
(Sept. 5, 1980) (transcript available at Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Anderson, Address to
the Council of Energy Resource Tribes].
224. See id. Specifically, Anderson promised that he would "press for the timely comple-
tion of the [Bureau of Indian Affair's] federal recognition project." Id. Anderson further
articulated, as a solution to the specialized concerns of the Native American community, that
he would push for "adequate funding for Indian controlled community colleges and bilingual
education, as mandated by law." Id.
225. Id. at 2. Anderson offered that the Native American community's "greatest hope for
economic development lies in the intelligent use of the" natural resources it controls. Ander-
son, Address to the Council of Energy Resource Tribes, supra note 223, at 2.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 3. In early July 1979, President Jimmy Carter held a "domestic summit" for ten
days at Camp David, to discuss, in the words of Rosalynn Carter, "how [the] nation could
rally to resolve the oil crisis and renew [the People's] confidence in the social, political, and
economic future of the country." ROSALYNN CARTER, FIRST LADY FROM PLAINS 325-26
(1984). The domestic summit generated intense interest-given the already long lines at the
gas pump-as the President brought groups of "governors, labor and business leaders, mem-
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4. The One Debate
The fact that Anderson was not invited to be part of the debates dealt a
final blow to his campaign. 229 Anderson was only able to participate in one
national debate that was held in Baltimore.23 ° While the debate coaches all
thought Anderson had won, evidently the people did not quite agree.231 Cart-
er, who was the Democratic nominee, would not even appear on the same
debate with Anderson and Reagan.232 Carter's excuse was that "he would be
debating two Republicans. 233 Being "shut out of the final debate" was the
bers of Congress, local officials, oil industry executives, economists, energy experts, even
religious leaders and philosophers." Id. at 326. As inferred by Anderson's remarks, Native
Americans were left without representation at this national round table discussion on energy.
See Anderson Address to the Council of Energy Resource Tribes, supra note 223, at 3.
229. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 63:13-14, 64:2-8.
230. Id. at 63:14-15. The first of two presidential debates that would be held in 1980 was
on September 21 in Baltimore, Maryland. The Anderson-Reagan Debate Transcript, supra
note 183. Though the debate was sponsored by the League of Women Voters Education
Fund, only Ronald Reagan and Anderson would spar that evening. Id. Throughout the de-
bate, Anderson spoke much about the progression of women's rights and distanced himself
from Reagan and Carter by taking positions that were diametrically opposite to the main two
parties' platforms. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 91:20-92:5; Interview with John
Anderson (Sept. 13, 1999), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/debatingourdestiny/
interviews/anderson.html.
231. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 63:15-17. After the debate, a poll was taken
among high school and college debate coaches to determine whether Reagan or Anderson
would have won the debate had the debate been judged on a point system; it was agreed that
Anderson had the advantage. Interview with John Anderson, supra note 230.
232. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 63:17-18.
233. Id. at 63:18-19. In a 1999 interview with Jim Lehrer, when asked about the impres-
sion left by President Carter's absence from the debate, Anderson responded that "Carter was
being very defensive, felt beleaguered and was unwilling to expose himself to a three person
debate." Interview with John Anderson, supra note 230. Anderson further proffered on Cart-
er's motives saying,
I think [Carter] feared that [his appearance at the debate] would legitimize my campaign to an
even greater extent.... I think it was purely defensive politics that he was playing that made
him refuse to get on the stage with both Reagan and ... his excuse was, of course, well, they
are two Republicans.
Id. But to Anderson, this could not have been further from the truth. Id. In his own words,
Anderson stated, "I had left the Republican party. I had taken diametrically opposed positions
to Reagan on National Security issues, on the energy problem, [and] on his tax policy. ...
[Thus], there couldn't have been two people on the stage that differed more widely than did
Ronald Reagan and I." Id. President Carter himself, in a 1989 interview with Jim Lehrer,
even indicated that the reason Reagan wanted Anderson in the debate with himself and Carter
was because "Reagan knew that every time [Anderson] got a vote, it was a vote taken away
from me." Interview with President Jimmy Carter (Apr. 28, 1989), available at
http://www.pbs.orglnewshour/debatingourdestiny/interviews/carter.html. Anderson also be-
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most damaging of all.2 4 It "took place just about ten days before the elec-
tion., 2 35 Anderson believes that by not being allowed to participate in the
debate, instead of getting about fifteen or twenty percent of the vote, he got
6.63%.236 Also, getting a higher percentage of votes likely would have paved
the way for a viable future third party.
237
lieves that Carter saw him as a real threat especially for the black vote, which was normally
Democratic. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 121:21-25.
234. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 64:2-8.
235. Id. at 64:3-4; Commission on Presidential Debates, The Carter-Reagan Debate Tran-
script (Oct. 28, 1980), available at http://www.debates.org/index.php?page=october-28-1980-
debate-transcript [hereinafter The Carter-Reagan Debate Transcript].
236. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 64:4-8. On November 4, 1980, when all was
said and done on election day, Anderson garnered 5,720,060 votes nationally, or 6.61% of the
popular vote. Our Campaigns, U.S. President Nat'l Vote Nov. 4, 1980, http://www.our
campaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RacelD=-1937 (last visited Feb. 25, 2010). Anderson's best
regional performance was in the New England states, where Anderson consistently received
upwards of ten percent of the popular vote. See id. Anderson ultimately had the greatest
concentration of supporters in Massachusetts as he received 15.15% of the total vote cast
within the state. Our Campaigns, U.S. President-1980 Massachusetts U.S. President Nat'l
Vote, Nov. 4, 1980, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RacelD=2288 (last vi-
sited Feb. 25, 2010). The State of Hawaii also turned out favorably for Anderson, where he
received 10.56% of the total vote. Our Campaigns, U.S. President-1980 Hawaii U.S. Presi-
dent Nat'l Vote, Nov. 4, 1980, http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=2278
(last visited Feb. 25, 2010). Although Anderson has never claimed that he would have won
the election, his inference of higher vote totals appears quite logical had he appeared eight
days earlier on national television for the final presidential debate. See Anderson Transcript I,
supra note 2, at 64:5-8.
237. Id. at 64:9-1I. Indeed, Anderson is a great proponent of Proportional Representa-
tion. See id. at 100:4-12. Since his departure from public office, Anderson has focused his
energy on trying to create an electoral system where multiple political parties can thrive. See
John B. Anderson & Jeffrey L. Freeman, Taking the First Steps Towards a Multiparty System
in the United States, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. Winter/Spring 1997, at 73, 73-74 (1997).
Anderson supports a piece of state-based legislation called the National Popular Vote bill that
would "guarantee the Presidency to the candidate who receives the most popular votes."
Letter from Barry Fadem, et al., National Popular Vote, Agreement Among the States to Elect
the President by National Popular Vote to the Public 1 (Apr. 29, 2009), available at
http://nationalpopularvote.comresources/8-Page-NPV-Memo-V65-B-2009-4-29.pdf. By so
enacting the National Popular Vote bill, third party candidates would become much more
viable as the opportunity to be elected would increase dramatically. See Anderson & Free-
man, supra, at 80. In addition, "difficulties encountered by third-party candidates, including
such basic issues as ballot access, participation in the presidential debates and attracting media
attention," would all but disappear if, in fact, every vote counted. See id. at 73. Anderson
posits "two methods by which a multiparty system can begin to take root in the United
States." Id. His first suggestion is coalition building; the notion that the energy of pluralistic
viewpoints must be harnessed prior to a presidential campaign, not because of one. See id. at
73-74, 80-81. Secondly, he suggests the possibility of multiparty politics through a fusion
ticket; a ticket "in which a candidate can appear on the ballot under the banner of more than
one party," and thereby garnish more votes through inherently broader voter appeal. Id. at 74,
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G. From His Own Perspective on Being a Supporter for Outsiders
When asked directly why he is a supporter of "outsider's rights," An-
derson observes that, despite his conservative upbringing, both religiously
and politically, his life experience steers him to support those who do not
have the advantages he had.238 He notes that he has had the advantage of
broad and extensive contacts with people of all walks of life.239 Anderson
"treasure[s] [the] open mindedness and the willingness to accept new ways,
new ideas, as being the road that we ought to travel." 40 It makes him smile
when he thinks about his roots and he now finds the liberal views far more
congenial. 24' When asked where his inner strength comes from, Anderson's
focus derives from the fact that a great many challenges are still out there.242
81. Anderson further solidifies his position as a great proponent of Proportional Representa-
tion through his chairmanship of the nonprofit organization, FairVote, The Center for Voting
and Democracy. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 65:25-66:1. Taken directly from the
FairVote website, its claimed purpose is to "act[] to transform our elections to achieve univer-
sal access to participation, a full spectrum of meaningful ballot choices and majority rule with
fair representation for all." FairVote, http://www.fairvote.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
Through Anderson's leadership at FairVote, the organization has endorsed the state-based
National Popular Vote bill, which now has been enacted by Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey,
Maryland, and Washington. Letter from Barry Fadem, et al., supra, at 1. Additionally, Fair-
Vote has championed efforts to push run-off voting and other election reforms. Anderson
Transcript I, supra note 2, at 66:1-2. Anderson truly believes that until the nation's people
reform the electoral process, all elections will remain exclusive contests between the two
major political parties. Id. at 66:3-4.
238. Id. at 55:17-56:10,56:16-19.
239. Id. at 56:16-21. Indeed the gamut has been run, from Anderson's African-American
congressional constituent who, prior to the Fair Housing legislation, was being held back by
discriminatory housing laws to the Prince of Sweden. Id. at 34:4-11. While Anderson was in
Congress, Prince Bertil of Sweden made a visit to Rockford, Illinois as part of a celebration of
the tricentennial anniversary of Swedish settlement of North America. Anderson Transcript I,
supra note 2, at 34:6-11. While the Prince was in town, Anderson arranged for the Prince to
visit his "father's humble little bungalow." Id. at 34:13-17. According to Anderson, as the
Prince entered the living room, "[his] father sat there beaming, [and] shook hands with-he
could hardly believe it himself-the crown prince of Sweden." Id. at 34:17-20.
240. Id. at 56:21-24.
241. Id. at 57:3-10. As Anderson notes the irony of his current political views, now he
looks "for the most liberal candidate for whom [he] can vote rather than the most conserva-
tive." Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 56:11-13.
242. Id. at 151:20-152:1. Anderson admits to some feelings of "despondency and not
quite deep despair, but . . . discouragement," which he perceives is a product of having la-
bored so long over similar challenges. Id. at 151:10-19. Generally, Anderson cites the con-
tinued need for reforms in "our own electoral system, our ... domestic politics, and in the
international realm." Id. at 151:12-16. Yet specifically, he notes that the World Federalist
Association, which is dedicated to supporting a global system of democratic governments that
are accountable to its citizens, has been around for a number of years with very few of its
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As long as Anderson sees some progress, it is enough to provide a spark to
keep going.
1m]. THE PERSPECTIVE OF OTHER INSIDERS:
SENATOR GEORGE MCGOVERN
A. Reflections
While it is often stated that politics make for strange bedfellows, that
would seem, on its face, to hold true for John Anderson, the Rockefeller Re-
publican-turned-Independent and George McGovern, the liberal-leaning
Democrat;2" however, the analogy, as with many labels, is deceiving.
Though each has championed a career under the guise of competing labels,
representing their respective parties, both Anderson and McGovern, more
often than not, were on the same side of an issue, crafting careers as refor-
mers and often challenging the status quo. They share the rare experience of
running as candidates for President of the United States, while similarly hav-
ultimate goals realized. Id. at 151:16-19. The most evident example of its failure, logically,
can be seen in the fact that many world governments, even those within Europe, still are not
democracies and are thus not accountable to their citizens. See Global Solutions, The World
Federalist Institute, http://www.globalsolutions.org/wfi (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
243. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 152:12-15. To propound his thoughts, An-
derson uses the example of women in government to illustrate how the progress in that area
provides his inspiration to continue fighting. See id. 152:16-17. As Anderson points out, for
a long period of time the only woman in the United States Senate was Margaret Chase Smith.
Id. at 152:17-19. Now, he says, "I think we have at least 16 members of the Senate ... who
are women .. " Id. at 152:20-21. Moreover, Anderson cites to the fantastic governorships
held by women, particularly Kathleen Sebelius, the United States Secretary of Health and
Human Services, and former governor of Kansas, and Jennifer Granholm, the governor of
Michigan. Id. at 152:22-153:7. Further, Anderson recognizes the epitomic mark of progress
of having Diane Feinstein as a leader in the United States Senate, Nancy Pelosi as the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, and Hillary Clinton as the most viable woman candidate to
run for president. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 153:9-12, 16-17. While Anderson
admits that he supported Clinton's opponent for the Democratic nomination, now President
Barack Obama, he offers that he "could not but admire the valiant struggle that [Hillary Clin-
ton] made. And [he] think[s] she made a real contribution in her campaign to remind us that
... we will see a woman President of the United States, and we'll wonder why did it ever take
as long as it did." Id. at 153:17-24. Thus, it is heart-warming examples of progress, like the
area of women in politics that instill hope and propel people like John B. Anderson to contin-
ue the good fight. See id. at 152:15-154:2.
244. Both of McGovern's parents "were conservative Republicans till the day they
die[d]." Transcript of George McGovern, at 12:10-11 (2009), (on file with Nova Law Re-
view) [hereinafter McGovern Transcript].
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ing shared the prominence of very public defeats.245 Yet seemingly, as if the
most natural progression in the world, both Anderson and McGovern went
on to champion some of their most heartfelt issues following their presiden-
tial bids, using their credibility capital to springboard reforms in voting and
global humanitarian reform.
George McGovern and John Anderson first met while both were serving
in the U.S. House of Representatives. 246 Reflecting upon their early days in
the House together, McGovern stated that he admired Anderson from, "the
first time [he] met him. '247 McGovern viewed Anderson in a way that would
become even more apparent when Anderson later became a practicing law
professor: scholarly. 248 McGovern also described Anderson as a person of
"obvious personal character, integrity [and] self-confidence." 49  It was
McGovern's impression of John Anderson, early on, that Anderson engen-
dered respect from his listeners when he spoke on the floor of the House of
Representatives, having an innate confidence which bespoke of thoughts
carefully devised and not improvised.25°
When asked whether their similar backgrounds25 ' helped them form a
closer bond as both colleagues and friends, McGovern indicated affirmative-
ly. 252 McGovern remarked that he thought Anderson shared or, at a mini-
mum, had similar views on war, having had firsthand experience.253 McGo-
vern reflected that, "we came home with a healthy appreciation for how
bloody war [could] be, especially modem war. '254 McGovern suspects that
245. McGovern stated that he "talked to [Anderson] several times after the campaign. He
didn't seem to be demoralized. He was glad he tried and he made a lot of new friends across
the country." Id. at 25:1-4.
246. Id. at l:19.
247. Id. at 1:20-21. McGovern stated, "One thing, it may seem a little superficial, I ad-
mired the way he carried himself, absolutely straight up, no nonsense." Id. at 1:21-23.
248. McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 1:24.
249. Id. at 1:24-25.
250. See id. at 2:1-7.
251. Similar, in that both were from the Midwest and both served in World War 11. Id. at
2:16-17.
252. Id. at 2:19-20. McGovern was a bomber pilot during the war and, "came home with
a desire to make whatever contribution [he] could to the cause of peace." McGovern Tran-
script, supra note 244, at 2:25-3:3.
253. Id. at 3:9-11. According to McGovern, "he had learned enough about war from
firsthand experience so that he realized it was more than just a glamour trip. That we had to
be careful about where we committed young Americans." Id. at 3:10-14.
254. Id. at 4:2-3. He came to appreciate that fighting in a war did not make him or Ander-
son pacifists, but merely appreciative of the bloodshed and complexities of war. See id. at
4:1-3. According to McGovern, "I'm proud of my service in World War I1. It's the last war I
believed in." McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 3:4-5.
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Anderson is also "cautious about [sending] young Americans to combat. 255
When asked about McGovern's vote for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution-
which Anderson reflectively and soberly stated was one of his greatest mis-
takes256-he echoed a similar sentiment in that he also "regret[ted] that vote
more than any other. '257 McGovern recalls speaking with Anderson about
the Vietnam War and, on occasion, would ask Anderson what he thought
about a particular issue.25 8 Once McGovern moved into the Senate, with
Anderson remaining in the House of Representatives, their concentric circles
shifted, and they had less contact with one another, politically.2 59
B. Courageousness of the Third-Party Candidacy
"I was always skeptical of an independent run," remarked McGovern
when discussing Anderson's break with his party and choice to run for Presi-
dent as a third-party candidate. 260 He summarized, "[t]he problem with run-
ning as an independent is that we've never elected one."'26 , McGovern ap-
proaches the idea of running outside the two-party system as a pragmatist-
seeing what is, while Anderson, though firmly grounded, approaches the
presidency in a theoretical fashion-seeing what could be. McGovern noted
the obstacles to electing a viable third-party candidate, such as the possibility
of shifting moderate and liberal independent votes away from the Democrats
which, "might ensure the election of a Republican. 262 McGovern felt that
255. Id. at3:15-18.
256. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 45:8-11.
257. McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 6:17-18. McGovern spoke candidly, with
the disappointment still evident in his voice, about being misled by President Lyndon Johnson.
Id. at 4:9-11. He, like many congressmen and senators, believed that the President would not
order a wider war. Id. "[A]t that stage in my life, I thought presidents told the truth. I may
have been naive, but that's what I thought." Id. at 4:20-22. McGovern thought that President
Johnson would have gone ahead to expand United States involvement in Vietnam, even with-
out the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Id. at 6:11-13. However, McGovern remembers that it
gave the appearance of authority for President Johnson to do "whatever he wanted to do,
despite his assurances that he had no intention of committing more troops or deepening our
involvement there." McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 6:14-16.
258. Id. at 8:9-11.
259. Id. at 1:17-18. McGovern quipped, "it may surprise you to know that ... there isn't
a lot of communication between the House and the Senate until we get to Conference Com-
mittee." Id. at 1:8-11.
260. Id. at 8:21-22.
261. McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 8:14-15.
262. Id. at 8:22-25. In McGovern's mind, this was the "horror of horrors." Id. at 9:1. He
also seemed weary that either of the major party candidates would usurp the substance of the
independent's platform if the independent candidate had a "good platform" and got "a sizeable
vote as [Senator Robert] LaFollette did in 1924." Id. at 8:16-20.
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Anderson made a run for the presidency on principle more than anything
else.263 He does mention, however, that he does not think that Anderson's
bid for the presidency as an Independent in any way affected Reagan getting
elected, in terms of taking votes.2 64 Although, had Anderson been elected,
that would have undoubtedly been a preferential course of history for a vast-
ly liberal McGovern.265
Though McGovern recognized the difficulty an independent candidate
would have to overcome to succeed in beating out two major party candi-
dates, he admired Anderson's resolve for trying to win, as well as his clear
presentation of the issues. 266 "I think it took courage for John to do that and
I'm glad that he did.2 67 In 1980 "we needed some voice other than Carter
and Reagan. They didn't cover some of the issues that I thought were very
important, and John did. ' 68 In McGovern's estimation, Anderson, whose
straightforward nature seamlessly coalesced with the role he played as an
independent candidate, "served a useful purpose" in the 1980 election.269
When questioned as to how much Anderson's campaign has "opened the
door for success of third-party candidates," McGovern thought that it had
and that an upcoming candidate could build upon Anderson's ideas, stating
"he's probably got some good pointers" as well.
Finally, when asked whether there was anything that George McGovern
thought people should know about Anderson, he said that he "never heard
one whisper against his character, against his integrity. Never.
271
IV. WHY DID AN INSIDER EMBRACE THE OUTSIDERS?
The obvious question, after sifting through the story of John Anderson's
life, is why an individual connected to the dominant group in society via
race, religion, and gender, would direct his professional career towards im-
263. Id. at 9:2-3.
264. McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 9:3-5.
265. See id. at 21:16-21.
266. See id. at 21:8-21. McGovern further discusses Anderson's presidential platform
saying, "I happened to have agreed with him on most of what he said." Id. at 21:19-21.
267. Id. at 23:5-6.
268. McGovern Transcript, supra note 244, at 23:7-10.
269. Id. at 23:10. McGovern was never "tempted" to take on the role of the third-party
candidate and "thought it was better to battle it out in the [d]emocratic ranks and hope you
could win a nomination." Id. at 23:11-14.
270. Id. at 24:16-22.
271. Id. at 34:12-16. McGovern extrapolated, "You know, they say that Republicans have
financial scandals and Democrats have sex scandals. I never heard of either one around
John." Id. at 34:16-19.
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proving the lives of those with whom he shares minimal commonality?272
What appears influential, related to Anderson's behavior, is a sense of social
justice and an empathic response to humanity, all key elements to models of
civic professionalism emerging within educational and philosophical litera-
ture. As Thomas Skrtic points out, "civic professionalism restores a sense of
collective social purpose in the professions. It recognizes the professions'
responsibility to the community-especially to those most negatively af-
fected by social problems" and "that the point and value of professional ser-
vice is its contribution to the good society and the good life for all., 273 In a
time flushed with rampant expertism, where politics and professionalism
created narrow views of competence, devoid of any sense of social or moral
obligation to the greater good, John Anderson emerged as a civic profession-
al with equality and justice forming the foundation for his work. 274
A. Civic Professionalism
Utilizing concepts of social justice and pragmatism as a foundation,
contemporary philosophers such as William Sullivan describe a current crisis
in professionalism related to rampant technocratic expert-driven practices. 75
272. While it is impossible to prove the nature of Anderson's actions through some type of
scientific pursuit, utilizing his statements as a backdrop against psychological, biological,
social, and political theory might render interesting notions related to his life. Id. Though
Anderson notes that he is not completely sure why he chose the path he did in life, as an ob-
vious advocate of equal rights for all people, he posits that it may be because he is "well-
circulated around the globe" and has "wide tastes when it comes to reading and literature."
Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 56:4-5.
273. Thomas M. Skrtic, A Political Economy of Learning Disabilities, 28 LEARNING
DISABILrry Q. 149, 152 (2005).
274. See generally WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND
PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA (1995) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WORK AND
INTEGRITY].
Work and Integrity ... examines the crisis as well as the promise of professionalism in con-
temporary society. This ... book argues for the importance of a new civic professionalism
that reflects the ideals of democracy and public service in our ever more complex economic
environment.... Work and Integrity explores the most current thinking on the various-and
often conflicting-ways in which the concept of professional work is understood.
See id. at dust jacket, front flap.
275. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 5-7. It has been argued that
"technocratic and expert-driven tendencies in government ... further alienate citizens from
the political process" as opposed to "build[ing] a habit of participative and informed political
discussion between government and citizens." Marietjie Myburg, More Public and Less Ex-
perts: A Normative Framework for Re-connecting the Work of Journalists with the Work of
Citizens, GLOBAL MEDIA J., AFRICAN ED., 2009, at 1, I available at http://sun025.sun.ac.za/
portallpage/portal/Arts/Departementel/Joernalistiek/Globa Media Journal/Global Media
Journal - Past Editions 3(1).
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A perceived lack of interest in social justice and political responsibility,
coupled with an unbridled desire for economic and social status, define a
type of professionalism grounded in both individualism and expertism.276
This set of expert professionals stays insulated from political or social obli-
gations and does not recognize a connection between professional practice
and the proliferation of a civil society.277 Furthermore, technocratic profes-
sionalism would not be viewed as a vehicle for promoting change or social
progress, given its relative disconnect to political responsibility within a de-
mocracy defined by market liberalism. 2 78
Consequently, discussions of civic professionalism, rooted in pragmatic
philosophy and concepts of social justice, constitute a rethinking of profes-
sional training and indoctrination. 79 Civic professionals display a commit-
276. STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF PROFESSIONALS IN
POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 40-41 (1994).
The primary definition [of professionalism] is that of individual professionalism: the idea that
membership of a profession carries with it a set of intemali[z]ed values that will be reflected in
the way in which work is carried out and the ethical standards that are adhered to.... Al-
though the term "professionalism" is associated with a fairly specific range of high-status oc-
cupations, much the same claim about other occupations is embodied in terms like... "public
service ethos."
Posting of John Quiggin to, Word for Wednesday Professionalism: Definition, http://www.
johnquiggin.com/archives/001491.html (Sept. 10, 2003). While Anderson appeared to be
headed for this type of professionalism, an ironic position in life changed that course. See
Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 16:18-25. Public service was the farthest thing from
Anderson's mind when he decided to pursue a legal career; rather he sought individual pros-
perity. See id. He believed the best direction was a traditional practice of law where you
started with a firm and then formed your own firm. Id. The most rewarding part of his career
however was campaigning for the presidency in 1980. Id. at 38:16-19. Though this course
seems grounded in individualism, Anderson was finally free of the restrictions that were
placed on him by conservative Republican leadership, enabling him to just crisscross the
country and openly speak with people. Id. at 39:2-3.
277. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 15. Anderson has done exactly the opposite. See An-
derson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 55:5-20. Rather than insulate himself from political
obligations, he has stood front and center championing causes such as ERA and fair housing.
Id. What is more poignant is that Anderson could have easily remained insulated within his
privileged status, but it was his close connection to the people whom he fought for-a product
of his life experiences-that drew him outside his comfort zone. See id. at 55-56.
278. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 82.
279. See Skrtic, supra note 273, at 152; see also William M. Sullivan, Engaging the Civic
Option: A New Academic Professionalism?, CAMPUS COMPACT READER, special ed. 10, 12-
13 (2003).
The concept of civic professionalism points to the public functions and social responsibilities
of the professions .... To practice one's profession in a public-regarding way in a full and di-
rect sense, professionals must view themselves as active participants in civic life. They must
cast their identities, roles, and expertise around a democratic, public mission, suffusing their
technical competence with civic awareness and purpose.
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ment to social justice and acknowledge the need for political engagement to
resolve complex social problems, whether or not the issue personally affects
them.280 Professional ethics dictate involvement in policy and politics as a
means through which to resolve the disenfranchisement and inequity expe-
rienced by the citizenry.28'
While demonstrations of civic professionalism are certainly evidenced
by historical figures such as John Dewey and Jane Addams, the dominance
of expertism has overshadowed its relevance and viability over time.282
Scott J. Peters, Educating the Civic Professional: Reconfigurations and Resistances, 11
MICH. J. COMMUNITY SERV. LEARNING 47-48 (2004).
280. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 228. In Anderson's case,
this meant fighting for women's rights and fair housing. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2,
at 55:6-17. In opposition of the technocratic professional who is disconnected to social and
political responsibility, see BRINT, supra note 276, at 82, Anderson was able to connect to the
people whom he fought for because his life experiences left him open to accepting new ways
and new ideas. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 56:16-24.
281. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 232; Peters, supra note 279,
at 47-48. Anderson embodies this type of ethical professionalism. See Anderson Transcript 1,
supra note 2, at 25:3-27:23. This is clearly evidenced by his involvement in securing the vote
that assured the passing of the Fair Housing bill and particularly how he secured the vote. See
id. at 26:10-27:5. Anderson was moved by a young well-educated African American who
was living the inequity experienced by the citizenry and unable to secure housing for his fami-
ly. 114 CONG. REC. 9551 (1968) (Statement of Rep. John B. Anderson); see also id. at 9557-
58 (Statement of Rep. John B. Anderson) (elaborating on statement from previous cite). In an
unconventional act-an act of heroics perhaps forged out of his own understanding of humble
beginnings-Anderson jumped party lines knowing that his vote would break the tie and pass
the Fair Housing bill. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
282. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 74-76. John Dewey and
Jane Addams understood the
interdependence of modem society which the industrial metropolis dramatized, [and] sought to
render its complex functional interrelationships intelligible .... Providing this intelligibility
was for them the professional calling par excellence. By bringing the interdependence to vivid
public awareness, they hoped to provoke political action. Aroused publics would then struggle
for conscious regulation and planning of what would otherwise have remained but dimly per-
ceived .... benefiting the powerful few but harming the many.
Id. at 72. "During the 1890s, John Dewey articulated [his] philosophy of. .. 'creative democ-
racy' at the ... University of Chicago." Id. at 73. Dewey "concluded that developing a dem-
ocratic public would require creating institutions within which learning could become a conti-
nual practice in all areas of life .... [and] sought to develop a cultural understanding that
would orient professional life there toward public concerns." Id. at 74. Jane Addams collabo-
rated with Dewey, for "Addams was seeking to involve the entire community in an education-
al effort whose aim was to form active and responsible citizens." Id. at 77. To accomplish
this, she pioneered the Hull House which reached out to "young men and women"-
immigrants "only a short remove from their peasant origins"-and aimed to give them an
"understanding of the industrial metropolis." SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note
274, at 76. Like Dewey and Addams, Anderson embodies the civic professional who is unfor-
tunately a minority in the political scheme, following his heart as opposed to the technocrat,
who has lost his identity and is forced into action by social obligations.
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However, renewed interest in the merits of pragmatism and civic professio-
nalism are emerging, in response to burgeoning organizational, societal, and
educational problems in current society. Given this, it is necessary to ex-
plore the type of democracy, understanding of social justice, and method of
problem solving through which the professional engages in order to under-
stand this continuum between expert and civic professionalism.
1. Democracy
While its conceptualization varies widely, democracy can be subsumed
under two generic models that inherently affect professionalism: A weak,
elitist model and a strong, participatory one. 84 The political theory of mar-
ket liberalism provides philosophical grounds for weak democracy.285 In a
283. See Peters, supra note 279, at 47; Kerry J. Kennedy, Rethinking Teachers' Profes-
sional Responsibilities: Towards a Civic Professionalism, 1 INT'L J. CITIZENSHIP & TCHR.
EDUC. 3, 3 (July 2005). An example of this renewed interest is the No Child Left Behind Act
of 2001. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2006). The Act was designed with the theory that setting high
standards and establishing measurable goals can improve individual outcomes in education.
Id. To achieve this, the Act requires states to develop assessments in basic skills to be given
to all students in certain grades. Id. The act was proposed by President Bush and shepherded
through the Senate by Ted Kennedy. Sanford Levinson, What Should Citizens (as Partici-
pants in a Republican Form of Government) Know About the Constitution?, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2009). It received overwhelming bipartisan support and, despite criticism
of its overall effectiveness, Congress increased federal funding for education by forty percent
in 2007. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Fiscal Year 2007 Budget Request Advances
NCLB Implementation and Pinpoints Competitiveness (Feb. 6, 2006), available at
http://www2.ed.gov/news/pressreleases/2006/02/02062006.html. Thus, this legislation repre-
sents Congress' coming together as civic professionals for a common cause rather than as
socially and politically obligated technocrats. See Peters, supra note 279, at 47.
284. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, A PLACE FOR Us: HOW TO MAKE SOCIETY CIVIL AND
DEMOCRACY STRONG 20-21 (1998); JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRITICS, CONTESTATIONS 9 (Will Kymlicka et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter
DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND].
285. BARBER, supra note 284, at 20-22; see DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND
BEYOND, supra note 284, at 9. Market liberalism is a descendent of classical liberalism, clas-
sical denoting before the 20th century. See J.L. Hill, The Five Faces of Freedom in American
Political and Constitutional Thought, 45 B.C. L. REV. 499, 561-62 (2004). Classical liberal-
ists believe the individual should be free from the state and thus stand in direct contrast from
social liberalists who believe in a welfare state. See id. at 543, 561. In a welfare state, public
funds are used to support the needy. See Richard M. Ebeling, National Conflicts, Market
Liberalism and Social Peace, FREEDOM DAILY, May 1994, available at http://www.fff.org/
freedom/0594b.asp. Classical liberalists oppose this, presumably, because as an elitist group
it is the funds of the private wealthy sector which are redistributed in the form of taxes to
support the needy. See id. This redistribution of private wealth infers government interfe-
rence with the individual's right to choose. See id. Therefore, the market or classical liberal-
ism theory suggests a weak democracy because of its focus on the individual. See id.
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tradition of political thought ranging from the works of James Mill and Je-
remy Bentham in the early nineteenth century to Joseph Schumpeter and
Anthony Downs in the twentieth, utilitarian philosophy helps frame the most
important idea in market liberal theory: the self's primary and innate moti-
vation is to maximize the satisfaction of its own desires and preferences.286
Freedom for market liberals means the right to pursue individual interests
without interference from either the state or other individuals. 287 Given this,
technocratic professionals would enjoy similar benefits by engaging in pro-
fessional behavior targeted to individual advancement despite the presence of
social inequity.
288
Unlike the weaker forms of democracy, strong democratic forms exhibit
a "double democratization," where not only the organization of government
but also social and economic institutions require the substantive participation
289Onmo
and judgment of ordinary citizens. One model of democracy, known as
286. See DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND, supra note 284, at 9 (At its
core, liberalism is "based on the assumption that individuals are mostly motivated by self-
interest rather than any conception of the common good."). See generally Terence Ball, An
Ambivalent Alliance: Political Science and American Democracy, in POLITICAL SCIENCE IN
HISTORY: RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND POLITICAL TRADITIONS 41-65 (James Farr, et al. eds.,
1995). Utilitarianism can be described as "the greatest good for the greatest number" of
people. New World Encyclopedia, Utilitarianism, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/
entry/Utilitarianism (last visited Feb. 24, 2010). To achieve this, the market liberalist believes
that the state should be separated "from all economic activity." Ebeling, supra note 285.
287. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND, supra note 284, at 9.
288. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 41; see also SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra
note 274, at 23. To insure the passing of the Fair Housing Act, Anderson, who could not
focus on advancing himself while he knew others had no access to basic opportunities, crossed
party lines. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968). While this did not sit well with his
fellow republicans, Anderson felt this was one of the most useful pieces of legislation he
helped pass while in Congress. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 25:21-24. All this
effort because of a young man whom Anderson knew was qualified for yet deprived of similar
opportunities. Id. at 29:3-12.
289. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 283 (1987). The weaker forms of democracy
are evidenced by the market liberalism---laissez-faire-theory which thrives on individualistic
pursuits. See Ebeling, supra note 285. This is in direct contrast with the civic professional
who thrives in a participatory democracy where the government, through the voice of the
people, provides social services and helps regulate industry. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND
INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 228. Anderson embodies that civic minded professionalism.
He believes in the power of participation and awaits "a new era, when [the] American admin-
istration will concede that international law" plays "an important role in determining our
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developmental liberalism, 290 contains the language of compassion, equality,
social and civic mindedness, dispositions, and attitudes it insists must per-
meate all institutions, not just political ones. 91 Strong democratic citizens
would actively and jointly balance private and public interests always in con-
sideration of the common good.292 Such citizens recognize their dependency
and need for one another not only in personal projects of self-development,
but also in collective efforts to improve society. 93 These citizens would con-
stitute the cadre of civic professionals, motivated to utilize knowledge and
expertise for advancement of the total citizenry.294
2. Social Justice
Encapsulated in notions of equal rights, protections, opportunities, and
obligations for all, philosophies of social justice appear not only in the histor-
ical and contemporary rhetoric of American laws and constitutions, but also
in the professional indoctrination of doctors, social workers, educators, and
the like.295 How professional and political arenas support notions of social
justice within policy and practice is entirely variable and has led to an overall
weakening or attenuation of the foundational ethics and morals of the con-
cept.296 This phenomenon, some might argue, correlates directly with the
individualism and political disengagement afforded within a capitalistic so-
ciety and weakened democracy described above.2 97
From a technocratic perspective, issues related to social justice would
be regulated through the markets, not through governmental or universal
social programs, and would hinge upon a fundamental acceptance that some
290. JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 228 (Prometheus Books 2000) (1935)
[hereinafter DEWEY, LIBERALISM]; see also C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TINES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 47 (1977).
291. DEWEY, LIBERALISM, supra note 290; see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND
EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 25,137 (Paul Monroe ed.,
1916) [hereinafter DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION].
292. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 228.
293. Id.; see also J. Robert Kent, A Global Challenge: Reframing Democracy and Educa-
tion, 41 Am. STUD. 375, 377 (2000). Anderson recognized this need for a collective effort to
benefit society when in an unorthodox move he jumped party lines to secure the crucial Fair
Housing vote. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
294. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 237.
295. See Colleen Galambos, A Dialogue on Social Justice, 44 J. SoC. WORK EDUC.
Spring/Summer 2008, at 1, 4 (concluding that these professions are inherently bound to a code
of ethics which include the moral obligation to support society and its needs respective to their
profession).
296. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 8.
297. See HELD, supra note 289, at 283.
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citizens may never have their basic needs met.298 Given this, an expert pro-
fessional would not have to incorporate philosophies or policies within the
scope of his or her work that would address such concerns. 299 This is not to
say that expert professionals could not maintain personal values related to the
promotion of social justice and equality for all; they very well might.3°° The
important point is that technocrats would avoid consuming professional time
in order to address societal maladies, seeing those issues as separate and dis-
tinct from their responsibilities.3°1
On the other hand, civic professionalism requires the participation of
professionals in the process of targeting and solving societal problems in
order to promote the ideal that all citizens deserve a basic and equitable set
of social rights.0 2 This conceptualization of social justice depends upon the
professional training of a cadre of civic professionals, willing to share exper-
tise in order to promote the greater social good.30 3 While these professionals
undoubtedly benefit both personally and professionally from their expertise,
this deep sense of social obligation consistently guides and influences their
actions.3 4 Most importantly, civic professionals do not have to be racially,
socially, or financially representative of those for whom they advocate be-




298. HILDA BLANCO, HOW TO THINK ABOUT SOCIAL PROBLEMS: AMERICAN PRAGMATISM
AND THE IDEA OF PLANNING 201 (1994); see also JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRACY IN CAPITALIST
TIMES: IDEALS, LIMITS, AND STRUGGLES 21 (1996) [hereinafter DRYZEK, DEMOCRACY IN
CAPITALIST TIMES]. Case in point is the current health care crisis in America. See DRYZEK,
DEMOCRACY IN CAPITALIST TIMES, supra, at 201. It is argued that some government regula-
tion is needed to assure that citizens receive basic health care. Christopher Beam, McCan't
and McShouldn't: At a Kansas City Forum, John McCain and Mitch McConnell Show Why
Bipartisanship on Health Care Is Impossible, SLATE, Aug. 31, 2009, http://www.slate.com/
id/2226793/?from=rss. Currently, while the market controls the system, there are many citi-
zens whose basic needs are not being met. Id.
299. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 9.
300. See id. at 36.
301. Seeid.at1O.
302. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 151; see also Kennedy, supra
note 284, at 3.
303. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 187. The preference inferred
from Sullivan's work is that not just training is needed, but that the type of training should be
civic professionals training other civic professionals. See id. Anderson fulfills this call to
duty as a law professor, ensuring that his ideals carry on through his students. See Anderson
Transcript I, supra note 2, at 107:25-108:1.
304. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 151.
305. See id. at 129. Most of Anderson's fights have been for people with whom he shares
no similar class identity, as well as for issues from which Anderson is completely removed,
such as a women's right to choose. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 91:20-92:1.
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3. Practice
Shaped by models of democracy and perceptions of social justice, pro-
fessionals enter the arena of problem solving and practice in very different
ways given the presence of this expert-civic continuum of professional beha-
vior.306 Guided by a market liberal democracy, technocratic professionals
need not participate in policy-making to any significant extent, with the ma-
jority of their professional time spent in individual pursuits. 37  As highly
specialized professionals, technocrats find little use for collaboration, relying
instead upon expertism and status to diffuse the need for problem solving.
308
By staying focused on individual work, expert professionals allow market
liberalism to diffuse organizational, political, or societal obligations to the
maximum extent possible.3°9 In the event that a technocrat chose to enter a
policy or political arena, he or she would do so armed with ideological ar-
guments and theories all deeply embedded within their particular expertise
and philosophical framework.31°
In contrast, civic professionals understand the delicate balance between
individual gain and the greater social good, acknowledging that practice and
policy-making must occur at multiple levels beyond individual work."' Col-
laboration would be viewed as an important vehicle through which to pro-
mote change, and the civic professional would be comfortable maneuvering
amongst diverse practitioners in order to achieve goals. l2 While civic pro-
fessionals would utilize their expertise to work directly with the populace,
they would also engage in policy-making and political activities at an organi-
306. See Kimberly Ann Harrison, Understanding Professionalism in Education 15 (Dec.
2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Kansas) (on file with Nova Law Re-
view).
307. See BRINT, supra note 276, at 38-39.
308. See id. at 39.
309. See id.
310. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 185. Technocrats embody
today's modem day political conservative who does not dispense with their values despite
people's needs. Harrison, supra note 306, at 46-47. For example, while many of today's
citizens need basic health care, technocrats, such as Mitch McConnell, still believe there is no
problem. See Beam, supra note 298. During Anderson's campaign for presidency, Anderson
introduced television ads in which Gerald Ford articulated, "Anderson never votes with his
party, he always votes with his conscience." Ford's remarks represent a truism of Anderson
that is evidenced by his decision to jump party lines for Fair Housing. See 24 CONG. Q.
ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
311. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 214-15.
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zational and societal level in order to promote macro-level responses to so-
cial problems.313
Fundamental to the collaborative acts of the civic professional, ac-
knowledgment of the tenuous delicate nature of problem solving requires a
pragmatic approach to the work.314 While various definitions of pragmatism
exist, philosophies of political pragmatism focus upon creating and maintain-
ing a civil society without engaging in ideological attacks or rhetoric.
315
Though diversity within the pragmatic school of thought exists, efforts to
utilize inquiry form the basis for determining any necessary action.316 Origi-
nating with the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, and ex-
panded upon by political progressives such as John Dewey, emphasis was
placed upon practicality in problem solving, outside the realm of conjecture
and speculation.3 7 Furthermore, Dewey stressed that the only way to resolve
emergent and complex social problems was to afford individuals opportunity
for civil rights and, most importantly, civic education.318 Critical to the
pragmatic philosophy is the concept of the "via media,"319 the practice of
finding the middle ground from which to begin resolving issues, as opposed
to ideological entrenchment based upon identity, political affiliation, or the
like.320 Thus, civic professionals engage in pragmatic problem solving by
incorporating the various expertise, knowledge, and beliefs of the stakehold-
313. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 231; see also Harrison,
supra note 306, at 65 fig. 2.
314. See BLANCO, supra note 298, at 181; see also SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY,
supra note 274, at 172.
315. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 53 (2003). It has been
suggested by some that the political pragmatist "is concerned with using both the right means
for the right ends, and is willing to let experience inform his assumptions, while the ideologue
is indifferent to the means used and willfully ignorant of experience that challenges his as-
sumptions." Tobin Harshaw, Pragmatism, Viewed Pragmatically, THE OPINIONATOR, Dec.
12, 2008, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com2008/12/12/pragmatism-viewed-pragmatically
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
316. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 172.
317. BLANCO, supra note 298, at 25-27. The reasons for this are twofold: first, practicali-
ty in problem solving aids in the resolution for those without resources in an expedient man-
ner, and second, practicality in problem solving utilizes fewer resources. See id. at 23-29.
When one takes the most practical approach to utilizing resources, unnecessary expenses are
avoided. See id.
318. See DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 291, at 77.
319. Wilfrid Sellars, Language, Rules, and Behavior in JOHN DEWEY: PHILOSOPHER OF
SCIENCE AND FREEDOM 289 (Sidney Hook, ed., 1950). "Civic education ... prepares people
of a country, especially the young, to carry out their roles as citizens." Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Civic Education, Dec. 27, 2007, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civic-
education.
320. See POSNER, supra note 315, at 53.
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ers in an efficient manner, carefully avoiding ideological exploitation in or-
der to arrive at an equitable and timely resolution to any given problem.32'
B. John Anderson as a Civic Professional
John Anderson's commitment to social justice, combined with the
pragmatic manner in which he entered and shaped political debate and action
throughout his career, appears to cast him as a contemporary civic profes-
sional.322 Anderson's abilities to cross party lines, to advocate for those with
whom he had little in common, and to stay firmly rooted in a commitment to
equality demonstrate the synthesis of a collective political, civic, and social
sense of responsibility necessary to promote the greater good. 323
While John Anderson's professional training as a lawyer might have
kept him grounded in technocratic practices, entering the political arena fore-
shadowed his increasing awareness of social problems and his future rele-
vancy in American politics. 324  Furthermore, when Anderson could have
adopted a market liberal approach to his work given his background and
identity, he engaged in the type of participatory political behavior sympathet-
ic to constructions of deliberative democracy and civic professionalism
throughout his career by working collaboratively alongside conservatives
and liberals alike to create social change.325
321. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 231-32; see also Harrison,
supra note 306, at 64.
322. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 3, at 4 ("1 do think that this deeper ethic, humanis-
tic ethic, that you have described of civic professionalism was an important element in fash-
ioning my political career. Because that was the event, not to go endlessly about this one
matter, that brought me really nationwide attention.").
323. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968). Anderson crossed these party lines and
voted with democrats to ensure the passing of the Fair Housing Act. Id. Further, most of
Anderson's fights have been for people with whom he shares no similar class identity as well
as for issues from which Anderson is completely removed such as a woman's right to choose.
See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 91:20-92:1.
324. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 29:3-18. Yet, public service was the
farthest thing from Anderson's mind when he decided to pursue a legal career; rather, he
sought individual prosperity. Id. at 16:18-22. He believed the best direction was a traditional
practice of law where one started with a firm and then formed his or her own firm. Id. at
16:18-25. The most rewarding part of his career, however, was campaigning for the presi-
dency in 1980. Id. at 38:16-19. Though this course seems grounded in individualism, Ander-
son was finally free of the restrictions that were placed on him by conservative Republican
leadership, enabling him to just crisscross the country and openly speak with people. Id. at
38:20-39:3.
325. This is, in one instance, evidenced by his unorthodox move across party lines to pass
the Fair Housing Act. See 24 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 152, 165 (1968).
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Also symbolic of civic professionalism, John Anderson remained firmly
rooted in the ideal of social justice, even at the expense of his own political
opportunity at times.326 The fact that Anderson openly opposed political
allegiances in order to prohibit discriminatory housing practices, as evi-
denced by his support of the Open Housing Act of 1968, demonstrates just
one example of his commitment to social justice, despite historical and envi-
ronmental factors in his life that might have pointed towards contradictory
actions.32 7
Similarly, evidence of pragmatism can be found in John Anderson's
professional practice, particularly because his actions were not reflective of
the kind of radicalism or "identity politics" often rooted in expertism.328 Re-
sisting entrenchment in political labels, Anderson pursued political and poli-
cy-making activities at multiple levels, remaining carefully focused upon
equity as the ultimate goal while working alongside diverse groups of people
to achieve such outcomes. 329 By consistently maintaining a core set of social
justice beliefs, coupled with an ability to focus on the issue and not the emo-
tion or idealism behind the issue, Anderson contributed to the advancement
of civil rights by targeting and ameliorating problems in an efficient and log-
ical fashion.33 °
As would be the case for any civic professional in an environment dom-
inated by a weak democracy and rampant expertism, John Anderson's politi-
cal methods were not always appreciated.33' Yet, this deep sense of civic-
mindedness kept him firmly entrenched in the ethics and values of equity.332
Furthermore, in keeping with notions of civic professionalism, Anderson was
willing to put his political career at stake because of this commitment to the
greater social good.333 As Anderson notes:
326. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 29:22-30:12. While Anderson's move
across party lines did not sit well with his own political party, it was nevertheless one of his
most rewarding moments in Congress. Id. at 25:21-26:23.
327. See id. Another example of his unorthodox motivations was his fight for women's
rights; he championed many causes in which he had no social, class, or gender ties. See id. at
91:20-92:1.
328. See id. at 25:21-24.
329. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 25:21-26:23.
330. See id. at 27:1-5. This core of beliefs likely stems from Anderson's life experiences.
See id. at 55:17-57:10. He was "able to meet people from all walks of life" who represented
various viewpoints, and he admired and embodied the "open mindedness and the willingness
to accept new ways [and] new ideas." Id. at 56:19-23. This was the road that he chose to
travel. Id. at 56:16-24.
331. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 27:6-10, 103:8-17.
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I do think that this deeper ethic, humanistic ethic, that you have
described of civic professionalism was an important clement in fa-
shioning my political career .... I was always pretty well satisfied
that the course I have chosen was the best one for me .... [I]t gave
me the inner satisfaction of knowing that even though I'd failed in
the one attempt I've described-[running for president]-that nev-
ertheless I had, for my own sake, done the things and followed the
path that I thought was best.
334
C. Anderson's Evolution as a Civic Professional
Given the relative impossibility in knowing whether biology played a
role in Anderson's empathic response to human rights and other social jus-
tice issues, exploring relevant environmental factors offers an interesting
opportunity for speculation and analysis. 335 And, while Anderson appears to
be an "insider" for many reasons, including the fact that he is an educated,
white male in American society, many elements of his life cast doubt upon
336the assumption that Anderson remained insulated in that status. Moreover,
the empathic, altruistic behaviors developed over Anderson's history seem to
form the foundation for the civic, pragmatic, and political approach he uti-
lized to influence politics and public policy.337
In considering Anderson as a civic professional, discussions related to
social justice and empathy inherent to the model ignite the nature-nurture
debate and call into question how an individual develops those tendencies.
338
Research suggests that individuals who display caring, empathetic types of
334. Id. at 4.
335. See generally Christopher Boehm, Purposive Social Selection and the Evolution of
Human Altruism, 42 CROSS-CULTURAL RES. 319 (2008).
336. See Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 33:3-17. What are the many elements
that have prevented him from being insulated-any element exposed to outsiders: world's
fair, military, etc.-and exposed him to outsider issues?
337. See id. at 169:13-24; Anderson Transcript 1I, supra note 3, at 1.
338. See generally Boehm, supra note 335. The nature versus nurture debate is one of the
oldest debates in psychology. See Kimberly Powell, Nature vs. Nurture: Are We Really Born
That Way?, ABOUT.COM, Sept. 17, 2009, http:llgenealogy.about.comlcs/geneticgenealogyla/
naturenurture.htm. Even Shakespeare's lago confides in Roderigo, "I am not what I am."
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO act 1, sc. I. The debate essentially poses
the question: Why are we the way we are? I got my eyes from my mother, but where did I
get my personality and talents, or weaknesses for that matter? Did I learn this from my par-
ents and environment, or was I born with it? See Powell, supra. Anderson's traits stem from
a mix of his family, school, and the church. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 3:1-3. In
particular, his desire for social justice, to give back to the people, arguably stemmed from
working at his father's grocery store where he stocked shelves, sacked potatoes, and carried
groceries for the elderly women. Id. at 3:19-24.
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behavior towards others do so because they are environmentally shaped that
way. 339 An example of this can be drawn from the disability community and
their struggle endured over decades to achieve equal rights and opportuni-
ties. 34° Many parents who championed the rights of children with disabilities
in the 1970s did so because their children were directly affected by the disa-
bility and by the lack of educational opportunities afforded them.34' Other
environmental factors hinge on rewards or status gained by displaying the
empathetic, altruistic behavior towards others. 42 It would make sense that
the deep commitment to social justice exhibited by civic professionals might
originate from responses to environmental inequity and the marginalization
of certain citizenry. 43
However, increasing research is actually being targeted to the biological
derivations of empathy with suggestions mounting that empathetic behavior
may be predicated upon genetic predictors. 344 Regardless, speculations of
339. See Frans B.M. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution of
Empathy, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 282 (2008).
340. See generally DANIEL P. HALLAHAN & JAMES M. KAUFFMAN, TEACHING EXCEPTIONAL
CHILDREN: CASES FOR REFLECTION AND ANALYSIS FOR EXCEPTIONAL LEARNERS (7th ed.
1997). It was not until 1987 that the New York City Council approved Local Law 58 which
required the city's buildings to be handicapped accessible. Anthony DePalma, Mandating
Access for the Handicapped, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1988, at Al. Further, it was not until 1991
that Congress mandated a nationwide law that required multifamily housing to be handi-
capped accessible. Id.
341. See National Research Center on Learning Disabilities, Twenty-Five Years of
Progress in Educating Children with Disabilities Through IDEA, http://www.nrcld.org/
resources/osep/historyidea.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). In the early 1970s educational
opportunities were limited for children with disabilities in U.S. schools. See id. Only one in
five children with disabilities were educated and "many states had laws excluding certain
students, including children who were deaf, blind, emotionally disturbed, or mentally re-
tarded." Id. It was with the help of landmark cases such as Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. Pennsylvania & Mills v. Board of Education of the District of Columbia that helped
establish Public Law 94-142, Education for All Handicapped Children Act. Id. This Act was
significant in developing major national goals for implementing educational programs for
children with disabilities. Id.
342. See Brent Simpson & Robb Willer, Altruism and Indirect Reciprocity: The Interac-
tion of Person and Situation in Prosocial Behavior, 71 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 37, 37-38 (Mar.
2008). One environmental factor which may affect an individual's empathetic behavior to-
wards others is the "interaction of the person and situation." Id. at 50. "[R]esearch shows that
egoists respond [more strongly to] the presence or absence of reputational incentives," while
altruists "act altruistically at high levels not only when reputational incentives exist, but also
when they do not." Id.
343. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at 11.
344. See Aurora M. Nedelcu & Richard E. Michod, The Evolutionary Origin of an Altruis-
tic Gene, 23 MOLECULAR BIOLOGY & EVOLUTION 1460 (2006). The altruistic gene theory
presents the issue of whether selfish behavior is genetic and, if so, can one learn to be altruis-
tic. Id. Richard Dawkins, in his book, The Selfish Gene, proposed that people were selfish
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biological influences along with environmental ones related to civic profes-
sionalism are certainly worth considering. 345 Contemplating the influences
upon Anderson's personal and professional demonstrations of civic profes-
sionalism offers an opportunity to consider the relevance of context and mo-
tivation within his personal journey.
1. Family Influences
As Anderson notes, his father was born and raised in Sweden for many
years prior to moving to the United States.346 Whereas Anderson himself did
not experience the realities of living abroad and relocating to the United
States as an immigrant, research supports the notion that individuals who
experience living as the "minority" in a majority society tend to develop cul-
tural awareness and reconfigure ethnocentric tendencies towards a broader
world perspective.347 It is possible that Anderson's father might have in-
because the human gene pool is chemically selfish. John Hansen, Richard Dawkins-The
Selfish Gene, SuITEIO.coM, Aug. 9, 2009, http://americanfiction.suitel01.con/article.cfm/
richard dawkins the selfishgene (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); see also Jane Allyn Piliavin &
Hong-Wen Chamg, Altruism: A Review of Recent Theory and Research, 16 ANN. REV. SOC.
27 (1990). Nevertheless, while our genetic traits may be irreversible, they can be unlearned.
Hansen, supra. Humans, unlike animals who experience this genetic makeup, are not com-
pelled by their selfish genetic makeup. Id. Humans can learn through environmental influ-
ences to be altruistic. Id. Piliavin and Charng suggest that:
[T]here appears to be a "paradigm shift" away from the earlier position that behavior that ap-
pears to be altruistic must, under closer scrutiny, be revealed as reflecting egoistic motives.
Rather, theory and data now being advanced are more compatible with the view that true altru-
ism-acting with the goal of benefitting another--does exist and is a part of human nature.
Piliavin & Charng, supra, at 27.
345. See Boehm, supra note 335, at 342; see also J. Philippe Rushton et al., Altruism and
Aggression: The Heritability of Individual Differences, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
1192, 1192, 1196-97 (1986), available at http://psychology.uwo.ca/faculty/rushtonpdfs/
Altruism%20and%20Aggression%201986.pdf. The authors gave questionnaires to 573 adult
twins of the same sex which "measured altruism, empathy, nurturance, aggressiveness, and
assertiveness." Ruston et al., supra at 1192. The results suggested that "50% of the twins'
variance in altruism, empathy, nurturance, aggressiveness, and assertiveness" were attributed
to genetic influence. Id. at 1196. "[V]ery little, if any, of the twins' altruistic or aggressive
tendencies [were a result] of their common, shared environment." Id.
346. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 2:12-14.
347. See Anthony C. Ogden, Ethnographic Inquiry: Refraining the Learning Core of
Education Abroad, FRONTIERS: INTERDISC. J. OF STUDY ABROAD 87, 109 (2006). It can be
argued that Anderson was not a minority given that he lived amongst a majority of Swedish
immigrants in a close-knit community. See LUNDIN, supra note 4, at 67. According to the
1930 U.S. Census, Swedish immigration in Rockford, Anderson's home town, comprised
forty percent of the total population. Id. Rockford acquired the identification as a "Swede
Town," as "Rockford Swedes occupied the office of both mayor and chief of police [and]
controlled three national banks." Id.
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stilled such values upon his family, having participated in a socially demo-
cratic society for many years.
348
Another potential family influence relates back to Anderson's child-
hood. For example, it was not rare in that time period that half of Ander-
son's biological siblings died of disease during childhood. 349 Although not
atypical of the times, this certainly could portend later, empathic leanings as
research suggests that kinship ties often increase the likelihood of altruistic
behavior.350 As Anderson describes his family as "protective" and "close-
knit," the impact of sibling death upon the psychological and social function-
ing of the family cannot go unnoticed.35' Moreover, it warrants the hypothe-
sis that Anderson learned to accept trauma and misfortune as human realities
with no racial, economic, or gender barriers.352
Likewise, Anderson mentions that his father established a family-owned
grocery business, through which his children participated in the daily opera-
tions in various capacities.353 Anderson notes the tremendous impact of the
Great Depression upon his family's business, and the economic and social
realities of the hardships he and others suffered.354 Again, this experience
cultivated an opportunity for Anderson to experience life as a temporary
"outsider," by witnessing and being influenced by the devastating conse-
quences of poverty.355 Thus, empathic responses to issues related to social
348. Anderson Transcript 11, supra note 3, at 2- 3. Anderson recalled how his father's
tolerance helped shape his life. See id. His father was "very tolerant of people regardless of
their religious beliefs and religious faith and racial background and ... accept[ed] people on
the basis of [their] common humanity." Id. at 3. This tolerance seemed to stem from a "mix-
ture of a striving for acceptance and a desire for greater equality that many immigrants felt."
Id.
349. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 1:25-2:3. Before Anderson was born in 1922,
three of his siblings had succumbed to diseases, one of whom was likely a victim of the 1918
influenza pandemic that swept the globe killing, by some accounts, 2.5% to 5% of the world's
total population. Anderson Transcript 11, supra note 3, at 5.
350. Jon K. Maner & Matthew T. Gailliot, Altruism and Egoism: Prosocial Motivations
for Helping Depend on Relationship Context, 37 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 347, 349 (2007).
351. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 2:4-11; Anderson Transcript I1, supra note 3,
at 5. Anderson proffers that the overly protective nature of his parents was likely a result of
the childhood deaths of three of his siblings. Anderson Transcript II, supra note 3, at 5. He
recalls that his father was particularly distraught from the loss of three of his children and,
being as devout as he was, would make regular visits to their gravesites. Id.
352. VIMALA PILLARI & MOSES NEWSOME, HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT: FAMILIES, GROUPS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND COMMUNITIES 52 (1998).
353. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 3:19-25.
354. Id. at 3:9-12.
355. See Anderson Transcript II, supra note 3, at 7.
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justice and social welfare tend to increase when individuals become intimate-
ly affected by social problems.356
2. Religious Influences
Anderson notes a conservative religious upbringing, which may have
perpetuated a traditionalist approach to life for some individuals. 7  Often,
transmitting strict moralistic values within the family unit, if delivered con-
sistently and repeatedly, are indelibly ingrained in the future actions and be-
haviors of the family members and can lead to intolerance and bigotry.358 On
the other hand, exposure to basic moral values within the family can also
increase the expression of ethics such as empathy and kindness, as well.359
Anderson discusses the role of religion without disdain, yet cannot fully
commit to the notion that his sense of social justice originated with those
experiences. 3' However, Anderson may have knowingly or unknowingly
reshaped certain ideals from this familial religious training into a worldview
of acceptance.361
356. See Nancy Eisenberg et al., The Role of Sympathy and Altruistic Personality Traits in
Helping: A Reexamination, 57 J. PERSONALITY 41, 42-43 (1989).
357. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 11:11-12:3. Anderson says the church's
approach to religion is to believe that "salvation was achieved through faith in Christ and that
to achieve that required a public confession, and [living] by a very strict code." Id. at 11:25-
12:3. Anderson stated that back then,
[The church] was very fundamentalist in its doctrine, and it believed in a public confession of
faith and of living by very strict rules of conduct that included a willingness to eschew what
were, at least by the standards of those early days, regarded as worldly pleasures. And you
were encouraged to find other ways of amusing yourself other than attending the theater and so
forth.
Id. at 12:13-20.
358. GEORGE A. APPLEBY, EDGAR COLON, & JULIA HAMILTON, DIVERSITY, OPPRESSION, &
SOCIAL FUNCTIONING: PERSON-IN-ENVIRONMENT ASSESSMENT AND INTERVENTION 230-31,
238 (2d ed. 2007).
359. Id. at 230-31; see also BRENDA DuBoIs & KARLA KROGSRUD MILEY, SOCIAL WORK:
AN EMPOWERING PROFESSION (3d ed. 1999).
360. Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 33:3-9.
I still cherish the same Evangelical faith, but I interpret it in, I think, far broader terms than an-
ything that I ever specifically recall hearing expounded to me from the pulpit. I can't -- I can't
credit that for the beliefs that I hold very strongly about the rights of human beings to be
treated with equality.
Id.
361. See id. at 33:3-17.
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Anderson fondly describes memories of his public school education, a
fact worth noting for many reasons as it relates to his sense of empathy and
social justice.362 Educational theorists suggest that a public school education
affords children the chance to experience social, economic, and psychologi-
cal realities in society.363 Although, this could easily be argued in terms of
geographic and financial inequities evidenced across the entirety of the
American public school system, civil rights and disability law inherently
demand that children from all walks of life be afforded the chance to be edu-
cated amongst their peers.3" Thus, the influence of such diversity upon An-
derson's public school education could explain his sensitivity and aware-
ness.
365
There is other research to suggest that children benefit from the guid-
ance of strong adult role models in educational settings, 366 and it appears that
Anderson is of no exception. As Anderson dove into debate and government
classes, two particular teachers demonstrated a keen interest in his intellec-
362. Id. at 14:12-18.
I think, in my life, teachers in the public schools became my role model. I particularly remem-
ber a Miss Vincent, who was one of my grade school teachers. And probably [why] I remem-
ber her so fondly is because she let me skip one whole grade and I went into the sixth grade
without pausing from the fourth grade and going through the fifth grade.
Id.
363. See JACK L. NELSON ET AL., CRITICAL ISSUES IN EDUCATION: DIALOGUES AND
DIALECTICS 171 (Jane E. Vaicunas 4th ed., 2000).
364. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EDUCATING ONE & ALL: STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES
AND STANDARDS-BASED REFORM 3 (Lorraine M. McDonnell et. al. eds., 1997).
365. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 363, at 170.
366. Daniel Rose, The Potential of Role-Model Education, ENCYCLOPEDIA INFORMAL
EDUC. (2004), www.infed.org/biblio/role.modeleducation.htm. Rose believes that:
Role model education can be seen as effective because it bridges the gap between the ideal and
reality. Education becomes experiential, as students learn a little about their teachers' lives,
and how they embody the values they are trying to pass on and explore. The gap between
theory and practice is bridged, as ideological concepts become realities before the eyes of the
students. Once they have truly understood an idea because they have seen it at first hand
through teacher's expression of it in the way they conduct themselves, they are only then in a
true position to judge its validity to their life, and then make the relevant lifestyle decision.
Id. Anderson's most notable role models were his debate teachers in high school and college
who taught him:
[T]o be able to learn to argue both sides of the question, even though you were on the affirma-
tive team, that if you were going to be an effective debater, you had to try to put yourself into
the shoes or into the mind of the person who was taking the other side of the question in order
to make the more effective counterarguments that-that should be made.
Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 16:10-17. Further, these educators, in part, inspired
Anderson to pursue a career in public service. Id. at 16:1-2.
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tual development and became clear influencers in his future.367 These men-
tors, as Anderson credits, gave him the opportunity to understand the com-
plexities of vast social problems and political issues while simultaneously
affording him the ability to observe empathy and servitude in action.368 Such
experience no doubt propelled Anderson towards a career in law, which
again forced him to analyze intricate social and political issues with a multi-
faceted lens.369
4. Personal Influences
It should also be noted that Anderson maintained well-established per-
sonal connections to individuals of diverse backgrounds, both in personal
and professional circles. 370 Research related to human diversity delineates
the importance of exposure and suggests that individuals, who reach for op-
portunities to meet and associate with others of varying ethnic, racial, reli-
gious, and sexual orientations, automatically expand their ability to empath-
ize and understand differences. 371 Anderson's desire to maintain an inclusive
social network reinforces his apparent appreciation for diversity and willing-
ness to expand his worldview beyond that which he experienced in child-
hood.372 And, as Anderson acknowledges, the influence of his wife through-
out the marital relationship increased his awareness and appreciation for the
effects of gender inequity and his subsequent professional actions related to
the issue.373
367. Id. at 14:12-13, 15:1-4.
368. Id. at 15:13-18, 16:1-6.
369. Id. at 15:25-16:4, 16:10-16.
370. See Anderson Transcript I, supra note 2, at 171:15-20. In particular, Anderson was
very fond of Representative John Conyers Jr. See id. at 172:6-9. Anderson remembers Con-
yers coming over to him after Anderson's swinging vote on the Housing Act. Id. at 26:11-13,
27:24-28:3. Conyers "came striding over from the Democratic side of the aisle and shook
hands and embraced [him] and thanked [Anderson] for the help that [he] had given." Id.
Anderson considers Conyers as emblematic "of the restlessness of minorities in this country,
at how slow we have been to gradually progress toward the goal of equal rights, of true equali-
ty, regardless of race and color and background and national origin." Id. at 171:15-20. In
addition, Conyers, according to Anderson, represents "the hope of the future." Anderson
Transcript I, supra note 2, at 172:6-7; see supra note 104 and accompanying text (for further
reading regarding Congressman Conyers).
371. KARLA KROGSRUD MILEY, MICHAEL O'MELIA & BRENDA DuBois, GENERALIST
SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE: AN EMPOWERING APPROACH 67 (3d ed. 2001).
372. Anderson Transcript 1, supra note 2, at 56:16-21, 171:15-20.
373. Id. at 135:13-136:11. Anderson describes his wife as "a wonderful partner in what-
ever I did." Id. at 54:2-3. According to Anderson, not only was she without objections to
Anderson's involvement in public life, "she thoroughly approved" of and enjoyed politics as
much as he did. Id. at 54:12-15. Though she had "an independent mind of her own," both
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Clearly, Anderson appears deeply aligned with moral values founda-
tional to a sense of social justice and empathy.374 In retracing his life, it is
possible to weave social, psychological, and biological theories into an ar-
gument for why Anderson would so passionately and consistently advocate
for those with whom he has little in common.375 Yet, simply maintaining a
sense of social justice would not have been enough to produce the impact
Anderson had in political and professional domains given his status as an
insider.376 Arguably, Anderson's success as a civil rights advocate, attorney,
and politician, required the coupling of social justice ideals with pragmatic
practices in order for him to maneuver through such highly-charged political
landmines while staying grounded in a model of civic professionalism.
377
V. CONCLUSION
The clarity and consistency of Anderson's commitment to social justice
and his pragmatic approach to politics affords an opportunity to consider the
relevance of civic professionalism not only as an explanation for his behavior
but for its potential to perpetuate social change given the saliency of human
rights and equality issues related to sexual orientation, immigration, and
health care, dotting the contemporary political landscape. Through whichev-
er lens one views the life of John B. Anderson-reformist, civic professional,
intellectual, prophet--one cannot escape a recurrent theme in Anderson's
life, his incessant striving for something more. Anderson continues to seek
Anderson and his wife were "pretty much of a mind on everything from ... gay rights to
women's rights," and all the other classic issues that many couples may be divided on. Id. at
54:19-24.
374. See Anderson, American Protestantism and Political Ideology, supra note 144, at
155-82.
375. See Jost B. ASHFORD, CRAIG WINSTON LECROY & KATHY L. LORTIE, HUMAN
BEHAVIOR IN THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Jan
McDearmon & Barbara Kimmel eds., Brooks/Cole Pub. Co. 1997).
376. Anderson Transcript II, supra note 3, at 4. Anderson recalls:
I often have told and retold the story of the young man who had come to me during that time
when that legislation was brewing and before its final passage and said, he was a professional
person, a person of color, but he could not locate a home that anyone was willing to rent to him
or sell to him in the section of the city where he really wanted to live and to bring up his family
because of his color. And that resonated with me from the moment he told me that story
through the events that led to the Open Housing Act in 1968. So yes, I do think that this dee-
per ethic, [this] humanistic ethic, that [has been] described [as] civic professionalism was an
important element in fashioning my political career.... [A]nd so I think it gave me the inner
satisfaction of knowing that even though I'd failed in the one attempt I've described, that nev-
ertheless I had, for my own sake, done the things and followed the path that I thought was best.
Id.
377. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 274, at xix; see also Harrison, supra
note 306, at 77-78.
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social justice and voting reform, never wavering in his lifelong commitment
to a higher ideal. It is rare that such a compassionate scholar, having been
born an insider, would consciously live for the voiceless and create an exis-
tence centered around improving those who have neither the means nor the
ability to help themselves. Anderson has etched a place in history as an
avant-guard politician and independent thinker whose ideas continue to
shape our ever-changing future. Time will only serve to establish, and fur-
ther validate, the visionary that is John B. Anderson.
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THE POOR AS A SUSPECT CLASS UNDER THE EQUAL




Both judges and legal scholars assert that the United States Supreme
Court has held that the poor are neither a quasi-suspect nor a suspect class
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unit-
ed States Constitution. They further assert that this issue was decided by the
Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
It is the thesis of this article that the Supreme Court has not yet decided
whether the poor are a quasi-suspect or a suspect class under Equal Protec-
tion. In fact, the majority in San Antonio Independent School District v. Ro-
driquez found that the case involved no discrete discrimination against the
poor. Whether the poor should constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect class
under Equal Protection remains an open constitutional question.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is now blackletter law, taught to thousands of American law students,
that the poor are neither a quasi-suspect nor a suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution.' The United States Supreme Court has stated that the poor are not a
suspect class: "for this Court has held repeatedly that poverty, standing
alone, is not a suspect classification."2
It is the thesis of this article that the issue of whether the poor are a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class under traditional Equal Protection jurisprudence
has not been decided by the Supreme Court. In fact, language in one majori-
ty opinion of the Supreme Court indicates that the poor are a suspect class
and classifications based on this status should receive strict scrutiny from the
courts: "And a careful examination on our part is especially warranted
where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, two factors which
would independently render a classification highly suspect and thereby de-
mand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."3
This article will examine the Supreme Court's suspect class analysis
under the Equal Protection Clause and will explore its application to indigent
persons. The primary contention of this article is that the issue of whether
the poor are a quasi-suspect or suspect class under Equal Protection remains
an open constitutional question.
HI. DEVELOPMENT OF SUSPECT CLASS CATEGORIES
IN EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE
The roots of the suspect class categories emerged in 1938 in what has
been described as "the most famous footnote in the Court's history"-note
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.5 Reflecting on the new defe-
rence that the Supreme Court would apply to judicial review of constitutional
challenges to economic regulatory legislation, Justice Stone suggested in
note four of his majority opinion in Carolene Products that more searching
1. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIEs 786 (3d ed.
2006). Erwin Chemerinsky, a constitutional scholar, states in his constitutional law hombook
that: "In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court expressly held that
poverty is not a suspect classification and that discrimination against the poor should only
receive rational basis review." Id.
2. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (citations omitted).
3. McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (citations omitted).
4. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 209
(2007).
5. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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judicial review should be applied to legislation that, inter alia, reflects "pre-
judice against discrete and insular minorities" who may be inadequately pro-
tected in the majoritarian political process.6
In 1944, the Supreme Court began to identify those minority groups that
would be entitled to special constitutional protection. 7 In Korematsu v. Unit-
ed States,8 the majority wrote that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect" and the "courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." 9 Despite the heightened scru-
tiny, the Court in Korematsu went on to uphold the conviction of an Ameri-
can citizen of Japanese descent for violating an order of the U.S. Military
excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from any "military area" in Cali-
fornia. °
In Boiling v. Sharpe,' a companion case to Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 2 the Supreme Court held that the segregation of school children by race
in the public schools in the District of Columbia violated the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee against unjustified discrimination.13 The majority in Bol-
ling stated: "Classifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with
particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitu-
tionally suspect."'
' 4
The current Equal Protection test for reviewing governmental classifica-
tions on the basis of race began to develop in McLaughlin v. Florida1 5 in
1964.16 A Florida statute made it a crime for a Negro and a white person of
the opposite sex who were not married to habitually share a nighttime
room. 7 A biracial, unmarried couple was convicted under the statute and
they argued that the statute violated their Equal Protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 The majority in McLaughlin concluded that the
statute could only be upheld "if it is necessary, and not merely rationally
6. Id. at 153 n.4. More searching judicial review under Equal Protection should also be
applied to legislation that appears to be facially unconstitutional and legislation that restricts
political processes. Id. at 152 n.4.
7. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
8. Id. at 214.
9. Id. at 216.
10. Id. at 223.
I. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 500.
14. Id. at 499.
15. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
16. Id. at 191-92.
17. Id. at 186.
18. Id. at 187.
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related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy."'9 The Florida
statute failed to satisfy this standard and was invalidated. 20 Later cases an-
nounced the current Equal Protection test for racial classifications, strict
scrutiny: Governmental classifications on the basis of race will only be
upheld if they are justified by a compelling governmental interest and are
necessary to the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental purpose.2' In
addition to strict scrutiny being applied to classifications based on national
origin and race, it has also been applied to state classifications based on alie-
nage.22
The Supreme Court first applied intermediate scrutiny to a quasi-
suspect classification based on gender in 1976 and announced that in order
for such a classification to satisfy Equal Protection it "must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to ... those objec-
tives. 23 Intermediate scrutiny was also applied to classifications based on
illegitimacy in 1988.24
Heightened scrutiny has been rejected in Equal Protection challenges to
classifications based on age25 and mental retardation. 26 These classifications
were subjected to minimal scrutiny-the classifications "must be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose" in order to withstand an Equal
Protection challenge.27
III. POVERTY AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Criminal Law Context
In Edwards v. California,28 the Supreme Court, in 1941, invalidated a
California statute that made it a crime to transport non-resident indigent per-
sons into the state, holding that this statute was outside of the state's police
power and was an unconstitutional barrier to interstate commerce. 9 In his
concurrence, Justice Jackson opined that a state could limit persons from
19. Id. at 196.
20. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 196.
21. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at
196).
22. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
23. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
24. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
25. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
26. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
27. Id. at 446; see Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315.
28. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
29. Id. at 173.
[Vol. 34
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss2/1
THE POOR AS A SUSPECT CLASS
entering the state if, for example, they were fugitives from justice or were
carrying a contagion. 30 However, he further opined that indigence was not a
legitimate reason to bar a person's entry into a state. 31 "The mere state of
being without funds is a neutral fact-constitutionally an irrelevance like
race, creed, or color."32 Justice Jackson was the first Supreme Court justice
to suggest the equivalent constitutional status of classifications based on po-
verty and race.33
The Supreme Court first addressed the relationship between poverty and
Equal Protection in Griffin v. Illinois34 in 1956.3' Griffin involved indigent
persons in Illinois who had been convicted of armed robbery, but who could
not pursue an appeal of their convictions because they could not afford to
pay for the mandatory trial transcript. 36 The Supreme Court held that it vi-
olated Equal Protection to deny an appeal of a criminal conviction to an indi-
gent person who could not afford a transcript, stating "In criminal trials, a
State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account of
religion, race, or color. 37
Similarly, the Supreme Court held in 1963 in Douglas v. California38
that it violated Equal Protection for a state to deny counsel to indigent crimi-
nal defendants in the appeals of their convictions. 39 The Court in Douglas
found that, like Griffin, the "evil" that offended Equal Protection was the
same: "discrimination against the indigent. '
Finding Equal Protection violations in situations where states offered
fewer procedural protections to indigent criminal defendants does not neces-
sarily apply with equal force to non-criminal matters. The Supreme Court
has stated that the Griffin and Douglas holdings are limited to criminal cases
because they involve a government monopoly on prosecution in which par-
ticipation of defendants is compelled, and they "do not extend to legislative
classifications generally."4  Moreover, the Supreme Court has not applied
suspect class analysis or the tri-levels of scrutiny-strict scrutiny, interme-
30. Id. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 184-85.
33. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 185 (Jackson, J., concurring).
34. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 17.
38. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
39. Id. at 357-58.
40. Id. at 355.
41. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,471 n.6 (1977).
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diate scrutiny, or minimal scrutiny-in its application of Equal Protection to
cases like Griffin and Douglas that arise in the criminal procedure context.
B. Civil Law Context
1. Pre-Rodriguez Cases
The significance of poverty in an Equal Protection case outside of the
criminal law context was first addressed by the Supreme Court in 1966 in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections.42 In Harper, Virginia residents chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a $1.50 poll tax on Virginia residents, the
payment of which was a precondition to voting in state elections. 43 The ma-
jority in Harper found that a state's interest in this area is limited to the pow-
er to determine the qualifications of voters."a However, as to wealth as a
voter qualification, the Court stated, "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not
germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.
Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are tradi-
tionally disfavored. 45 The Court went on to hold that the payment of a fee
as a condition of voting in a state election violated the Equal Protection
Clause.46 Harper suggested that classifications on the basis of wealth, like
classifications on the basis of race, should receive heightened scrutiny under
Equal Protection. 47 However, Harper also involved a factor that indepen-
dently leads to heightened scrutiny, an infringement of a fundamental inter-
est: the right to vote in state elections. 4 Consequently, the strict scrutiny
analysis in Harper does not rest exclusively on the indigent status of the
plaintiffs, but was also triggered by their fundamental interest in being able
to vote in state elections.49
The Supreme Court again commented on the role of indigency in Equal
Protection analysis in 1969 in McDonald v. Board of Election Commission-
ers.50 McDonald involved an Equal Protection challenge to Illinois' failure
to allow incarcerated criminal defendants who were awaiting trial to partici-
pate in elections as absentee voters.51 In assessing whether the state policy of
42. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
43. Id. at 664 & n.I.
44. Id. at 668.
45. Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
48. See id. at 670.
49. Id. at 668.
50. 394 U.S. 802 (1969).
51. Id. at 803, 806.
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not allowing inmates to vote absentee must be justified by a compelling state
interest, the majority stated: "And a careful examination on our part is espe-
cially warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, two
factors which would independently render a classification highly suspect and
thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny. 52 The Court in McDo-
nald concluded that the limitations in Illinois' absentee voting procedures
were "not drawn on the basis of wealth or race ' 53 and rejected the Equal Pro-
tection challenge to them.f4 However, the clear implication of the majority
opinion in McDonald was that if the plaintiffs' inability to participate in ab-
sentee voting had been based on their poverty, the Illinois' scheme would
have faced strict scrutiny under Equal Protection.
In Boddie v. Connecticut,56 the Supreme Court in 1971 held that filing
fees in divorce cases, as they were applied to low income persons who could
not afford to pay them, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas asserted that the
poor are a suspect class and the filing fees, as applied to them, violated Equal
Protection.s
In 1971, the Supreme Court in James v. Valtierra59 upheld the constitu-
tionality of a California requirement that all low income housing projects be
approved by public referendum.6 In a dissenting opinion in James, Justices
Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall asserted that the poor were a suspect class
under the Equal Protection Clause.6' Significantly, the Solicitor General of
the United States62 also argued, in his Amicus Curiae Memorandum in
James, that classifications on the basis of wealth are suspect.63 The majority
52. Id. at 807 (citation omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 810.
55. McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807.
56. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
57. Id. at 372, 383.
58. See id. at 385-86 (Douglas, J., concurring).
59. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
60. Id. at 142-43.
61. Id. at 144-45 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. See id. at 145. See generally Memorandum for the United States et al. as Amicus
Curiae, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (No. 154) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Memo-
randum]. The Solicitor General who appeared as Amicus Curiae in James was Erwin Gris-
wold, who was appointed Solicitor General by President Lyndon Johnson. Dep't of Justice,
Office of the Solicitor General, http://www.justice.gov/osg/aboutosg/griswolderwinbio.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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opinion in James did not address whether the poor are a suspect class under
Equal Protection.6
Also in 1971, the systems by which both California and Minnesota fund
elementary and secondary public schools were found to violate Equal Protec-
tion by the Supreme Court of California and a federal district court respec-
tively.65 In both cases, the Courts relied, inter alia, on Supreme Court
precedent to hold that the poor were a suspect class and the school funding
systems, in disadvantaging poor students, did not withstand strict scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
66
In Bullock v. Carter,67 several persons were not allowed to run in Texas
county primary elections because they could not afford to pay election filing
fees required by state law.68 These persons challenged the mandatory filing
fees on Equal Protection grounds.69 A unanimous Supreme Court found, in
1972, that since the filing fees likely impact voting rights-by limiting the
pool of candidates-and the impact is related to the financial resources of
voters, the filing fees would be subjected to strict scrutiny. 70 The Court held
that the filing fees violated Equal Protection because they were not necessary
to achieve the State's legitimate objectives in running efficient primary elec-
tions. 7' The Court concluded that critical to its finding of constitutional inva-
lidity is that "Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion of ability
to pay as a condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some candidates
otherwise qualified and denying an undetermined number of voters the op-
portunity to vote for candidates of their choice. 72
2. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez
In 1971, in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,73 the
Texas system of funding public elementary and secondary schools was found
64. See James, 402 U.S. at 145 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
65. Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870, 877 (D. Minn. 1971); Serrano v. Priest,
487 P.2d 1241, 1263 (Cal. 1971), superseded by statute, CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 31 (2009), as
recognized in Crawford v. Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 104
(Ct. App. 2002). In Serrano the Supreme Court of California only found that the California
system violated Equal Protection based on the allegations presented by the plaintiff and re-
manded the case to the trial court for final judgment. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1263, 1266.
66. Van Dusartz, 334 F. Supp. at 875-76; Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1250, 1263, 1265.
67. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
68. Id. at 135-36.
69. See id. at 136.
70. See id. at 144 (Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not take part in the decision).
71. See id. at 147.
72. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149.
73. 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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by a three-judge district court to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because, inter alia, it disadvantaged students from
indigent families.74 The three-judge court's per curiam opinion found that
wealth classifications, as well as the fundamental interest in education, each
necessitated that Texas justify its funding system by demonstrating that a
compelling state interest supported it; a test that Texas failed to meet.75 A
year later, the Supreme Court accepted Texas' appeal from the decision of
the three-judge district court.76
The Supreme Court's majority opinion in San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez7 7 initially found that the Texas system for fund-
ing public elementary and secondary education results in "substantial interdi-
strict disparities in school expenditures" and that these disparities are "large-
ly attributable to differences in the amounts of money collected through local
property taxation. '78 The Court also noted that "Texas virtually concedes
that its historically rooted dual system of financing education could not with-
stand the strict judicial scrutiny that this Court has found appropriate in re-
viewing legislative judgments that interfere with fundamental constitutional
rights or that involve suspect classifications., 79 The Court further stated that
the judgment of the district court should be affirmed if "the Texas system of
financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect
class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected
by the Constitution. 8°
In determining whether it should apply strict scrutiny in its review of
the Texas school funding system, the Court conducted a lengthy yet ultimate-
ly inconclusive analysis of whether the poor constitute a suspect class under
Equal Protection. 81 The Court described the district court's finding of wealth
discrimination as based on "a simplistic process of analysis: since, under the
traditional systems of financing public schools, some poorer people receive
less expensive educations than other more affluent people, these systems
discriminate on the basis of wealth. '82 The Court further stated that certain
"threshold questions" were largely ignored by the district court and must be
analyzed more closely here: What is the constitutional significance "that the
74. See id. at 281, 285-86.
75. Id. at 283, 285-86.
76. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 406 U.S. 966, 966 (1972), prob. juris.
noted, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
77. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
78. Id. at 15-16.
79. Id. at 16 (internal footnotes omitted).
80. Id. at 17.
81. Seeid. at 15-18.
82. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 19.
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class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary
Equal Protection terms? 83 What is the constitutional significance of "the
relative-rather than absolute-nature of the [alleged] deprivation"?'
The Court found that the district court provided "no definitive descrip-
tion of the classifying facts or ... disfavored class. 85 The Court opined that
the disfavored class could possibly include at least three groups: (1) "per-
sons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty," (2) per-
sons who are disadvantaged due to a correlation between lower family in-
come and lower educational expenditures on their behalf, and (3) all persons
who, regardless of income, live in school districts with lower property valua-
tions. 86 The Court then sought to compare each of these three possible
classes to the two distinguishing characteristics of persons who prior deci-
sions of the Court have found to be victims of unconstitutional wealth dis-
crimination: persons who were "unable to pay for [a] desired benefit, and as
a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of' the benefit. 87
As to the first possible description of the disadvantaged class-persons
whose income falls below an identifiable level of poverty-the Court found
that "neither of the two distinguishing characteristics of wealth classifica-
tions" apply.88 First, the plaintiffs offered no evidence that the Texas school
funding system "discriminates against any definable category of 'poor'
people. '89 Second, plaintiffs failed to establish that any disadvantaged class
experienced an absolute deprivation since all students were receiving a pub-
lic education, even if educational expenditures varied by school district.9°
Moreover, plaintiffs offered no proof that refuted the assertion of Texas that
its school funding system provided an adequate education to all children,
regardless of their school district.9' The Court concluded that "at least where
wealth is involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute




86. Id. at 19-20 & n.50.
87. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 20-21.
88. Id. at 22.
89. Id. at 25.
90. Id. at 23-24.
91. Id. at 24.
92. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24. The Court, in footnote 57 of its majority opinion, cited
four prior Supreme Court decisions for the proposition that, as to wealth, Equal Protection
does not require absolute equality. Id. at 24 & n.57. Illustrative of these decisions is Draper
v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), in which the Supreme Court stated that although an
indigent person who is convicted of a crime is entitled to a free record on appeal, the record
need not be a verbatim transcript of all trial court proceedings that could be purchased by a
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The second possible description of the disadvantaged class is those per-
sons who experience relative discrimination because the Texas school fund-
ing system resulted in a correlation between lower family income levels and
lower educational expenditures.93 However, the Court concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to prove the existence of such a correlation.94
The third possible description of the disadvantaged class is based on
district wealth discrimination, i.e. persons, regardless of income, who live in
school districts with lower property valuations. 95 The Court found that the
evidence presented below did establish a correlation between lower district
property valuations and lower educational expenditures, "without regard to
the individual income characteristics of [the] district['s] residents., 96 The
Court described the students in the school districts with the lower property
values as "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the com-
mon factor of residence in districts that happen to have less taxable wealth
than other districts."97 The Court also asserted that this third class had "none
of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."98 The Court
concluded its analysis of the suspect class issue by stating that "the Texas
system does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class." 99
The Court further held that education is not a fundamental right under
the Constitution and, therefore, strict scrutiny of the Texas school funding
system was not required.'0° Finally, the Court concluded that the Texas
school funding system, with a commitment to adequate funding for all stu-
dents, is rationally related to a legitimate state interest and, therefore, satis-
fies the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.0°
As to whether the poor are a suspect class under Equal Protection, the
majority in Rodriguez made several key findings. First, they found that there
non-indigent person but rather a lesser record that is adequate and effective at presenting the
issues on appeal is constitutionally acceptable. Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96. For example, if
the defendant is only attacking the validity of the underlying criminal statute, no transcript
need be provided by the state. See id.
93. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 25.
94. See id. at 27.
95. Id. at 27-28.
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id. at 28.
98. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
99. Id.




: Nova Law Review 34, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2015
NOVA LAW REVIEW
was no evidence that the Texas school funding system discriminated against
the poor in any discrete way.' °2 Second, they found that the group that was
disadvantaged by the Texas school funding system was the students living in
school districts with lower property values and these students shared no
common income characteristics.103 Finally, they found that this latter disad-
vantaged group did not possess the characteristics of a suspect class under
Equal Protection.' °4 Thus, the issue of whether the poor are or are not a sus-
pect class under Equal Protection was not answered by the majority in Ro-
driguez. Nevertheless, the Rodriguez holding on the suspect class issue took
on a mythical life of its own in future Supreme Court decisions.
3. Medicaid Abortion Prohibition Cases
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program that provides health insurance
to low-income persons. 05 In 1975, Connecticut promulgated a regulation
that limited Medicaid reimbursement "for first trimester abortions to those
that are 'medically necessary."" 6 Two indigent women who were unable to
obtain Medicaid-reimbursed abortions in Connecticut challenged the state's
imposition of the medically necessary limitation on, inter alia, Equal Protec-
tion grounds,'0 7 and their case reached the Supreme Court in Maher v. Roe. 08
The Supreme Court recognized in Maher that if the limitation operated to the
disadvantage of a suspect class it would require strict judicial scrutiny.' °9
The Court also recognized that the Connecticut limitation denied the indigent
a medical service based on a wealth classification.1"0 However, the Court
concluded that this case involved no discrimination against a suspect class
because "this Court has never held that financial need alone identifies a sus-
pect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.'' Thus, the Court in
Maher concluded that the poor are not a suspect class because the Supreme
Court has not previously recognized them to be a suspect class. 12 While the
102. Id. at 25.
103. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at23, 27.
104. Id. at 28.
105. See42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2006).
106. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977) (internal footnotes omitted).
107. Id. at 466-67.
108. See id. at 464.
109. Id. at 470 (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17).
110. See id. at 471.
Ill. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470-71 (citing Rodriquez 11, 411 U.S. at 29; Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)). The Supreme Court majority in Dandridge did not address
whether the poor are a suspect class. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 471.
112. See Maher, 432 U.S. at471.
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Maher Court accurately stated that no prior Supreme Court decision had
found the poor to be a suspect class,"3 it does not follow that the obverse is
true, i.e. that this history means the poor are not a suspect class. Rather, it
simply means that the Supreme Court had not previously decided whether
the poor are a quasi-suspect or suspect class under Equal Protection.
A later Supreme Court case, Harris v. McRae,' 4 addressed whether the
Hyde Amendment, a federal prohibition on Medicaid reimbursement for
abortions unless the mother's life is threatened by the pregnancy or the con-
ception resulted from incest or rape, violates Equal Protection. 15 The Court
in Harris acknowledged that "the principal impact of the Hyde Amendment"
fell on the indigent." 6 However, the Court relied on Maher to conclude that
limitations on Medicaid-funded abortions affect no suspect class of indigent
persons.'1 7 The Harris Court went further to state that "this Court has held
repeatedly that poverty, standing alone, is not a suspect classification."'' 8
Thus, the Supreme Court inaccurately asserted in Harris that it had consis-
tently found that the poor are not a suspect class." 9 In fact, none of its prior
decisions had so held.
4. Status of the Poor Under Equal Protection
The creation of quasi-suspect and suspect classes in Equal Protection ju-
risprudence is based on a judicial recognition that certain groups have suf-
fered historical discrimination under American law and need special consti-
tutional protection from the majoritarian political processes that may contin-
ue to disfavor them. 2° As a result, any government classifications that dis-
advantage these groups and are challenged on Equal Protection grounds will
receive heightened scrutiny from the courts to ensure that the classifications
are carefully drawn to achieve important governmental objectives.121
113. Id.
114. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
115. Id. at 301-02.
116. Id. at 323.
117. Id.
118. Id. (citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 145 (1971)). The Supreme Court majori-
ty in James did not address whether the poor are a suspect class.
119. See Harris, 448 U.S. at 323. In a later Equal Protection case, the Supreme Court
cited Harris for the proposition that state statutes should not be subjected to strict scrutiny
even if they affect the poor and the wealthy differently. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487
U.S. 450, 458 (1988).
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The courts will consider several factors in determining whether a par-
ticular group should be treated as a quasi-suspect or suspect class under
Equal Protection.'22 These factors include: whether there are legitimate rea-
sons for the government to treat members of the group differently than other
persons; whether members of the group have immutable characteristics;
whether federal and state legislation reflects a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice against the group; whether the group is politically powerless in its abili-
ty to attract the attention of lawmakers; and whether there are principled
ways to distinguish the group from other similar groups who might seek
heightened scrutiny under Equal Protection. 123 The Supreme Court has never
applied these factors to the consideration of whether the poor as a group are
or are not a suspect class under Equal Protection.
The treatment of the poor under the Equal Protection Clause has been
uneven.'24 In the context of criminal prosecution, it is now well established
that to deny the poor basic procedural protections because of their inability to
pay for them violates Equal Protection. 25 In the civil context, the Supreme
Court has offered dicta indicating that classifications based on wealth, like
those based on race, involve suspect classifications that should trigger strict
12612
scrutiny. However, the Supreme Court has never directly so held. 27
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 28 the issue of
the poor as a suspect class was considered by the Supreme Court.1 29 Howev-
er, the Court majority found that the plaintiffs failed to establish any discrim-
ination against the poor as a group. 30 Moreover, they found that the plain-
tiffs in Rodriguez only established a single correlation between lower district
property values and lower educational expenditures. 3' The Court further
found that the group who was disadvantaged as a result of this correlation
was "a large, diverse, and amorphous class, [who was] unified only by the
122. See id.
123. Id. In City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court rejected quasi-suspect or suspect class
status for the mentally retarded. Id.
124. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.
12, 17-20 (1956).
125. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58; Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17-18.
126. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs,
394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
127. The Supreme Court's best opportunity to decide whether the poor are a quasi-suspect
or suspect class under Equal Protection arose in James v. Valtierra, but the majority did not
address the issue. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143-45 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
128. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
129. Id. at 17-18.
130. Id. at 22.
13 1. Id. at 25-27.
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common factor of residence in districts that happen[ed] to have less taxable
wealth than other districts" and that this group did not share any common
income characteristics. 3 ' The Court concluded that this indistinct class that
shared no common income characteristics had "none of the traditional indicia
of suspectness.' 33 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the "Texas system
does not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class. ' 34 De-
spite the narrowness of the Court's holding on the suspect class issue in Ro-
driguez, the case has been cited inappropriately for the broad proposition that
the poor are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.
135
The Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez on the suspect class issue
can only fairly be described as the Court finding that the plaintiffs failed to
establish that the poor as a group were disadvantaged by the way that Texas
funded its schools. 136 The Supreme Court in Rodriguez did not address
whether poor persons as a group have any of the traditional indicia of sus-
pectness137--e.g., whether they have been subjected to a history of purpose-
ful unequal treatment or have been relegated to a position of political power-
lessness-that would trigger strict scrutiny. Rodriguez did not decide wheth-
er the poor as a group are a quasi-suspect or suspect class under the Equal
Protection Clause.
The issue of whether the poor are a quasi-suspect or a suspect class un-
der Equal Protection has not yet been decided by the United States Supreme
Court. To properly decide this issue, the Court would need to carefully as-
sess whether the indicia of suspectness apply to the poor in America. 138 Until
such an assessment is done by the Supreme Court, the status of the poor un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment remains an
open constitutional question.
132. Id. at 28.
133. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
134. Id.
135. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977).
136. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at28.
137. Id.
138. Id. The best example of the Supreme Court's application of the "indicia of suspect-
ness" to a particular group occurred in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985). In City of Cleburne, the Court held that the mentally retarded con-
stituted neither a quasi-suspect nor a suspect class. Id.
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No matter how they felt about law school when they were students,
graduates' perspective is likely to improve as time passes. Such is the case
for members of the Avon Law School Class of 1958, who had returned for
their fiftieth reunion.2 The school has provided some excellent refreshments,
and the classmates mingle and share stories from yesteryear. Our heroes,
Ford Sr. and Hart Sr., reminisce about their years at the school and how
proud they are that their sons both attended Avon Law in the 1970s. After
saying hello to yet another person named "Dean," they steal away from their
colleagues to revisit the law school and the library. We join them as they
wander through the hallowed halls.
* Associate Dean, Director of the Law Library and Information Resources, Professor of
Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Newark, New Jersey. Dean Roehrenbeck is in her
twenty-eighth year as a law school administrator.
** Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center, Davie,
Florida. Professor Richmond completed twenty-eight years as a law school administrator in
July 2009.
1. A few years ago, the authors noticed an increase in the number of assistant and
associate dean titles used at many law schools. They had used Ford Jr. and Hart Jr. on two
previous occasions, involving library subject-area alcoves and rescuing a clueless faculty
member from bad teaching evaluations. Because Ford Jr. and Hart Jr. were too busy
practicing law to help this time, the authors decided to enlist Ford Sr. and Hart Sr.
Fortunately, their fiftieth law school reunion was at hand and they could obtain much of the
data without raising the suspicions of the deans and other administrators. See Research
Methodology infra for specifics of the research and a list of the Association of American Law
Schools' charter member schools on which this study focuses. Unless a reference indicates
otherwise, data discussed in this article covers only the charter member schools.
2. The faculty members and administrators in this play previously appeared in earlier
"histories" of the fictional Avon Law School. See Carol A. Roehrenbeck & Gail Levin
Richmond, Three Researchers in Search of an Alcove: A Play in Six Acts, 84 LAw LIBR. J. 13,
14 (1992) [hereinafter Three Researchers]; see also Gail Levin Richmond & Carol A.
Roehrenbeck, From Tedious to Trendy: A Tax Teacher's Triumph, 17 NOVA L. REV. 739,
739-40 (1993).
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(IN ORDER OF APPEARANCE)
HART SR.: a member of the Class of 19583
FORD SR.: another member of the Class of 1958'
AMANDA BONNER: Associate Dean for Career Services
5
MARIAN PAROO: law librarian
6
MICHAEL LIGHTCAP: the dean
7
JOHN LINDSAY: a law professor8
A'riCuS FINCH: Associate Dean for Academic Affairs9
Other assistant and associate deans too numerous to list
ACT 1: OUTSIDE THE RECEPTION AREA
HART SR.: I needed to take a short break from the group. I'm so con-
fused by the names, and I don't want to insult anyone.
Every other law school employee I've met tonight has the
same first name-Dean. My head is spinning. In our day
we had good, solid names and lots of variety-Milton,
3. Father of Hart Jr. See JOHN J. OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE 52-54 (1971), in
which Ford and Hart broke into Langdell Hall at approximately 5:00 a.m. Once inside, they
proceeded into the stacks, remaining long enough to avoid an encounter with Professor
Kingsfield. Id. In the movie version, they entered the red set room in the library in search of
class notes belonging to Professor Kingsfield. See THE PAPER CHASE (CBS/Fox Video 1973).
4. Father of Ford Jr. See OSBORN, supra note 3, at 52-53.
5. Sometime after her appearance in Three Researchers, supra note 2, Professor
Amanda Bonner joined the administration. Her character is named after the defense attorney
portrayed by Katherine Hepburn in ADAM'S RIB (Loew's, Inc. 1949).
6. Professor Paroo joined the Avon Law School faculty after leaving River City, Iowa,
to attend law school. Unfortunately, this facet of her history was omitted from the stage
(1957) and motion picture (1962) versions of The Music Man. See THE MUSIC MAN (Warner
Brothers 1962) (starring Shirley Jones as Marian); MEREDITH WILSON, THE MUSIC MAN
(1957).
7. Dean Lightcap has not followed the trend of shorter deanships. He was Avon's dean
when Three Researchers, supra note 2, was written, and he has no plans to "retire" to the
faculty. He is the namesake of the law professor played by Ronald Coleman in THE TALK OF
THE TOWN (Columbia 1942).
8. Professor Lindsay, who also appeared in Three Researchers, supra note 2, has never
been an administrator. In this regard, he is a rarity at Avon Law School. When portrayed by
Edward G. Robinson in I AM THE LAW (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1938), he served as a special
prosecutor.
9. After To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Brentwood Productions 1962) appeared, Finch left
the practice of law and became a professor at Avon Law School. Since his appearance in
Three Researchers, supra note 2, he has become Associate Dean for Academic Affairs.
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Benjamin, or Arthur, for example. These people's parents
seem to have been fixated on the name "Dean." Perhaps
they all hoped that their children would become deans at
some university. How embarrassing for all of them to have
ended up here at the same school. I bet the students get con-
fused with all these folks named "Dean" running around."'
(Hart and Ford enjoy a good laugh.)
FORD SR.: You certainly are right. Maybe there was someone famous
with that name twenty-five or thirty years ago. Was there a
famous Dean other than Dean Martin, Dean Acheson, or
John Dean that would explain how the name came into
vogue? Perhaps those parents should have followed our
path-I can't imagine Ford Jr. being named "Dean."
HART SR.: We should go ask someone.
FORD SR.: Maybe we should wait, Hart. One of those chaps named
"Dean" said there would be a tour after dinner. Why don't
we ask him about the name thing and find out when the tour
will be held.
HART SR.: Don't worry. Nobody will notice that we aren't at the recep-
tion. Say, what is this office?
FORD SR.: It says "Career Services."
HART SR.: Maybe it's for undergraduates-to encourage them to attend
law school.
FORD SR.: Oh look, the place is run by somebody else named "Dean,"
Dean Bonner. Let's ask that woman if he is in. Maybe we
can resolve this name thing right now.
BONNER: Can I help you two? You look lost.
HART SR.: We want to talk to Dean Bonner.
BONNER: I'm Dean Bonner.
FORD SR.: Uh, no we want the gentleman named Dean Bonner.
10. When our protagonists entered law school in the mid-1950s, the average number of
law school deans and other administrators was 2.5. See infra Appendix, Chart A (using the
average for 1955). The administrative team in most law schools consisted of a dean, a
librarian, and sometimes an assistant dean. (Empirical data is available in the offices of the
authors.) The regional average for the Midwest was 2.4, the Northeast was 3.1, and the West
Coast was 2.5. See infra Appendix, Chart C.
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Bonner: I am Dean Bonner-Dean Amanda Bonner. What can I do
for you?
Hart Sr.: Uh, excuse us. We're confused. We keep meeting people
called "Dean." We met the dean of the law school so we
know that these other folks aren't the "Dean," but we're
trying to figure out why so many parents named their kids
"Dean." When we attended school, there was only one dean
and he was a he."'
Bonner: Well, I think things may have changed a bit since you
attended law school. Here at Avon we have ten deans, both
male and female, and that is not unusual.
1 2
Ford Sr.: You mean all those folks are deans at the school?
Bonner: Yes-the dean and nine assistant or associate deans.
Ford Sr.: Well what do they all do?
Ford Sr.: And why would they put a dean from the undergraduate
school in the law school? Is the university trying to talk
undergraduates into a law career? Don't they know they
want to be lawyers by the time they get here?
Bonner: (Somewhat annoyed) What are you talking about?
Hart Sr.: He means why do they have this career office here? Surely
it can't be for law students. They should already know they
want a career in law.
Bonner: (Still annoyed) Today Career Services does much more than
place students in jobs. We help law students in many ways,
11. By the time our protagonists attended law school the expansion in administrators was
just beginning. See James M. Peden, The History of Law School Administration, THE
HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARIES AND PRIMARY
SOURCES 1105, 1116-17 (Steve L. Sheppard ed., 1999). For example, in 1916, the Harvard
Law School administration consisted of Dean Roscoe Pound and an administrative staff of
two; in 1923, Columbia's trustees voted to create the position of Assistant to the Dean. Id. at
1116. By the time Hart Sr. and Ford Sr. completed their first year of law school, Michigan
had both an associate and an assistant dean, and Rutgers Law School had a dean, an assistant
dean, and an associate professor who also served as librarian. See id. at 1117; ASs'N OF AM.
LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OFTEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS: 1956, at28, 110 (1955).
12. In 2005, the average number of administrators in our sample was 10. See infra
Appendix, Chart A. The regional averages were Midwest 9.75, Northeast 13.27, and West
Coast 9. See infra Appendix, Chart C.
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including resume writing, practicing interviews, and finding
the position that best advances their legal career path.
3
Hart Sr.: Ford, I think we need to let Dean Bonner get back to work.
We should rejoin our group.
Ford Sr.: Thank you, Dean Bonner.
Outside in the hallway, Hart and Ford confer.
Ford Sr.: I knew we shouldn't have left the group. Now we've of-
fended Dean Bonner.
Hart Sr.: Ford, keep quiet for a minute. We know the law school had
only one dean and a librarian when we were students. They
ran the place. I can't believe there are ten deans now.
Ford Sr.: Well most are assistant or associate deans according to Dean
Bonner.
Hart Sr.: Do you remember how many deans were there when our
sons were in law school?1
4
Ford Sr.: The only thing my son had to say about law school was
something about some tough professor named Kingsfield.
He and your son almost got caught breaking into the library
looking for notes before an exam. 15
Hart Sr.: This deserves some research. Let's go to the library and see
if we can find the law school yearbooks.
Ford Sr.: Oh dear, this brings back memories, not all of them good.
Do you think Marian Paroo is still around?16  Maybe she
could help us.
13. The use of "career services" instead of "placement" was not limited to law schools.
Between 1975 and 1997, the majority of [four-year] institutions changed the name of their
career planning and placement function from 'placement' to 'career services,' reflecting the
broader mission and expanded programs and services. In 1997, 88 percent of career services
offices were centralized units and 78 percent reported to student affairs, with 15 percent
reporting to academic affairs.
R. Samuel Ratcliffe, Use of the CAS Standards by Career Services Directors at Four-Year
Public Colleges and Universities II (July 14, 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Virginia
Polytechnic Institute and State University), available at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/avail-
able/etd-07262004-150008/unrestricted/RatcliffeDiss.pdf.
14. The average number of administrators in 1975, the year after our protagonists' sons
graduated, was 4.77. See infra Appendix, Chart A.
15. See OSBORN, supra note 3, at 52-53.
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
ACT 2: MARIAN PAROO'S OFFICE
Act 2 occurs simultaneously with Act 1. Marian Paroo is alone in her
office, packing up her files. She is retiring after sixty years at Avon Law
School, a fact that will be announced to the alums at the reunion dinner the
next evening. Dean Lightcap plans to use the announcement as a fundraising
springboard, to endow the Marian Paroo Professorship. Dean Lightcap
enters.
Lightcap: Marian, why aren't you at the reunion party? The alums are
eager to talk to you. After all, you've been at Avon Law
longer than any other faculty member.
Paroo: I'll be up in a minute. I was going through these files and
simply lost track of time. Is there anything in particular you
need?
Lightcap: Actually, I've come to give you some wonderful news.
President Stodgy has approved your promotion to Associate
Dean for Library & Technology. 7
Paroo: I didn't know I was being considered for an associate dean
title. After all, I'm retiring in two months. If I've managed
without the title for sixty years, what is the point of having it
for eight weeks?
Lightcap: Well, that is the problem. Although you never asked for the
title, it appears that librarians want the same titles as the ad-
ministrators in career services, admissions, student affairs,
graduate programs, academic affairs, clinical and externship
programs, academic support, development, and budget. The
person to whom I've offered your position won't accept it
17. The use of titles incorporating more than the word "librarian" to refer to the library
director begins to appear in 1996. See infra Appendix, Chart F. Early titles include Associate
Dean for Library and Computer Service (Columbia), Associate Dean (Northwestern), and
Dean for Information Resources (Washington University). Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCH., THE
AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1996-1997, at 115, 163 (1996). By the year 2005, ten
schools in the charter group had AALS Directory listings that included information, computers,
or associate or assistant dean in their library director titles. See Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCH., THE
AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2005-2006, at 29 (2005). The use of the associate or
assistant dean title also appears in other publications or resources. See, e.g., Carol
Bredemeyer, What Do Directors Do?, 96 LAW LIR. J. 317, 318-19 (2004). For example, in
an article published in 2004, Carol Bredemeyer reported, 'Today, nearly 40% of the
responding directors have responsibility for all law school technology. Many have had
assistant or associate dean added to their title ... ." Id. at 318 (internal footnotes omitted).
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unless I make her an associate dean. And I knew getting
another title through President Stodgy would be easier if it
was for you-President Stodgy really appreciates all the free
research your staff has provided the university and the
library space you've given up for university storage.
Paroo: But doesn't he know I'm retiring at the end of the semester?
Lightcap: Details, details, details. He's such a busy person, and I hate
to bother him with the day-to-day operations of the law
school.
Paroo: I take it that he doesn't know.
Lightcap: In any event, the maintenance workers are putting a new
nameplate on your door at this very moment. Congratula-
tions, Marian.
Lightcap leaves a few minutes before Ford Sr. and Hart Sr. arrive.
ACT 3: MARIAN PAROO'S OFFICE
When Ford Sr. and Hart Sr. arrive at Marian Paroo's office a few min-
utes later, they do not notice the nameplate on the door. They knock and
enter when she says, "Come in."
Ford Sr.: Professor Paroo, it's so good to see you after all these years.
We're back for the reunion and wanted to stop and say hello.
Hart Sr.: And we need your help figuring out what has happened to
our law school.
Paroo: Gentlemen, what are you talking about? It's the same law
school it's always been. Avon Law School doesn't chase
after fads the way some other schools do. The curriculum is
virtually the same as it was when you were students.18 We
even have some of the original tables in the library. And,
although we've added some modem gadgets, like computers
for students to use for what we call online legal research,
18. But cf ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF
LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA 6 (2004) ("It has been a decade of dynamism in legal education.
From the first year required curriculum through upper division electives, law schools have
revised the configuration of courses, increased emphasis in skills and professionalism, and
added opportunities in electives, specializations and other degree granting offerings."). As
Professor Paroo noted, Avon Law School has not followed this trend.
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you'll notice the books are all still in place. Of course I also
have some helpers-librarians who perform online legal
research and teach research classes.' 9
Ford Sr.: That may be, but what about all these dean people? We
weren't in the building more than fifteen minutes before we
met at least five of them. At first we thought their first
names were Dean-a frightful lack of imagination by their
parents-but then Dean Bonner in Career Services informed
us it was a title and that the law school had nine assistant and
associate deans. Can this be true? When we were students,
there was only one dean, good old Dean Diditall.
20
Hart Sr.: Exactly-the school seems to have deans in charge of every
function, even functions I've never heard of. Dean Diditall
and his secretary ran everything-admitted us, got us jobs,
and asked us to give money. You ran the library. Why does
Avon need anything else? Does the school really have
NINE assistant and associate deans?
Paroo: Well, I must admit I get a bit confused about who I should
go to for different things. If you ask me I'd say, "Less is
more, but .... "
Ford Sr.: That's a relief. Perhaps that Bonner person really is named
Dean and didn't want to admit her parents lacked imagina-
tion.
Paroo: No, Amanda really is an associate dean. She was more easy-
going when she was a young faculty member. Satisfying the
job aspirations of law students is probably less enjoyable
than being a full-time faculty member.
Ford Sr.: But how many assistant and associate deans are there really?
Paroo: As of a few minutes ago, we have ten. It appears I am now
an associate dean.
19. In 1955-56, the average number of librarians in the charter group was 5.17, although
three schools, Harvard (reporting 17), Michigan (reporting 18), and Yale (reporting 20),
reported numbers well above those reported by the other schools that reported to the American
Association of Law Libraries (AALL). See infra Appendix, Chart E. In 1955-56, the total
number of librarians in the charter group was 150; by 2005 it had increased to 347. See infra
Appendix, Chart D.
20. In 1955, the total number of administrators in the charter group was seventy-four; by
2005 it had increased to 326. See infra Appendix, Chart B.
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Hart Sr.: I'm sure we're delighted for you, but we still don't under-
stand why the school needs so many titles. Can you help us
out here? You were always so good to us when we were
students. In fact, our sons have fond memories of sitting in
the library doing their homework while we attended class.
Law school life was challenging for returning veterans and
their families, but you were always so gracious. I'm sure
you were an important factor in their decision to attend
Avon Law.
Paroo: It was my pleasure. Now I don't want to keep you from
your reunion. Meet me for breakfast tomorrow morning,
and I'll explain everything. How is eight a.m. at the Campus
Diner?
Ford Sr.: We'll see you then.
ACT 4: THE CAMPUS DINER
Paroo, Hart Sr., and Ford Sr. sit around a table and enjoy breakfast.
Paroo: Gentlemen, let me take you back in time. When you gradu-
ated in 1958, law schools were relatively small and uncom-
plicated.21  We admitted almost all of our applicants, told
them to look to their left and right because one-third of them
wouldn't survive the first year, and taught them in large
classes using the Socratic Method. When a student gradu-
ated, he 22 went home and joined a local firm or hung out a
shingle. The dean, his secretary, and the library director
could handle most tasks on their own or with a bit of help
from the central university.23
21. Total J.D. enrollment reported by 127 American Bar Association-approved law
schools for the 1955-56 academic year was 33,405. Memorandum from James P. White,
Consultant on Legal Educ. to the Am. Bar Ass'n, on Women Enrollment: First Year, J.D.,
Total to the Deans of ABA Approved Law Schs. (Apr. 16, 1997) (on file with the authors)
[hereinafter Memorandum from James P. White]. The average law school thus had an
enrollment of 263 J.D. candidates. See id. The total number of J.D. students in the charter
group was 11,600. See infra Appendix, Chart G.
22. Total enrollment of women in 1955-56 was 1234. Memorandum from James P.
White, supra note 21. This constituted slightly less than four percent of total J.D. enrollment.
Id.
23. In 1957, the AALS reported that fifty-two schools had a library staff of one person.
Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCH., ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION 445 (1961).
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Over time, accreditation standards and government regula-
tion increased the number of services law schools provide.
And, given ABA Standards regarding qualified students,'
the look to the left and right method no longer worked.
Schools needed to hire staff to review applications and select
among applicants. As tuition increased, financial aid be-
came increasingly important. The focus on career services,
bar passage, academic support, disability services, pro bono
opportunities, etc., required additional staffing-and not
merely at the clerical level.25 And, because deans were con-
stantly on the road raising money, they no longer had time to
run the day-to-day law school operations. The increase in
administrative staffing had begun by the time your sons at-
tended Avon.26 And, while law schools were becoming
more complex, they were also increasing in size. Many law
schools added additional J.D. students.27 Others added
LL.M. or non-law master's degree students. Many did both.
24. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, STANDARDS & RULES OF
PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLs 38 (2009), Standard 501(b) [hereinafter
STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS] ("A law school shall
not admit applicants who do not appear capable of satisfactorily completing its educational
program and being admitted to the bar.").
25. "A law school shall provide all its students ... with basic student services, including
maintenance of accurate student records, academic advising and counseling, financial aid
counseling, and an active career counseling service to assist students in making sound career
choices and obtaining employment." Id. at 43, Standard 511. "A law school shall provide the
academic support necessary to assure each student a satisfactory opportunity to complete the
program, graduate, and become a member of the legal profession. This obligation may require
a school to create and maintain a formal academic support program." Id. at 24, Interpretation
303-3.
26. From 1916 to the mid 1950s, law schools experienced a second wave of adding
administrators. Peden, supra note 11, at 1117. For example, in 1956, the University of
Michigan added its first associate and assistant deans. Id.; see also Jeffrey Brainard, Paul Fain
& Kathryn Masterson, Support-Staff Jobs Double in 20 Years, Outpacing Enrollment, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Apr. 24, 2009, at Al (looking at universities generally rather
than at specific departments).
27. As illustrated in Appendix, Chart H, fall semester J.D. enrollment at American Bar
Association-approved schools increased significantly from 1995 through 2005. See infra
Appendix, Chart H. Data for 1955 through 1995 appear in the White Memorandum. See
Memorandum from James P. White, supra note 21. Data for 2000 appears in the Morgan
Memorandum. See Memorandum from Rick L. Morgan, Data Specialist, on Fall 2000 Law
School Enrollment in ABA-Approved Law Schools to the Deans of ABA-Approved Law Sch.
(Apr. 5, 2001) (on file with the authors). Data for 2005 appears in the Rosenlieb
Memorandum. See Memorandum from David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist, on Fall 2005 Law
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And then there are all the questionnaires. Sometimes it
seems that all I do is answer questionnaires. The ABA col-
lects mountains of data every year. Then along come U.S.
News, Peterson's, Princeton Review, NALP, and others I
can't even remember. And that is just the tip of the iceberg.
Because the university is regionally accredited, it must sub-
mit significant amounts of data.28 Law school administrators
have to respond to those requests. Faculty members can't be
bothered with those requests; they want to focus on teaching,
scholarship, and community service. Non-faculty adminis-
trators can be hired-or terminated-more easily; and some
of them add to the curriculum by teaching on an adjunct
basis. 29
Hart Sr.: OK. I understand why you need more administrators. But
why must they all be called "Dean"?
School Enrollment in ABA-Approved Law Schools to the Deans of ABA-Approved Law Sch.
(Feb. 10, 2006) (on file with the authors). The 2005 data covered 191 law schools, yielding an
average J.D. enrollment of 737 students. (Note that 2004 data is used for Tulane and Loyola-
New Orleans, which were forced to suspend operations after Hurricane Katrina in 2005.).
Within the charter group, J.D. enrollment increased from 11,600 in 1995 to 23,537 in 2005.
See infra Appendix, Chart G. The increase in Chart H is more dramatic than that in Chart G
because Chart H reflects an increase in the number of law schools during that period. The
American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar website
currently provides enrollment and graduation data for the 1963--64 through 2008-09 academic
years. See ABA, Enrollment and Degrees Awarded 1963-2008, available at http://www.
abanet.orgflegaled/statistics/charts/stats - I.pdf. By 2008-09, there were 200 accredited law
schools (including provisionally approved schools) and a total of 142,922 students enrolled in
J.D. programs. Id.
28. See STANDARDS & RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note
24, at 4, Interpretation 101-1.
29. See id. at 32. The American Bar Association computes student/faculty ratio using a
formula found in Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools. Id.
Interpretation 402-1 counts full-time faculty members on tenure track or its equivalent as
"full" faculty members if they don't have significant administrative duties; those who have
significant administrative duties count for less (.5 each). See id. at 32-33. Other percentages
apply to full-time clinicians and legal writing instructors who are not on tenure track or its
equivalent (.7 each) and to adjuncts, emeriti, and administrators who are not on tenure track or
its equivalent (.2 each). Id. at 33. For purposes of computing the ratio, the additional
resources represented by individuals in the .7, .5, and .2 categories cannot exceed twenty
percent of the count of "full" faculty members. Id. at 32. A proposal to delete Interpretation
402-1 is pending. See Memorandum from Hulett H. Askew, Consultant on Legal Educ., and
Richard J. Morgan, Chair, Standards Review Comm., on Proposed Deletion of Interpretations
402-1 and 402-2 of the ABA Standards for the Approval of Law Schools to Interested Pers. &
Entities (Aug. 2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/committees/Standards
Review documents/N & C 402-I.DOC.
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Paroo: That is a very interesting question, and it has a variety of
answers. One explanation relates to reporting hierarchies.
Each new reporting level requires a new title. Once an of-
fice has used assistant director, associate director, and
director, assistant or associate dean is the next step. Another
explanation involves salary levels. A university might attach
a maximum salary to a particular title; at some point, a better
title is the dean's only way to justify a higher compensation
level. A third possible explanation relates to respect. Some
university vice presidents treat deans, including associate
and assistant deans, better than they do directors. Faculty
members are more likely to be civil to an assistant dean than
to a director. Students today may hesitate at calling a dean
by his or first name; we aren't sure they will do so for
directors, coordinators, or other titles that would not
normally be used in conversation.
Ford Sr.: You mean students actually call you Marian? We would
never have done that.
Paroo: There are those who do. I wonder if that practice will end
now that I have this exalted associate dean title.
Although I don't know why, my successor refused to accept
this position without the title change. I was surprised to hear
that. So after you left last night, I did some research into
librarian titles. Although most of the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools (AALS) charter members continue to use
the director title,30 I was surprised to learn that many library
directors have become assistant or associate deans. Appar-
ently, I'm the tail end of a trend rather than its vanguard.
By the way, please act surprised tonight when Dean
Lightcap announces my retirement.
30. See infra Appendix, Chart F; Ass'N OF AM. LAW ScH., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF
LAW TEACHERS 2009-2010 (2009) [hereinafter AALS DIRECTORY 2009-2010]. The AALS
Directory released in fall 2009 showed that seven of the thirty charter schools (Drake, George
Washington, Minnesota, NYU, Ohio State, Syracuse, and Washington University) included
dean titles in describing their library directors. Harvard used a dean title on its website but
indicated only "director" in the Directory; Northwestern used a dean title on its website (in
addition to a separate director) but did not include the dean in its Directory listing. See id.
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John Lindsay and Atticus Finch emerge from a booth at the back of the
Campus Diner. They are engaged in a heated discussion and don't notice
Paroo, Hart Sr., and Ford Sr.
Paroo: Gentlemen, what is causing so much angst? You appear not
to have noticed us at all. Let me introduce you to two alums
from the class of 1958, Hart Sr. and Ford Sr. You may have
taught their sons, Hart Jr. and Ford Jr.
Lindsay: I'm glad to make your acquaintance. I assume you are back
for reunion weekend.
Finch: It's my pleasure to welcome you back. Now that I am the
associate dean for academic affairs, I don't teach as many
students as I used to. I do seem to recall teaching your sons
when I was a young faculty member. I hope all is well with
them.
Paroo: Please join us for coffee and let us know what you were
debating a few minutes ago.
Lindsay: Sorry, Marian, but we got carried away discussing Dean
Lightcap's five-year plan. I appear to be the odd man out
around here. From my perspective, the plan amounts to
empire building. I'll admit he'll raise a significant amount
of money, and we really do need a building addition. But
I'd hoped for new classrooms and faculty offices. The blue-
prints seem to call for more administrative offices, and that
probably means yet another gaggle of assistant and associate
deans. Finch, here, went over to the "dean" side awhile ago.
He can't wait to add publications and human resources
offices, separate alumni from development, and establish a
faculty development office within academic affairs.
Paroo: John, it can't be as one-sided as that. Perhaps the class-
rooms and faculty offices are on the upper floors.
Lindsay: Unfortunately not. The upper floors will be student apart-
ments, which I grant are a good idea, even though it means
adding yet another administrator-an assistant dean for
facilities management. No wonder we all wear name
badges-it's the only way to recognize all these non-faculty
administrators.
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Finch: John, I know I'll never convince you, but Avon is behind the
curve on this issue. Dean Lightcap did his research before
proposing the five-year plan. These new titles, and others
we aren't proposing, already exist at other law schools. I'm
sure Marian can verify this. In fact, many of her fellow
library directors have become assistant and associate deans.
Lindsay: I know I'm "just" a law professor, but that doesn't mean I'm
ignorant. I don't think you'll ever convince me all these
administrators improve our school.
Finch: "Just" a faculty member? John, you are no more "just" a
faculty member than a diamond is "just" a mineral. The last
time I looked you were the Major Donor Distinguished Pro-
fessor of Law and Director of the Program in Applied Legal
Ethics. And you are hardly alone; at least half the members
of this faculty direct a program, a center, or an institute. I
don't recall your declining that opportunity or complaining
about any of the other faculty titles.31 In the end, it's all
about providing service to our students. No matter how
much we'd like them to be, law schools aren't one-room
country schoolhouses and our students don't want them to
31. For example, in early April 2010, the website of AALS charter member Columbia
University listed the following titles for faculty administrators who are not deans: Director,
European Legal Studies; Director, Center for Gender and Sexuality Law; Director of the
Center for the Study of Law & Culture; Director of the Center for Chinese Legal Studies;
Director, Center for Japanese Legal Studies; Co-Chair, Charles E. Gerber Transactional
Studies Program; Director of Clinical Education. Columbia Law Sch, Full Time Faculty,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/faculty/full-time (last visited Apr. 3, 2010). The website also
listed several other Centers: Center for Climate Change Law; Center for Contract and
Economic Organization; Center for Korean Legal Studies; Center for Institutional and Social
Change; Center for Israeli Legal Studies; Center for Law & Philosophy; Center for Law and
Economic Studies; Center for Public Interest Law; Center on Corporate Governance; Center
on Crime, Community and Law; Center on Global Governance; Kernochan Center for Law,
Media and the Arts; Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment.
Columbia Law Sch., Programs, http://www.law.columbia.edu/center-program (last visited
Apr. 3, 2010). Several of these other Centers listed faculty members as directors, but the
faculty list supra did not include the director title. Columbia's administration included a dean,
two vice deans, an associate dean for finance and planning, an associate dean for development
and alumni relations, an assistant dean for faculty services, an assistant dean for special
projects, an assistant dean for registration and financial services, a dean of admissions, a dean
of career services, a dean of graduate legal studies, a dean of social justice programs, a dean of
students, and a law library director. Columbia Law Sch., Admininistration (and links from
this page), http://www.law.columbia.edu/lawschool (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
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be. Let's have this conversation at the end of the five-year
plan. I bet you'll see that I was right.32
ACT 5: DEAN LIGHTCAP'S CONFERENCE ROOM
A year has passed since the reunion. Dean Lightcap has called a meet-
ing of all of the associate and assistant deans. The recession, and resulting
lack of employment opportunities for recent college graduates, has resulted
in more applicants to law schools. Unfortunately, Avon Law School cannot
accommodate more students--despite its need for revenue-unless it hires
more faculty members. The university has cut the budget in most areas and
imposed a freeze on adding additional personnel. The only way the school
can hire more faculty members is by reducing its costs for non-faculty
administrative personnel.
Lightcap: Friends, this is a sad day for me. You have all worked so
hard for Avon Law. Your efforts are a major factor in our
success. Unfortunately, we are victims of the current eco-
nomic downturn. Our endowments have plummeted in
value, thus reducing discretionary income; the university has
cut our operating budget; and we cannot add new personnel.
The only way I can add new faculty, which we sorely need
to cover courses demanded by our students, is to eliminate
non-faculty positions.
If you hold a tenure-line faculty position, I will either add to
your administrative duties or return you to the full-time
faculty. If you are a non-faculty administrator, I will be
furloughing you-or the directors who report to you-for a
few days each month. In some cases, I will be eliminating
positions. If you have a J.D. degree and are not teaching a
course, I will expect you to do so if you are retained. 33 You
32. Whether Finch is correct is the subject for another article, but the statistics
demonstrate that law school administrations have expanded dramatically since 1955. See
infra Appendix, Chart B. The number of administrators increased 341%. Id. The number of
librarians increased 131%. See infra Appendix, Chart D. The number of students increased
103%. See infra Appendix, Chart G.
33. See Peter A. Facione, 20 Ways for Colleges to Cut Costs and Make Money, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Mar. 20, 2009, at A36. The methods the author suggests
include requiring "every administrator with a master's or doctoral degree to teach a course"
and offering "employees temporary or partial leave without pay but with full benefits." Id.;
see also Gary A. Olson, The Unkindest Cut of All, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Oct
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are all such valuable contributors, and I hate to take these
steps. But because faculty members generate tuition reve-
nue, I cannot eliminate their positions while retaining non-
faculty administrators. The university is establishing an out-
placement office to help you find other positions. It has
been an honor to work with you all.
5, 2009, at A42 ("Seek to reduce the number of administrators when possible. Administrative
posts sometimes proliferate just as unnecessary programs do.").
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APPENDIX
Research Methodology
For the purpose of this study, we focused on the charter members of the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS).34 We collected data from
the thirty schools that remained in the charter group and excluded schools
that resigned or whose status was not clear.35 In instances where data was
not available or recorded, that fact is noted on the charts. In one case a
school, Indiana University, had two locations (Bloomington and Indianapo-
lis), separate faculties and librarians, but one administration. When separate
data was available it was included in the study. We used five-year intervals
and began in 1955, the year that Ford Sr. and Hart Sr. began law school.
All data for administrators was taken from what our protagonists would,
in politically incorrect language, refer to as the "Stud Book" and that is today
known as The AALS Directory of Law Teachers. To arrive at the number of
administrators for any given year, we counted individuals listed as dean,
associate dean, assistant dean, and librarian. We did not count other titles,
including director, that begin to appear more recently because it was not
clear how much, if any, administrative responsibility those titles included. If
those individuals were included, the number of administrators would be
34. Charter members were determined by the "Charter Member" designation in The
AALS Directory of Law Teachers. See AALS DIRECTORY 2009-2010, supra note 30. The
AALS was founded in 1900 with thirty-two charter members. Ass'n Am. Law Sch., About
AALS, http://www.aals.org/about.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). Professor James Bradley
Thayer, Harvard Law School, was its first president. Id. Professor Michael H. Cardozo of
Cornell University Law School became the Association's first Executive Director in 1963 and
established the Association's national office. See id. From a full-time staff of two in 1963
(including the Executive Director), the AALS full-time staff has grown to approximately
twenty, including the Executive Director, Deputy Director, and Associate Director. Id. The
staff is based at the national office in Washington, D.C. See id.
35. Charter member schools were Boston University, California-Hastings, Western
Reserve (which later became Case Western Reserve), Cincinnati, Colorado, Columbia,
Cornell, Drake, George Washington, Harvard, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Iowa College of Law
(Des Moines) (listed as Drake in 1905), Kansas, Michigan, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York University, Northwestern, Ohio State, University of Pennsylvania, University of
Pittsburgh, Stanford, Syracuse, Tennessee, Washington University (St. Louis),Wisconsin, and
Yale. The original group of members, those who signed the Articles of Association before
July 1, 1901, also included Baltimore, Buffalo, and Denver Law School. REPORT OF THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1901 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE ABA 576-77. Baltimore and Buffalo resigned in 1906. REPORT OF THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITrEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1906 ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE ABA 125-27. Denver is listed as a member until 1905. ASS'N OF AM. LAW
SCHS., PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING 2 (1905). We counted Indiana as two
schools to reflect the two campuses. See id.
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much higher. Because the AALS did not publish a directory during the
2008-09 academic year, we could not use that source to report on 2008 or
2009 data. Because we ended with 2005 data, the charts may not reflect
changes caused by the current economic downturn or other factors.
Data for librarians was taken from the American Association of Law
Libraries (AALL) Directory.36 These numbers may differ from the numbers
reported in other surveys and calculations based on other data sets or using
different compilation methods. While the study generally uses five year
intervals, this was not possible for the years 1965 and 1975. The AALL
Directory was published biennially from 1964 to 1980, so we selected 1966
and 1976.37 The director of the library is included in this category. The
director is also counted as an administrator and appears in the numbers for
law school administrators if he or she was listed in the AALS Directory.
Titles for librarians that were the basis for the information in Chart F were
taken from the AALS directories. As noted in the preceding paragraph, this
information may differ from information reported in other surveys and
directories. The numbers in Chart F include librarians who listed decanal
titles such as assistant or associate dean and titles including computer or
information resources or variations thereof.
Student enrollment numbers were taken from multiple sources. The
numbers in Chart G, Total Number J.D. Students, AALS Charter Member
Schools, were taken from American Bar Association statistical reports with
titles that varied over the time period of the study.38 The numbers in Chart
H, Total Number J.D. Students, All ABA Law Schools, were taken from
American Bar Association Memoranda.39 Chart H is the only chart that is
not restricted to charter member schools.
36. Title variations include LAW LIBRARIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (1940-
1962/3), DIRECTORY OF LAW LIBRARIES (1964-1987), and AALL DIRECTORY AND HANDBOOK
(1987/88).
37. The data for the 1966 and 1976 Directories were based on questionnaires submitted
to libraries in January of 1966 and 1976.
38. See ABA, COMPREHENSIVE LAW LIBRARY STATISTICAL TABLE; ABA, STATISTICAL
SURVEY OF LAW SCHOOL LIBRARIES AND LIBRARIANS; and ABA, A REVIEW OF LEGAL
EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (The Association, Chicago).
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"[A] man's dying is more the survivors' affair than his own."'
Murders, plagues, accidents, tragedies, and disasters regularly claim
2multiple lives in one fell blow. The issue of simultaneous death arises when
* Victoria J. Haneman, Associate Professor of Law, University of La Verne College of
Law; B.A., Arizona State University, 1996; J.D., California Western School of Law, 1999;
LL.M., New York University, 2000, Taxation. Jennifer M. Booth, B.A., University of Cali-
fornia Santa Barbara, 1999; J.D., California Western School of Law, 2007. An earlier version
of this paper was presented by Professor Haneman at the "Emerging Issues in Estate Planning,
Probate & Trust Law Symposium," Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Houston, Texas,
March 26, 2009. The authors would like to thank research assistants Benjamin Reusch and
Shannon Shafron Perez.
1. THOMAS MANN, THE MAGIC MOUNTAIN 532 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans., Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc. 13th ed. 1963) (1927).
2. Advances in modern transportation may increase the frequency with which simulta-
neous deaths occur. See Stephen M. Arcuri, Note, Does Simultaneous Really Mean Simulta-
neous? Interpreting the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, 17 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 338,
340-41 (2004) (noting the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws'
recognition that "instances of simultaneous death [would increase] as a result of the advances
in forms of transportation"); Richard W. Harris, Federal Estate Tax Consequences of Com-
mon Disasters or Closely Proximate Deaths, 47 TAx LAW. 763, 763 (1994); Keith A. Pagano,
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there is insufficient evidence that two individuals died otherwise than simul-
taneously. Imagine, for example, a newly married couple is riding on a train.
A tragic accident ensues and the train is derailed. Husband is partially deca-
pitated, and Wife's heart is unceremoniously severed by a metal stake. The
first medical expert speculates that Husband survived Wife by at least three
minutes. After examining the remains, this expert believes that the partial
decapitation left the spinal column intact, and blood flow continued to Hus-
band's brain for several minutes. Conversely, the second medical expert
asserts that Wife survived Husband. She believes that both Husband and
Wife died immediately after receiving their injuries, but Wife's injuries were
incurred later than Husband's, based upon where she was seated in the train
car at time of impact. If it is resolved that Wife survived Husband, Wife's
heirs will inherit Husband's assets through Wife. And if it is resolved that
Husband survived Wife, Husband's heirs will inherit Wife's assets through
Husband. As a result, much is at stake for the heirs apparent, 3 and litigation
ensues.
In the case of closely proximate deaths, the legal issue that must be re-
solved is the order of death. Irrebuttable prescription of a particular order of
death simplifies resolution of this question of fact. Therefore, many states
have adopted arbitrary time periods by which one decedent must survive the
other to inherit.4 In California, the simultaneous death statutes are asymme-
trical. As a result, the devolution of property in such cases will hinge entire-
ly upon the type of estate plan adopted by the decedents.
5
If the decedent dies intestate, California Probate Code (CPC) section
6403 requires clear and convincing evidence of survival by 120 hours.6 CPC
section 6211 applies to statutory wills, and adopts the same standard. 7 CPC
section 220 is applicable to those decedents who die with a non-statutory will
in place-such as a holographic will or a formally attested will.8 This sec-
tion requires clear and convincing evidence of death, but does not adopt the
120-hour rule.
9
Note, Simul et Semel: Estate Planning Principles and the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act's
Corresponding Tax Consequences, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 449,449-50 (2000).
3. An heir apparent is defined as "a person who is certain to inherit unless excluded by
valid will." THE LAw DICTIONARY 195 (7th ed. 1997).
4. See Harris, supra note 2, at 764-65.
5. See 3 California Probate Practice, § 23.05(2)(b)(i) (LexisNexis Matthew Bender
2009).
6. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403(a) (West 2010).
7. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6211 (West 2010).
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The same policies that prompted the California Legislature to adopt the
120-hour rule in some instances can be argued to support the 120-hour rule
in other instances. A more compelling argument in favor of legislative
symmetry, however, is the fact that inheritance should not turn merely upon
the testamentary instrument-or lack thereof-selected by the decedent. The
present inconsistency has little or no detrimental effect upon a decedent who
retains counsel to draft his testamentary instruments, while the self-
represented decedent is adversely affected.
This Article proposes that the 120-hour rule be codified as a default
rule, applying to all instruments in lieu of a provision to the contrary. Sec-
tion I considers the evolution of the California simultaneous death statutes.
The inconsistencies in the California statute are considered in Section II, and
weighed against a broader normative standard. Section lIl sets forth the pro-
posal that the 120-hour rule be consistently adopted through the CPC as the
standard default rule, and counters criticisms.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF SIMULTANEOUS DEATH1" IN CALIFORNIA
A. Overview of Simultaneous Death
Rapid mass transportation, natural disasters, and multiple homicides"
are common situations in which a decedent and his heir apparent will perish
without clear evidence as to the order of death.' 2 Order of death is the ques-
tion raised by the closely proximate deaths of the decedent and his heir ap-
10. The term "simultaneous death" is a misnomer, since the two individuals may not
have died simultaneously. In this Article, the term is used to indicate a scenario in which the
two individuals are known to have died at approximately the same time, but the order of their
death is uncertain.
11. One multiple murder case occurred in Woodstock, Illinois, when Richard Church
allegedly brutally beat and stabbed his former girlfriend's parents and attacked the girlfriend
and her younger brother. Marja Mills & Nancy Ryan, New Clue in Woodstock Slayings: 2
NIU Students Report Seeing Suspect Richard Church, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 13, 1989, at D6. The
coroner's office determined that the parents died within a minute of each other. Id. Due to
the close proximity of their deaths, a simultaneous death issue arose as to whose heirs should
get the proceeds of a $360,000 life insurance policy. Id. Based on their wills, if the mother
had been deemed to have survived, the money would go to her estate and the children would
inherit the proceeds. Id. However, based on the coroner's report, the father was deemed to
have survived the mother by one minute; therefore, the proceeds were to go to his father,
recently deceased. Id. Fortunately, the family members negotiated the disbursement of these
funds and ensured the children were provided for; however, this is not always the case. Mills
& Ryan, supra. Newspapers across the country are inundated with stories of murders and
other types of incidents where multiple deaths occur within close proximity of each other.
12. Perhaps there are no surviving eyewitnesses to attest to order of death, or alternative-
ly, the nature of the disaster or accident leaves the order of death in question.
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parent. Much hinges on the answer to the question. Order of death will ul-
timately determine if the devolution and distribution of assets will flow from
the decedent through his heir apparent, who is also now deceased, to the be-
neficiaries of his heir apparent--or alternatively, if inheritance will flow
from the decedent directly to his heirs, bypassing the heir apparent entirely.,
3
This is significant, in that the average decedent would prefer to leave proper-
ty to his heirs, rather than the beneficiaries of his heir apparent.
The order of death is a question of fact. 14 Advancements in medical
science and technology sometimes blur where the line should be drawn be-
tween life and death. 15 Medical experts often offer contradictory opinions on
the precise time of death, 16 wielding sanguinary medical evidence, and fuel-
ing protracted litigation.' 7  When deaths occur within a short period of
time,' 8 determination of order of death may be nothing short of speculative.' 
9
13. See generally David Polin, Proof of Survivorship of Common Disaster, 56 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3D 255, § 3 (2009).
14. David W. Meyers, Time of Death: Medicolegal Considerations, 16 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 2D § 11 (2008).
15. Even the definition of death remains somewhat ambiguous. Some courts have used
Black's Law Dictionary's definition of death. See, e.g., In re Estate of Schmidt, 67 Cal. Rptr.
847, 854 (Ct. App. 1968) (holding the wife had survived her husband by ten to fifteen minutes
on evidence of her moaning and breathing through the application of Black's Law Dictionary
definition, which focuses on "'the total stoppage of the circulation of the blood and [a] cessa-
tion of the animal and vital functions [consequent thereon] such as respiration.... pulsation,"'
etc.). Other courts have resorted to signals of death which may contradict one another such as
receptivity-or lack of-to painful stimuli, lack of movement or breathing for at least an hour,
EEG readings, and hypothermia. See In re Haymer, 450 N.E.2d 940, 945 n.9 (111. App. Ct.
1983). When cases turn on the determination of time of death and the definition is not stan-
dard, the outcome of such cases may rest solely on the judge hearing the case. See, e.g., Smith
v. Smith, 317 S.W.2d 275, 282 (Ark. 1958). One such case involved a husband and wife who
were killed in a common accident. Id. at 276. The husband was dead and unresponsive to
resuscitation while machines supported the wife for seventeen days. Id. The case turned on
whether the wife had simultaneously died with the husband or whether her coma state was
enough to deem that she survived him by seventeen days. See id. at 277. The court decided
that the fact she was breathing, albeit with the assistance of machines, was sufficient to sup-
port a finding that she survived the husband. See id. at 276, 282.
16. Polin, supra note 14, § 37.
17. See Edward C. Halbach, Jr. & Lawrence W. Waggoner, The UPC's New Survivorship
and Antilapse Provisions, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1091, 1095 n.24, 1149 (1992).
18. As an interesting side note, two new studies have found a "bereavement effect" in
which close individuals die within short periods of time of each other due to factors such as
emotional attachment and shared environments, with elderly couples most at risk of simulta-
neous deaths. See generally Chris Emery, Science Seeks Explanations; Shared Emotions and
Environments Can Contribute to Simultaneous Deaths, BALT. SUN, July 30, 2006, at A I6.
19. See Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 1094 ("Too often, proof of survival,
even survival by only an instant, became impossible in such cases.").
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At common law, in simultaneous death scenarios, heirs were expected
to prove survivorship by whatever means available. 20 When it was not poss-
ible to establish order of death, decedents were treated as having died at the
same moment in time, and property was distributed accordingly. 21 Upon a
finding of instantaneous death, the share that would have gone to the benefi-
ciary-now deceased-was deemed to have lapsed and either passed to those
mentioned in the residuary clause of a will, or passed through intestacy to the
heirs of the decedent. 22 To bring efficiency to this area of the law, several
state legislatures attempted to resolve order of death through the use of arbi-
trary presumptions.
23
Irrebuttable prescription of a particular order of death simplifies prob-
lems created by indeterminable death order, such as double administration,
conflict, and litigation. 4 When there is insufficient evidence of order of
death, approximately twenty-one states have incorporated a 120-hour surviv-
al requirement into their statutes-requiring that an heir apparent survive the
decedent by 120 hours to inherit from the decedent. 25 California is one such
state.26
B. Governing Statutes in California
A valid will in California may come in one of three forms: An attested
will, a statutory will, or a holographic will.27 California has adopted a 120-
hour rule for both intestacy and statutory wills. 28 California Probate Code
section 6403 governs intestacy and provides a bright-line workable stan-
20. Harris, supra note 2, at 765.
21. Id. (citing In re Estate of Conover, 259 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)).
22. See generally THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS § 140 (2d ed.
1953).
23. Harris, supra note 2, at 765-66 (explaining that presumptions included 'the younger
person survives the older,' or 'the male survives the female,' or that a 'parent survives a minor
child or infant').
24. Mark A. Lester, Identifying and Solving Selected Problems in Probate Administra-
tion, 15765 NAT'L Bus. INST. 47, 75 (2005).
25. Harris, supra note 2, at 763-64.
26. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6403, 6211 (West 2010).
27. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110 (West 2010) (attested will requirements); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6111 (West 2010) (holographic will requirements); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6200 (West 2010)
(statutory will requirements); see also 14 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, WILLS AND
PROBATE § 111 (10th ed. 2005) (discussing attested and holographic wills); Id. § 115 (discuss-
ing statutory will requirements).
28. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6403, 6211.
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dard. 9 In order to take an intestate share, the deceased beneficiary's estate
must show by clear and convincing evidence that the beneficiary survived
the intestate decedent by at least 120 hours. 30 Failure to meet this time re-
quirement results in the beneficiary being treated as predeceasing the dece-
dent, unless the treatment would cause the property to escheat to the state. 31
The 120-hour rule was adopted for intestacy to protect married couples with
children from prior relationships who die simultaneously. 32 A similar provi-
sion protects those who use statutory wills pursuant to California Probate
Code section 6211, as long as specific, standard language is used in the
will.
33
California Probate Code section 220 is the default rule governing simul-
taneous death and applies to formally attested and holographic wills.34 Sec-
tion 220 requires that the beneficiary show survival by clear and convincing
evidence.35 If order of death cannot be determined by clear and convincing
evidence, section 220 prescribes that each party will be treated as if that par-
ty predeceased the other.36 A beneficiary may take under the will as long as
there is clear and convincing evidence of survival by one breath, as no 120-
hour limitation is incorporated into this statute.37 Unless the beneficiary's
29. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403(a) (intestacy standards); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6211 (sta-
tutory will standards).
30. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403(a).
31. CAL. PROB. CODE. § 6211.
32. See Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, 17 CAL. L. REVISION
COMMISSION REP. 443,447 (1984).
33. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6211. The 120-hour rule applies in a statutory will provided
that the language contains either the phrase "if living" or who "survives me," and failure to
survive will similarly cause the gift to lapse and return to the estate of the deceased testator.
Id. The statutory will form cannot have words crossed out, and all provisions provide "sur-
vive [sic] me." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 2010). The accompanying instructions ad-
vise:
A person must survive you by 120 hours to take a gift under this Will. If that person does not,
then the gift fails and goes with the rest of your assets. If the person who does not survive you
is a relative of yours or your spouse, then certain assets may go to the relative's descendants.
Id.
34. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 220, 6111 (West 2010).
35. CAL. PROB. CODE § 220. The clear and convincing standard has been interpreted as
"clear, explicitly and unequivocal;" "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt;" and "suffi-
ciently strong to commend the unhesitating assents of every reasonable mind." Lester, supra
note 24, at 76 (citing In re Angelia P., 623 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1981), superseded by statute, WELF.
& INST. § 366.26, as recognized in In re Cody W., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 848 (Ct. App. 1994) and
cases cited therein).
36. CAL. PROB. CODE § 220.
37. In re Estate of Schmidt, 67 Cal. Rptr. 847, 852 (Ct. App. 1968) ("If the burden of
proof is met, survival by one second is enough to make the statute inapplicable.") (citing In re
Estate of Di Bella, 100 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (Surr. Ct. 1950)). Although it seems drastic, courts
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estate can sufficiently prove survival or the will explicitly provides a con-
trary presumption, the testator will be presumed to have outlived the named
beneficiary.38 If the beneficiary's estate fails to show survival by clear and
convincing evidence, the person asserting survivorship has failed to meet the
burden of proof and the property lapses, returning to the testator's estate.3
C. The Model Uniform Code and the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act
The simultaneous death provisions in the California Probate Code have
been adapted from the Model Uniform Probate Code and the Uniform Simul-
taneous Death Act (USDA),4° both of which are "model codes" offering uni-
form rules that states may adopt in whole, part, or not at all.
4 1
The USDA was created in response to various cases in which the need to
determine the order of death became apparent.42 To replace "the former arbi-
trary and complicated presumptions of survivorship with effective, workable,
have upheld survival by seconds. See In re Estate of Rowley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 139, 141, 143 (Ct.
App. 1967) (court held that wife had survived the husband by 1/150,000 of a second and al-
lowed her estate to take a share under the will rather than have it pass through the will's resid-
uary clause).
38. See LAWRENCE P. KELLER, WILLS: SIMULTANEOUS DEATH STATUTORY PROVISIONS,
app. K (2009).
39. Lester, supra note 24, at 79.
40. See Harris, supra note 2, at 763-64. The USDA was created in 1940 and adopted, at
least in part, by forty-six states and the District of Columbia by 1994. Id. at 763. The Act
sought to simplify the probate issues that surround cases of simultaneous death and establish
the order of death in a manner consistent with most testators' intentions. See id.; Nancy G.
Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions in Wills (Part 2), PRAC. LAW. July 1997 at 15, 29
[hereinafter Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions].
41. For an overview of the adoption of the Uniform Probate code by state see Lawrence
H. Averill, Jr., An Eclectic History and Analysis of the 1990 Uniform Probate Code, 55 ALB.
L. REV. 891, 900 (1992).
42. See, e.g., Janus v. Tarasewicz, 482 N.E.2d 418, 418 (III. App. Ct. 1985). Stanley and
Theresa, husband and wife, returned from their honeymoon to find that Stanley's brother died
from undetermined causes. Id. at 419. While the family gathered at Stanley's brother's house
to mourn, both Stanley and Theresa unknowingly ingested the same Tylenol-laced with
cyanide-that had been ingested by Stanley's brother. Id. The case centered on the determi-
nation of the order of death of Stanley and Theresa for the distribution of Stanley's life insur-
ance policy, which named his wife as the primary beneficiary and his mother as the contingent
beneficiary. Id. In disregard of Stanley's obvious intent, the court ultimately found that The-
resa had survived Stanley, and the insurance proceeds flowed through her to her family. Id. at
424. The trial included contradictory evidence of various experts as to Theresa's survival.
Janus, 482 N.E.2d at 423. One expert testified that after reviewing her charts, she was brain
dead upon arrival to the hospital, while another contended she died several days later. Id. The
Janus case brought nationwide attention to the simultaneous death problem.
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and equitable rules,"43 the USDA prescribes a fictitious order of death in
cases where it is impossible to determine the true order.44 In these situations,
the estate passes as though each person predeceased the other.45 For exam-
ple, if a husband and wife die in a common accident and the order of death
cannot be determined with sufficient evidence, the husband will be treated as
predeceasing the wife for the purpose of the disposition of the wife's estate
and vice versa for the husband's estate.46 When this occurs, the wife's estate
no longer passes through the already deceased husband but rather passes to
those next in line.47 If there is a will, this property will pass to the next per-
son listed as a beneficiary or named in the residuary clause.48 In intestacy,
this would mean this share of property would go to her heirs instead of pass-
ing on to his heirs.49
The Uniform Probate Code, prior to 1990, created an arbitrary mini-
mum requirement for survivorship of 120 hours for both wills and intesta-
cy. 50 This requirement was adopted to protect the average decedent's intent
of passing property for the benefit and enjoyment of his heirs.51 The 120-
hour rule permits the property to revert back to the decedent's heirs if the
deceased beneficiary is unable to outlive the decedent by 120 hours.52 This
time requirement effectuates the probable intent of the decedent to pass on
property to the closest or named beneficiary without adverse tax conse-
quences, while at the same time balancing the decedent's intent to pass prop-
erty to his heirs rather than to the already deceased beneficiary's heirs.53
In 1990, the Uniform Probate Code's 120-hour rule was incorporated
into the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act, which made the 120-hour rule
mandatory for intestacy pursuant to USDA section 2-104.54 It also instituted
a provision under section 2-702 for wills, life insurance policies, and joint
43. Azvedo v. Benevolent Soc'y of Cal., 270 P.2d 948, 952 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1954) (per curi am).
44. Harris, supra note 2, at 763; see also 14 WITKIN, supra note 27, § 288 (describing
these situations as unresolvable).
45. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, prefatory note (1993).
46. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT § 2.
47. See UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, prefatory note.
48. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603(b)(4) (amended 2006).
49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103 (amended 2006).
50. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 1095.
51. Id. at 1095-96.
52. See Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 448 ("Most
people who consider the question would want the taker to be someone who is likely to survive
for more than a few minutes, hours, or even days. They would not want property to pass to
one side of the family solely due to an instant of survival.").
53. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 1095-96.
54. Id. at 1096.
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tenancies as a default when there is no provision to the contrary in the docu-
ment.5 5 These provisions increased the requisite standard of proof for survi-
vorship, requiring proof of survival by 120 hours by clear and convincing
evidence. 56 This 120-hour rule is extended to those who die testate or intes-
tate under the Uniform Probate Code but can be contracted out through con-
trary express language in a willy These changes sought to decrease litiga-
tion by statutory resolution of close calls by creating a presumption of non-
survival .58
11. THE EFFECT OF INCONSISTENT LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA
The 120-hour rule is not the panacea for conflict and litigation in every
instance where two people die within seconds, minutes, or hours of each
other, but it is an easily articulated and understood objective standard by
which order of death is efficiently resolved.59 The 120-hour rule ensures
consistent and efficient estate administration, thus protecting the intent of the
average testator, 6° avoiding double administration of estates,6 and decreasing
litigation when the deaths occur within a short period of time.62 If a time
requirement is inconsistently incorporated into the Code-applying to some
estate plans, but not others-several of these policies are frustrated in part or
in whole.63
55. Id. at 1096 & n.28.
56. Id. at 1096-97. The old standard of proof was a preponderance of the evidence.
57. Id. at 1094 ("[S]ection 2-702, which applies to wills and other dispositive documents
... is a rule of construction, or default rule, that yields to a contrary intention.").
58. Halbach & Waggoner, supra note 17, at 1097.
59. See Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 448 ("The
120-hour survival period would avoid litigation over survival for short periods of time.").
60. See id. ("Most people who consider the question would want the taker to be someone
who is likely to survive for more than a few minutes, hours, or even days. They would not
want property to pass to one side of the family solely due to an instant of survival.").
61. Henderson, Drafting Dispositive Provisions, supra note 40, at 30 ("The primary
purpose of requiring a beneficiary to survive a certain period of time after the client's death is
to reduce the likelihood that the property will pass through two administration proceedings to
reach the ultimate beneficiaries.").
62. Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 448 ("The 120-
hour survival period would avoid litigation over survival for short periods of time.").
63. See id. at 449.
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California is one of twenty-eight states64 that recognize holographic
wills.65 Pursuant to California Probate Code section 6111, a holographic will
is valid provided that "the signature and . . . material provisions are in the
handwriting of the testator, ' 66 and it was executed with the requisite testa-
mentary intent.67 A holographic will has very few formal requirements,68
providing an estate planning "safe harbor" for those who are unwilling or
64. Other states that recognize holographic wills, with varying requirements, include:
Alaska (ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.502(b) (2009)), Arizona (ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503
(2009)), Arkansas (ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-25-104 (2009)), Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-
11-502 (2009)), Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 560: 2-502 (2009)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. §
15-2-503 (2010)), Kentucky (KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.040 (West 2009)), Louisiana (LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1575 (2009)), Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-503 (2009)),
Maryland (MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 4-103 (LexisNexis 2009)), Michigan (MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.2502 (2009)), Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (2009)), Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522 (2009)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2328 (2009)), Neva-
da (NEv. REV. STAT. § 133.090 (2009)), New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2009)),
New York (N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-2.2 (McKinney 2009)), North Carolina
(N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (2009)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08-02 (2009)),
Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 54 (2009)), South Dakota (S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-
502 (2009)), Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-105 (2009)), Texas (TEX. PROB. CODE ANN.
§ 60 (Vernon 2009)), Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-502 (2009)), Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. §
64.1-49 (2009)), West Virginia (W. VA. CODE § 41-1-3 (2009)), Wyoming (Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 2-6-113 (2009)). Those states that have no statutory provision for holographic wills include:
Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Kevin R. Natale,
Note, A Survey, Analysis, and Evaluation of Holographic Will Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV.
159, 161 & n.15 (1988). Similarly, the District of Columbia has no statutory provision for
holographic wills. See id.
65. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (West 2010). A "holographic will" is
[a] will that is handwritten by the testator. Such a will is typically unattested. Holographic
wills are rooted in the civil-law tradition, having originated in Roman law and having been au-
thorized under the Napoleonic Code. French and Spanish settlers introduced holographic wills
in America, primarily in the South and West. Today they are recognized in about half the
states.-Also termed olographic will.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1735-36 (9th ed. 2004).
66. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6111 (a). Section 6111 (c) allows the statement of testamentary
intent to be in the testator's handwriting or part of a commercially printed will. CAL. PROB.
CODE § 6111(c). Section 6111 applies to testators who died on or after January 1, 1985. CAL.
PROB. CODE § 6111 cmt.
67. See In re Estate of Geffene, 81 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839-40 (Ct. App. 1969) (finding that
instructions to attorney for will provisions had the necessary testamentary intent to be admit-
ted to probate). The failure to include a date will not invalidate the will unless there is an
issue of testamentary capacity, or it is inconsistent with another will, and order of execution of
the documents cannot be determined. CAL. PROB. CODE § 611 1(b)(l)-(2).
68. Natale, supra note 64, at 160.
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unable to satisfy the requirements of a formally attested will. 69 Holographic
wills are a viable alternative for those who are unable to seek the assistance
of an attorney,7" and by and large, holographs are drafted by unrepresented
testators.71 While the perceived ease of drafting these wills has some benefit,
problems often arise when these wills are probated due to the lack of legal
guidance.72 The convenience of a holographic will may not outweigh the
failure of these informal instruments to adequately effectuate the testator's
intent, as the drafter may not understand the legal implications of words or
omissions in the document. 3  The problem of simultaneous death would
understandably be overlooked by a layperson drafting a holographic will.74
California Probate Code's failure to incorporate a 120-hour rule adversely
impacts such a testator-and this impact results primarily from the testator's
unrepresented status.75
The unrepresented testate decedent will have likely executed either a
statutory will or a holographic will. In a simultaneous death scenario, this
(likely uninformed) choice will produce an inconsistent result. While the
120-hour standard will apply to a statutory will,76 it will not apply to the ho-
lographic will. 77 In the latter circumstance, the share the testator intended for
69. Id. at 159-60 & n.9.
70. See Robert P. Kirk, Comment, The New Holographic Will in California: Has It
Outlived Its Usefulness?, 20 CAL. W. L. REV. 258, 272 (1984); Kathy Kristof, Document Your
Wishes Before Tragedy Strikes, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2005, at E3 ("You can take a cocktail
napkin at a bar, write down what you want to happen to your assets and sign it, and you are
set." (quoting attorney Bill Abrams)).
71. Donald R. Travers, Holographic Will, in CALIFORNIA ESTATE PLANNING, HOLO-
GRAPHIC WILLS § 5.12 (Robert Denham et al. eds., 2008).
72. Natale, supra note 64, at 160.
73. See id. at 160 & nn.9-10 (citing In re Estate of Teubert, 298 S.E.2d 456, 460 (W. Va.
1982)).
74. See Kristof, supra note 70 ("Still, a form is preferable because it includes various
options you may not think to include" in the holographic will, such as "how to distribute your
assets if your spouse should die at the same time as you.").
75. See id.
76. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6211 (West 2010). The 120-hour rule applies in a statutory will
provided that the language contains either the phrase "if living" or who "survives me," and
failure to survive will similarly cause the gift to lapse and return to the estate of the deceased
testator. Id. The statutory will form cannot have words crossed out, and all provisions of the
will form include "survive [sic] me." See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 2010). The accom-
panying instructions advise,
[a] person must survive you by 120 hours to take a gift under this Will. If that person does not,
then the gift fails and goes with the rest of your assets. If the person who does not survive you
is a relative of yours or your spouse, then certain assets may go to the relative's descendants.
Id.
77. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6211 (West 2010). Only a clear and convincing evidence
standard will be applied. CAL. PROB. CODE § 220 (West 2010).
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the beneficiary may pass on to the now-deceased beneficiary's estate rather
than to the testator's own heirs."8 Presumably, the average testator would
prefer to pass the property to his own relatives rather than to a relative of the
beneficiary, because the heirs of the beneficiary are receiving a share based
on their relation to the beneficiary instead of their relationship to the testator,
who is the original owner of the property.79
As a practical matter, the clear and convincing evidence standard leads
to the "battle of the expert witnesses" arising from conflicting expert opi-
nions on exact times of death with respect to two decedents. 80 Often the de-
termination of death is one in which experts have to weigh complex defini-
tions of death and analyze factors such as the manner of death, indicators of
struggle or suffering, the position of the bodies, differences in body tempera-
tures, signs of rigor mortis and lividity of the skin, condition of the eyes, and
differences in the putrefaction or decomposition of the bodies. 81 The inter-
play between these sometimes contradictory factors is compounded by the
fact that only 300,000 out of an average million and a half deaths a year in
the United States are investigated by coroners or medical examiners, leaving
much of the determination of death to laypeople at the time of death or later
by a jury.82
The decision to utilize a holographic will leaves the decedent without
the protection of the 120-hour rule. Sadly, the decedent would be protected
by the 120-hour rule if they had executed no instrument at all-allowing his
property to pass via intestacy. While the 120-hour rule does not eliminate
complexities regarding determination of death, it is an efficient approach to
ordering survival when mere seconds, minutes, or hours is the yardstick
against which a determination must be made.
78. Id.
79. Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 448 ("Most
people who consider the question would want the taker to be someone who is likely to survive
for more than a few minutes, hours or even days. They would not want property to pass to
one side of the family solely due to an instant of survival.").
80. See Alexander Morgan Capron & Leon R. Kass, A Statutory Definition of the Stan-
dards for Determining Human Death: An Appraisal and a Proposal, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 87,
92-93 (1972) (regarding difficulties in determining death); see also id. at 93 n.23 (defining
death according to Black's Law Dictionary (citing Thomas v. Anderson, 215 P.2d 478, 482
(Cal. Ct. App. 1950))). For an example of the effects of determination of death, see Henry
Pierson Curtis, Medical Examiner on Hot Seat, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 8, 2002, at B I
(couple dies in head-on collision and medical examiner originally determines times of deaths
to be identical, but later reviews the findings and determines the wife outlived the husband by
minutes entitling the wife's heirs to the entire $250,000 life insurance policy).
81. Elizabeth T. Tsai, Annotation, Construction, Application, and Effect of Uniform




: Nova Law Review 34, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2015
SIMULTANEOUS DEATH IN CALIFORNIA
B. Formally Attested Wills
When planning an estate for a married couple, a competent attorney will
address a potential simultaneous death issue in the drafting process 83 by in-
corporating language into the governing testamentary instrument.84 It is typ-
ical for the will of a husband or a wife to stipulate either that one survived
the other in the case of simultaneous death, or alternatively, that one spouse
must survive the other by a specified period of time--or will be treated as
"predeceased." 85
"However, such provisions are rarely used between parents and their
children .... 86 More often than not, the document will provide only that
property is gifted to a child or beneficiary on the condition that he survive
the testator, "otherwise to (an alternative beneficiary). ' '87 The problem with
this is obvious. The order of death is not proscribed in the instrument, and as
section 220 applies, only the clear and convincing standard will apply to the
order of the deaths, without the ease of administration offered by the bright
line of a 120-hour rule. 88
Several problems arise when an attorney fails to include an adequate
survivorship clause in the formally attested will because the clause is ambi-
guous, incomplete, or omitted.89 This failure will likely result in a malprac-
tice action filed against the drafting attorney, 9° and the wronged heir will
have standing to sue as a third party beneficiary of the will.9'
83. A common practice guide advises attorneys to include a survivorship provision in a
will. Donald R. Travers, Survivorship and Alternate Disposition, in CALIFORNIA ESTATE
PLANNING § 5.38 (Robert Denham et al. eds., 2008).
84. See id.
85. Harris, supra note 2, at 766.
86. Id.
87. See id. at 766-67.
88. CAL. PROB. CODE § 220 (West 2010).
89. For instance, common disaster clauses may not protect the testator when the dece-
dents die in a close proximity of time but because of different events. See Martin D. Beglei-
ter, Article II of the Uniform Probate Code and the Malpractice Revolution, 59 TENN. L. REV.
101, 123 (1991) ("Many wills contain common disaster clauses.... [Hlowever, the clause
does not apply because testators do not die as a result of the same event.").
90. Id. at 110 & n.65, 130 (citing Ogle v. Fuiten, 445 N.E.2d 1344, 1346 (I11. App. Ct.
1983), affd, 466 N.E.2d 224, 228 (III. 1984)); see also 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M.
SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 34:12 (2010) (noting that draftsmanship of a will containing
errors in the substance of the documents is a common claim for malpractice).
91. See Begleiter, supra note 89, at 104-05.
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In a state such as California,92 this omission will almost certainly give
rise to malpractice recovery, because every attorney who drafts a will is held
to the expertise of a certified specialist.93 In effect, an attorney will be held
to the higher standard of care that is imposed upon certified specialists, even
if the attorney claims not to be a specialist, and has never held himself out to
the public as a specialist, so long as his case is one where the attorney should
have recognized the existence of a specialty area and should have referred
the case to a specialist.
94
However, a malpractice action against an unskilled or incompetent at-
torney is not an adequate remedy in this instance, as the main actor-viz, the
decedent-is unable to bear witness and testify.95 A malpractice suit is often
impossible or impractical when the attorney did not accurately or adequately
counsel the decedent about simultaneous death because a malpractice action
requires that the decedent's intent be established, and an obvious evidentiary
obstacle exists. 9
6
Amending an inconsistent statute is clearly a more efficient alternative
to a malpractice action. Under current Code provisions, the intestate dece-
dent-who fails to express his wishes regarding the devolution of his es-
tate-is more protected than either the unrepresented decedent who attempts
to write his own will, or the decedent who unknowingly retains incompetent
92. The following states offer specialization directly to lawyers: Arizona, California,
Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Caro-
lina, Tennessee, and Texas. ABA Standing Committee on Specialization, Sources of Certifi-
cation, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/specialization/source.html (last visited Feb. 26,
2010). The following states approve specialization programs by state bars or other organiza-
tions: Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. Id.
93. See 2 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 20:4 (2010)
(discussing the increasing likelihood of malpractice where an attorney undertakes a task in a
specialized area of the law and fails to "exercise the degree of skill and knowledge possessed
by those attorneys, who practice in that specialty"); see also Goebel v. Lauderdale, 263 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 276 (Ct. App. 1989) (bankruptcy attorney was sued for failing to inform his client
of certain penal code sections); Day v. Rosenthal, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89, 104 (Ct. App. 1985)
(attorney was sued for failure to discuss tax law consequences with client); Home v. Peckham,
158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 716 (Ct. App. 1979) (general practitioner was sued in connection with
drafting Clifford trust).
94. Buddy 0. Herring, Liability of Board Certified Specialists in a Legal Malpractice
Action: Is There a Higher Standard?, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 67, 86 (1998).
95. In most instances, conversations between the attorney and the decedent will be pri-
vate and confidential-without witnesses present. If and when a witness is present for such
conversations, it may be the spouse or child whose closely proximate death, ironically, gives
rise to the simultaneous death issue at the crux of a malpractice action.
96. See Begleiter, supra note 89, at 10-11.
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counsel.97 Amending the Code would provide a statutory safety net for the
latter decedents.
I1. INCONSISTENT LEGISLATION-INDICATES INTENTIONAL OMISSION
In 1980, the California Legislature passed a resolution to have the Cali-
fornia Law Revision Commission (CLRC) study probate law and provide
recommendations for revisions to the California Probate Code.98 The CLRC
concluded that the California Legislature needed to supplant the "clear and
convincing evidence" evidentiary standard in the California Probate Code
with a 120-hour rule.99 At the time the study was conducted, at least thirteen
states had adopted the same requirement.' °
The CLRC expressed concern about the serious injustice that may arise
from the application of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in cases
where a husband and wife each have children from a prior marriage.' Gen-
erally, there was a concern with the inequities that inhere to the devolution of
a decedent's estate hinging upon a mere snapshot in time.10 2 The study found
that the average person does not want all of his estate to pass to someone
else's heirs, as opposed to his own, simply because he had the misfortune of
dying five minutes too soon. 10
3
The CLRC believed that the 120-hour rule would prove to be more of a
panacea than a pitfall, and it should apply as a default standard for both wills
and intestacy.'04 They found that it is an efficient rule, that almost entirely
eliminates the need for litigation to determine order of death, and yet, it is a
brief period of time that will not delay the administration of an estate. 105
When it came time to codify the recommendation of the CLRC, the Cal-
ifornia Legislature incorporated a 120-hour rule into California Probate Code
97. Intestate decedents are protected by the 120-hour rule in California Probate Code
section 6403(a) which is absent from section 220. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 220, 6403(a) (West
2010).
98. Recommendation Relating to Non-Probate Transfers, 15 CAL. L. REVISION
COMMISSION REP. 1605, 1607 (1980).
99. Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 445.
100. Id.at448n.3.
101. Id. at 447. The number of people with children from different marriages has risen.
Averill, supra note 41, at 895 & n.19.
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section 6403," but not into California Probate Code section 220.107 As a
result, the 120-hour rule applied only to intestacy. One can only speculate as
to the reasons underlying the partial legislative change, as the legislative
history on this issue is scant. 10 8 A decade later, arguments set before the Cal-
ifornia Legislature may clarify the hesitancy to extend the rule across the
breadth of the California Probate Code.
In 1990, Senate Bill 1775 proposed the application of the 120-hour rule
to the California statutory will.' °9 The stated purpose for this revision was to
distribute property in a "manner most consistent with the decedent's inten-
tions and to avoid litigation over the precise time of death in common acci-
dent cases."" 0 Additionally, it was noted that the revision would create con-
sistency between statutory wills and intestate succession.'' The drafters of
the bill recognized the policy behind the 120-hour rule was just as applicable
to statutory wills "since a person executing a statutory will cannot indicate a
preference as to the length of time a person must survive him or her in order
to be a beneficiary under the will." '
106. The Committee's recommendations were enacted in part through the addition of the
120-hour time requirement for intestacy to California Probate code section 64. See 1989 Cal.
Stat. 1818-19.
107. See 1989 Cal. Stat. 1815-26.
108. There is not a lot of legislative history at the time of adoption for this part of Assem-
bly Bill 158. This may have been because there was an unrelated highly controversial part of
the bill which pertained to no contest clauses (in terrorem clauses).
109. Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 1775, Assem. Comm. on Judiciary, 1990 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 8,
1990) [hereinafter Assem. Comm. on Judiciary]. Statutory wills were first enacted in Califor-
nia in 1982. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6240 (West 1990). These wills are designed as an alter-
native for those who would otherwise die intestate. Gerry W. Beyer, Statutory Fill-in Will
Forms-The First Decade: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Findings, 72 OR. L. REV.
769, 779 (1993).
110. Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 1775, S. Rules Comm., 1990 Reg. Sess. (Aug. 16, 1990).
111. CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, AUTHOR'S STATEMENT, RECOMMENDATION OF S.B.
1775, at 1 (1990).
112. Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 1775, Assem. Comm. on Judiciary, supra note 109, at 3. The
statutory will is not a flexible instrument, in that it cannot be amended or changed by the
testator. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6226(b) (West 2010). Section 6226(b) of the California Probate
Code provides:
Any additions to or deletions from the California statutory will on the face of the California
statutory will form, other than in accordance with the instructions, shall be given effect only
where clear and convincing evidence shows that they would effectuate the clear intent of the
testator. In the absence of such a showing, the court either may determine that the addition or
deletion is ineffective and shall be disregarded, or may determine that all or a portion of the
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This statutory amendment was not without its opposition, although at
best, it can be described as substantively vacuous.1 3 The State Bar of Cali-
fornia Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Section objected to the extension
of the 120-hour rule as it would shift assets to non-intended beneficiaries and
result in adverse federal transfer tax consequences."' The overarching pur-
pose of the probate code is to govern the way in which the decedent's assets
are distributed, and almost any change or amendment can be said to directly
or indirectly shift property to an unintended beneficiary. This argument,
without more, is superfluous as almost any change to the probate code can be
objected to on the grounds that it would shift property to non-intended bene-
ficiaries since the entire code's purpose is to determine the distribution of
property. Additionally, there is no subsequent discussion as to how the State
Bar of California Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Section came to the
conclusion that a statutory will drafter would prefer to pass property on
through a deceased beneficiary with the result that it is given to non-blood
relatives of the deceased. Without any reference to the contrary, it would
seem obvious that average testators would rather have their property pass to
their relatives than relatives of their spouse if their spouse only managed to
survive them by seconds or hours.1 15 Although tax avoidance is often a con-
cern in estate planning, most decedents would probably prefer to leave their
property to their blood relatives than to avoid generation transfer skipping
taxes, and these taxes often apply to larger estates, which presumably would
not be using a statutory will. 116
With regard to Senate Bill 1775, the CLRC found that the same policies
that justified the earlier adoption of the 120-hour rule for intestacy justified
its present extension to statutory wills; intestate succession is akin to a statu-
113. See Memorandum from Maurine C. Padden, Legislative Counsel, Cal. Bankers Ass'n
on Study L-3022-Access to Decedent's Safe Deposit Box, to Bill Lockyer, Cal. State Sen. I
(June 18, 1990).
114. Cal. Bill Analysis, SB 1775, Assem. Comm. on Judiciary Republican Analysis, 1990
Reg. Sess. (Aug. 14, 1990) [hereinafter Republican Analysis].
115. Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 448. "Most
people who consider the question would want the taker to be someone who is likely to survive
for more than a few minutes, hours, or even days. They would not want property to pass to
one side of the family solely due to an instant of survival." Id.
116. The Generation Skipping Tax (GST) applies when a gift skips a generation, going
from grandparent to grandchild. Sandy Kasten, Tax Considerations in Estate Planning, in
COMPLETE PLANS FOR SMALL AND MID-SIZE ESTATES § 3.50, 100-01 (2006). The gift is
viewed as going from the parent to the child and then to the grandchild; and by doing so,
imposes a transfer tax at each generation. Id. However, this tax often only applies to larger
estates because of a GST tax exemption for estates smaller than $2,000,000 in 2006. Id.
2010]
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss2/1
NOVA LAWREVIEW
tory will for those who have failed to execute any type of will. 117 However,
the CLRC changed its position-albeit quietly-with regard to incorporation
of the 120-hour rule into California Probate Code section 220,"8 which as a
practical matter, would extend the 120-hour rule to holographic wills and
formally attested wills. In a footnote, the CLRC expressed that the 120-hour
rule is superfluous for non-statutory wills, noting that
[w]hen a will is drafted for a testator, the person drafting the will
can include or omit a survival requirement for beneficiaries of the
will, according to the direction of the testator. A 120-hour survival
requirement is recommended for a statutory will because the sub-
stance of that will is fixed by statute.
119
In drawing this conclusion, the CLRC presupposes that every testate
decedent has the assistance of competent counsel. As explored earlier in this
Article, a survivorship clause may be unknowingly omitted when either the
testate decedent drafts his own holographic will, or the decedent is
represented by incompetent counsel. 20
IV. CALIFORNIA'S SOLUTION
The asymmetry in California's Probate Code emerges from the adoption
of the 120-hour rule in a piecemeal "estate plan specific" manner-meaning,
its application hinges upon the estate plan in effect at the time of the dece-
dent's death. The 120-hour rule is the standard applied when the decedent
dies intestate, or testate with a statutory will in effect. Conversely, the 120-
hour rule is not applied when the decedent dies testate with a formally at-
tested will or holographic will in effect.
That which makes the 120-hour rule a necessary protection for some
decedents, renders it a necessary protection for all decedents. Application of
this rule in an estate-plan specific manner leaves unprotected two important
groups of decedents: The decedent who writes his own holographic will, and
the decedent who unwittingly retained incompetent counsel to execute a
formally attested will.
The legislative solution is simple: California Probate Code section 220
must be amended to replace the "clear and convincing evidence" standard
117. Recommendation Relating to Survival Requirement for Beneficiary of Statutory Will,
20 CAL. L. REvISION COMMISSION REP. 549, 553 (1989).
118. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 220 (West 2010).
119. Recommendation Relating to Survival Requirement, supra note 117, at 553 n.2.
120. See supra Part II.A-B.
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with a 120-hour rule. In effect, this will create a default 120-hour rule in
California, and repair present legislative inconsistencies that prejudice the
self-represented or incompetently represented. Further, section 220 must
contain a proviso that a survivorship clause in a will may override the default
rule.
A. Benefits of the 120-Hour Rule
The 120-hour rule is efficient in a myriad of ways, including decreasing
litigation, avoiding double administration, and effectuating the average testa-
tor's intent.
This rule imposes an objective-though arbitrary-time period of five
days between the two deaths, by which one decedent must survive the other
to inherit. 121 Under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, the devo-
lution of a decedent's estate will hinge upon whether one decedent survived
the other by mere seconds or minutes-whereas, the 120-hour rule renders
unnecessary expert opinions as to the precise second or minute. It provides
an objective "yardstick" allowing deaths to be "ordered" for purposes of in-
heritance, without a costly battle of expert witnesses and protracted litiga-
tion. lz2 Arguably, even with the 120-hour rule, there will be cases where the
experts will disagree about whether the time standard has been met. Howev-
er, fewer cases will hinge upon determinations of mere seconds or minutes.
Further, in cases of closely proximate deaths, the 120-hour rule will al-
low property to avoid double administration, thereby preserving a greater
portion of the probate estate.'2 3 Estate administration is not inexpensive. 24
In California, probate fees are statutorily predetermined and correlate to the
size of the probate estate. 12' For an estate between $100,000 and $1,000,000,
probate fees are approximately two percent of the probate estate value plus
$3000 for both the attorney and executor. 126 In the case of a $500,000 estate
121. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403.
122. See Recommendation Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 447-48
('The 120-hour survival period would avoid litigation over survival for short periods of
time.").
123. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403.
124. See Posting of Jennifer Sawday, What Does Probate Cost in California?, to Califor-
nia Estate Planning Practice Blog, http://sawdaydrake.typepad.comlestate-planning/2006/02/
whatdoes.proba.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
125. Id.
126. Law Offices of Merwyn J. Miller, Frequently Asked Questions on Probate and Ad-
ministration, http://www.aboutlivingtrusts.com/Estate%20Admin/Estate%2Admin%2Faq.
htm#_l19 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions on Probate and
2010]
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that goes through double administration, the attorney and executor, com-
bined, will receive fees totaling $26,000 through the first probate process. 127
After these fees are netted, and the property passes to the deceased benefi-
ciary's heirs through the second probate process, the attorney and executor,
combined, will receive fees totaling $24,960.128 The fees total $50,960 for
the double administration of this estate, and additional fees may accrue if
there are any services provided by the attorney or executor that are beyond
the normal services. 129 Further, this is exclusive of costs of probate or any
tax consequences to the estate. 3 '
Monetary considerations are not the only disadvantage of double ad-
ministration of an estate. Probate is a time consuming process, sometimes
taking more than a year for each administration.' 3 ' Fewer estates would suf-
fer through double administration if the 120-hour rule were the default statu-
tory position. This is a desirable outcome for most, if not all, estate plans.
Conversely, it may be an undesirable outcome for the attorneys reaping a
windfall from the fees earned on double administration.
Finally, assuming that Mother and Father-a married couple, each with
children from prior marriages-are killed in an automobile accident, the
children of Mother will receive all property of both Mother and Father-to
the exclusion of Father's children-if they are able to establish that Mother
survived Father by mere moments under a "clear and convincing evidence"
standard. 132 The application of the 120-hour rule for intestacy is said to ef-
fectuate the average intent of the decedent. 133 The average decedent would
Administration]. This is an oversimplified estimate of the calculation of the estate fees pro-
vided by an estate attorney. Id. The true values are
[f]our percent on the first one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000), . . . [t]hree percent on the
next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) .... [t]wo percent on the next eight hundred
thousand dollars ($800,000) .... [o]ne percent on the next nine million dollars ($9,000,000),
*.. [o]ne-half of [one] percent on the next fifteen million dollars ($15,000,000).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 10810 (West 2010).
127. See Posting of Jennifer Sawday, Probate Cost, supra note 124. This estimate in-
cludes only the attorney and executor fees. Id. Additional expenses for this size estate maybe
closer to $28,000. See id. (finding the approximate cost to be $28,035 for an estate of
$515,000).
128. See id.
129. See Frequently Asked Questions on Probate and Administration, supra note 126.
130. See id.
131. Posting of Jennifer Sawday, What is Probate?, to California Estate Planning Practice
Blog, http:llsawdaydrake.typepad.comlestate-planning/2006/07/whatsis-probate_2.html (last
visited February 24, 2010) ("[Plrobate can tie up the property and other estate assets for
months and sometimes even more than a year.").
132. Recommendations Relating to Simultaneous Deaths, supra note 32, at 447, 447 n.I.
133. See id. at 448 ("Most people who consider the question would want the taker to be
someone who is likely to survive for more than a few minutes, hours, or even days. They
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rather pass property to his heirs than to the heirs of his beneficiary. In no
case is this clearer than when the two decedents have children from different
marriages or relationships.'34
B. Anticipated Criticisms
The CLRC suggested that the 120-hour rule was superfluous and unne-
cessary in non-statutory wills because the drafter could omit or include a
survivorship clause at the direction of the testator. '35 As explored in Section
B of Part II, a troubling conundrum lurks at the heart of this conclusion:
California authorizes the probate of holographic wills, largely-if not entire-
ly-used by the unrepresented decedent, while simultaneously denying the
same protections offered to the unrepresented decedent who opts for intesta-
cy or executes a statutory will. 136 Further, the CLRC ignores the practical
reality of incompetent representation-which may result in an uninformed or
unintended omission of a survivorship clause from a professionally drafted
will. Malpractice is not always a feasible remedy and is certainly less effi-
cient than a default survivorship rule.
Other critics suggest that the 120-hour rule does not go far enough and
the timeframe should be considerably longer.137 The longer the survival re-
quirement, the more reliable the approximation of the time of death be-
comes.138 The 120-hour timeframe is concededly arbitrary; 139 however, it is
would not want property to pass to one side of the family solely due to an instant of surviv-
al.").
134. See id. at 447 ("In this type of case, where one person dies soon after another, a se-
rious injustice may result. For example, where a husband and wife who each have children
from a former marriage die intestate in an automobile accident, all the community property
will pass to the husband's children if it can be shown that he survived his wife for a fraction of
a second.").
135. See Recommendation Relating to Survival Requirement, supra note 117, at 553 n.2.
136. See supra Part II.B.
137. Nancy G. Henderson, Henderson & Caverly LLP, Speech Prepared for the National
Business Institute: The Basics of Will Drafting 61 (Sept. 20, 2004) (speech outline available
at the Nova Law Review) [hereinafter Henderson, Speech] ("Most clients would prefer a
longer survivorship period [than 120 hours] to accommodate the possibility of a common
disaster which results in the death of the testator and the beneficiary within a relatively short
period of time.").
138. See Recommendation Relating to Survival Requirement, supra note 117, at 553 n.2.
Unquestionably, it would be easier to determine with greater accuracy whether two people
died more than a year apart, or even decades apart, than it would be to determine the deaths
within a second or fractions of a second.
139. While it may be argued that twenty days or two days should be used, the time limit is
not entirely arbitrary. See Henderson, Speech, supra note 137, at 61. For example, ninety
days and six-month limits would trigger undesirable consequences, namely a loss of the bene-
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simple and easily applied. 140  The 120-hour rule does not interfere with a
testator's freedom to include a survivorship clause with a longer timeframe
in his will. 14 1 In this instance, the 120-hour rule of California Probate Code
section 220 would be overridden by the language of testator's will.
A policy that drives this area of the law is the desire to effectuate the
testator's intent.'41 Symmetrical application of the 120-hour rule as a default
position clearly approximates the intent of the average testator. In 1990,
when the 120-hour rule was extended to statutory wills, the State Bar of Cali-
fornia Estate Planning, Trust and Probate Section objected on the grounds
that assets would be shifted to non-intended beneficiaries and adverse federal
tax consequences would result. 43 The State Bar Section framed the wrong
issue. The issue is not whether assets will flow to a "non-intended benefi-
ciary"--but instead, whether the decedent would prefer that his assets de-
volve to the heirs of his "intended (deceased) beneficiary." The natural ob-
ject of the average decedent's affection will be his heirs apparent-and as a
matter of policy, it seems that the decedent would prefer that his assets flow
to the natural object of his bounty, rather than the natural object of someone
else's bounty.
V. CONCLUSION
In death, the California Probate Code does not afford the unrepresented
layperson all of the same protections as the represented.'4 The 120-hour rule
governs the devolution of assets in a simultaneous death scenario.145 How-
ever, the adoption of the 120-hour rule by the California Legislature has been
piecemeal and estate plan specific: Applying to intestacy and statutory wills,
but not to non-statutory wills (including formally attested wills and holo-
graphic wills).
fit of generation skipping tax and the loss of the marital deduction to avoid estate tax, respec-
tively. Id. ("[A] survivorship period of not more than 90 days is permissible for a grandchild
to benefit from the generational move-up resulting from the death of a parent for purposes of
the generation skipping transfer tax. Further, if a survivorship period of more than six months
is imposed upon a surviving spouse's right to inherit, the marital deduction will not be availa-
ble to shelter the gift to the spouse from estate taxes.").
140. 14 WITKIN, supra note 27, § 288.
141. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 221 (West 2010). It is not uncommon for an estate planner to
include a survivorship clause ranging from sixty to one hundred twenty days.
142. See 96 C.J.S. Wills § 831 (2010) (explaining that the cardinal rule for will construc-
tion requires the intent of the testator be effectuated so long as it is ascertainable and does not
violate law or public policy).
143. Republican Analysis, supra note 114, at 1.
144. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 220, 6403 (West 2010).
145. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6403.
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The testator with a non-statutory will is subject to the "clear and con-
vincing evidence" standard of section 220, unless the instrument contains a
simultaneous death provision."' 6 Absent attorney incompetence or contra-
vening testator's intent, a formally attested, professionally drafted will gen-
erally contains a simultaneous death provision. Conversely, holographic
wills are usually handwritten by a layperson decedent-and typically fail to
contain simultaneous death provisions.
In a simultaneous death scenario, the devolution of a decedent's estate
should not be contingent upon the type of testamentary instrument (or ab-
sence thereof) executed by the decedent. Therefore, the 120-hour rule must
be consistently applied throughout the California Probate Code, and adopted
as a "safety net" when a non-statutory will does not express a contrary intent
or standard. The policy rationale of the 120-hour rule, which prevents
double administration of the estate and effectuates decedents' probable tes-
tamentary intent, is equally applicable to those who create holographic wills
or formally attested wills with insufficient survivorship clauses. The 120-
hour rule should be incorporated into the current California Probate Code
section 220 and associated code sections, thus creating equal protection for
those who draft holographic wills or for testators whose attorney fails to pro-
vide a contrary survival provision in their will.
146. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 220.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2007, the faculty at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
Law Center (NSU) approved a project for the Curriculum Committee de-
signed to provide the law school with an evidence-based framework for con-
sidering curriculum enhancements and revisions. This article is designed to
document the extended process in which the law school is engaged, and es-
tablish a framework for other schools that may wish to initiate their own cur-
riculum project with the explicit aim of enhancing and aligning their curricu-
lum and thus improve the learning and teaching of the law.
* Debra Moss Curtis is a Professor of Law at Nova Southeastern University Shepard
Broad Law Center, where she teaches Contracts, UCC: Sales, UCC: Secured Transactions,
and Law Office Management Workshop. This pilot project was conducted jointly with Pro-
fessors Ron Brown and Douglas Donoho of the Shepard Broad Law Center, and this article,
detailing the process, would not be possible without their hard work on the project. Thanks
also go to Professor Michael Flynn, who originally brought the idea of curriculum mapping to
the curriculum committee.
** Dr. David M. Moss is an Associate Professor of Curriculum and Instruction at the
University of Connecticut's Neag School of Education. His professional areas of expertise
include curriculum studies and research-based educational reform. He specializes in interna-
tional and environmental education and serves as a consultant for numerous institutions and
organizations.
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The idea for curriculum mapping came to NSU through a faculty mem-
ber who had seen a "curriculum map" for a K-5 school. Such a "map" was
an end result-a document laying out the topics and skills that students
would be learning at the school across the years, and how they interacted.
He brought the idea to the law school with the notion that we could create
such a document for our own curriculum, and use it as a resource for both
faculty and students to better understand the sequence and relationship of and
among courses.
Committee members began researching and investigating curriculum
mapping. As we soon discovered, curriculum mapping is a process, not an
end result.1 After two years of dedicated effort, we are a faculty actively
engaged in thinking about and documenting our curriculum, while collabo-
rating in ways that we had only imagined could happen. Although we con-
sider our work far from finished, we already have benefited greatly from
having undertaken this process through improved communication, and great-
er attention to our teaching. This article tells our story while instructing oth-
ers who may wish to engage in such a substantial evidence-based curricular
process.
Part II of this article describes the curriculum mapping process as it is
used in education generally. Part III discusses curriculum reform in the law
school arena. Part IV of this article discusses our project-first the student
survey process of the curriculum mapping project, then the faculty survey
process, then the data collection and analysis process in which we engaged.
Part V offers our conclusions and recommendations.
II. CURRICULUM MAPPING
Curriculum mapping is a coordinated effort conducted by faculty mem-
bers to better understand the scope and sequence of their own curriculum
with the explicit outcome of engaging in a coordinated and evidence-based
reform process. 2 It is a process by which education professionals "document
their own curriculum, then share and examine each other's curriculums for
gaps, overlaps, redundancies and new learning, creating a coherent, consis-
tent curriculum within and across schools that is ultimately aligned to stan-
I. "Mapping is a verb. It is active," according to Heidi Hayes Jacobs. JANET A. HALE,
A GUIDE TO CURRICULUM MAPPING: PLANNING, IMPLEMENTING, AND SUSTAINING THE
PROCESS, at xv (2008) [hereinafter HALE, A GUIDE TO CURRICULUM MAPPING].
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dards and responsive to student data and other.. . initiatives."3 One purpose
of mapping is that "[s]tudents should know where they are going, why they
are going there, and what is required of them to get there."4
The idea of mapping a curriculum was popularized by Fenwick English
in the 1980s as a "reality-based" documentation of the curricular content that
is actually taught, and matching it against the prescribed assessments. 5 In the
next decade, Heidi Hayes Jacobs enlarged and expounded on that idea, and
proposed a multi-phase process for accomplishing the mapping process.6 In
this multi-phase process, the first question to consider when undertaking
such a project is, "what is curriculum?"7 It has been suggested that "curricu-
lum is developed from any material a teacher refers to or uses to decide what
to teach, when to teach it, and how much of it to teach," which may include
textbooks, state and national guidelines, administrative directives, and per-
sonal experiences, among others.8 In examining curriculum, when these
varying resources and the use of them are not documented or shared in mea-
ningful ways by teachers, the result can be an experience by students that is
less than optimal.9
The reality across many areas of education, including higher education,
is that faculty often holds little or no direct knowledge of what others are
actually teaching in their courses, coupled with a poor sense of the curricu-
lum in its entirety.1° Even among faculty within a given specialty area, or
who teach different sections of the same course, these gaps can be signifi-
cant." When little or no data about what is actually being taught in class-
rooms is available, one of two things may result-either schools defensively
project the image of being in lockstep with regard to curriculum across the
institution, or schools become overly loose in terms of monitoring their cur-
riculum such that there is little or no understanding of what is really going on
in the classroom.12  A big-picture understanding of a student's journey
3. SUSAN UDELHOFEN, KEYS TO CURRICULUM MAPPING: STRATEGIES AND TOOLS TO
MAKE IT WORK, at xviii (2005).
4. Oklahoma State Department of Education, Curriculum Mapping, http://sde.state.ok.
us/Curriculum/CurriculumDiv/CurrilumMap/default.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
5. UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at xviii.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at xviii-xix.
9. Id. at xix.
10. See HEIDI HAYES JACOBS, MAPPING THE BIG PICTURE: INTEGRATING CURRICULUM &
ASSESSMENT K-12 3 (1997).
11. See DAVID M. Moss & HELEN A. MARX, A REPORT ON THE ALIGNMENT AND
ASSESSMENT OF THE CA4 DIVERSITY AND MULTICULTURAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES OF THE
GENERAL EDUCATION CURRICULUM 14 (2009).
12. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 3.
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through the educational process is a necessary part of providing that educa-
tion. 3 Curriculum committees that are charged with the review and approval
process for new courses sometimes may lose sight of the details underpin-
ning the curriculum, and thus are limited in their ability to ensure a well-
sequenced and coherent curriculum.
4
Historically, curriculum mapping has focused on externally monitoring
what actually was being taught within a given curriculum and ensuring that
instructors were spending the appropriate amount of "time on task."'' 5 By
contrast, contemporary curriculum mapping projects, such as the one piloted
at the law school, are designed to generate authentic data regarding what
students actually experience-as opposed to what is merely planned for in
the syllabus-with the aim of generating faculty consensus around a well
articulated set of learning outcomes.
6
A curriculum map may be useful to a faculty for many reasons, includ-
ing helping teachers to understand what is taught throughout a program,
coordinating interdisciplinary units, serving as a "venue for fostering conver-
sation about curriculum" among faculty, helping students find the connec-
tions between subjects in a curriculum, and helping teachers to reflect upon
their own teaching. 7 For example, regarding the substance of courses, a
curriculum map resulting from this data will enable a faculty to understand
when a particular doctrine is actually taught, how it is taught, and if taught
more than once, in what sequence. This information then allows the faculty
to determine whether instructional changes are warranted to meet the broader
learning goals.
Other fields have used outcome assessment planning and mapping in
their curriculum building. The Accreditation Counsel for Graduate Medical
Education (ACGME) has an outcome project in which assessing the pro-
gram's actual accomplishments is used as a core measurement in evaluating
the curriculum. 8 The National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Educa-
tion (NCATE) makes use of extensive self-study requirements centered
around a university's core curriculum, and governs performance-based state
licensing for teachers as well as board certification of accomplished teach-
13. Id.
14. English, supra note 2, at 558.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 558-59.
17. Curriculum Mapping, What Is It? A Practical Explanation from Least Tern (July
2003), http://www.leasttem.com/workshopsfMappinglWhatlsCurricMapping.ppt.pdf [herei-
nafter Curriculum Mapping, What Is It?].
18. The ACGME Outcome Project: An Introduction, http://www.acgme.org/outcome/
project/OPintrorev 1_7-05.ppt (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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ers.1 9 At the institutional level, the Harvard School of Dental Medicine has
developed a problem-based approach in which concepts are mastered
through group discussion and analysis of real patient cases,2° and their curri-
culum map demonstrates an interdisciplinary approach to professional train-
21ing.
By mapping the actual delivered curriculum, the law school faculty then
may engage in what is commonly referred to as a "backward curriculum de-
sign initiative. '22 That is, the resulting maps of key courses and program
areas will enable the faculty to evaluate, based on data, what we are teaching
across the curriculum, and if desired, plan for courses and experiences which
will result in an improved learning experience for all law candidates.23 By
"using data-driven evidence rather than 'verbal claims,"' an accurate assess-
ment can be made.2
This process has been described as "backward" in that it mandates goals
to be firmly set, then evidence is considered (assessment) prior to any specif-
ic activities or experiences being finalized.25 Such an approach is ironically
quite forward-thinking and consistent with the current research on curricu-
lum design and reform.26 Such an approach holds the greatest potential for
an evidence-driven curriculum where accountability is transparent and all
stakeholders are involved.27
Curriculum mapping is at its essence a process-a process of collecting
and analyzing data that identifies the core content and assessments used in
curriculum for subject areas-with the purpose of improving communication
and instruction throughout the curriculum. 28 According to Heidi Hayes Ja-
19. National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), NCATE's Role
in a Quality Assurance System for the Teaching Profession, http://www.ncate.org/public/
ncatrole.asp?ch=l (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
20. Harvard School of Dental Medicine, Curriculum Overview and Organization,
http://www.hsdm.harvard.edu/index.php/academics/dmd/curriculum-overview-and-organizat
ion (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
21. Harvard School of Dental Medicine, Curriculum Map (June 15, 2005).
22. GRANT WIGGINS & JAY McTIGHE, UNDERSTANDING BY DESIGN 14 (2d ed. 2005)
(emphasis added).
23. Seeid. at 14-15.
24. HALE, A GUIDE TO CURRICULUM MAPPING, supra note 1, at 3 (quotations added).
25. See WIGGINS & MCTIGHE, supra note 22, at 14-15 (emphasis added).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 15.
28. Curriculum Mapping, What Is It?, supra note 17. Least Tern is a consulting firm of
two educators who state:
We believe in the change that computers and other technologies brings [sic] to education. We
do not believe that this change means the extinction of the educational values that can be called
"traditional." Rather, we believe that a traditional education is enriched by technology tools
and by the wealth of resources available on the Internet. We do, however, believe that change
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cobs, author of Mapping the Big Picture, there are seven phases for curricu-
lum mapping.29 In phase one, teachers collect the data, including the
processes and skills emphasizing the content of concepts and topics and the
products/performances of the assessments.3° This process will be described
fully in Section IV, as it comprises the bulk of the pilot curriculum mapping
project at NSU Law to date, and has already produced extremely useful in-
formation for the law school.
Once this basic set of knowledge is gathered, phase two is a "first read-
through" of colleagues' curricula and a basic editing and comprehension by
faculty of what is being taught to their shared students.3 From there, phases
three and four are "mixed group" reviews of the data, with such groups first
including people who generally do not work together, followed by a large
group review of the data by the entire faculty.32 The purposes of these phas-
es are "reporting out," gathering commentary, and professional develop-
ment.33 It is not a judgmental process regarding the persons involved or the
successes of individual faculty.34 Making this process non-judgmental may
be held with a pre-determined process to set the stage for this often complex
interaction, with roles assigned to various faculty to keep participants on
task, such as being a recorder, timekeeper, or facilitator.35 Such roles can
help keep the procedure running smoothly, ensure all stakeholders are en-
gaged in the process, and focus on sharing, not evaluating information.36
One question that is frequently asked about curriculum mapping is,
"what are we going to do with the information?" Such a question may be
asked out of uncertainty as to the purpose of the project, out of wariness for a
perceived need for change, or perhaps from the desire to make changes. The
data collected from a curriculum map allows the stakeholders in the school's
curriculum to take a variety of avenues with the information-from making
no changes at all to making drastic changes. It is important for faculty to
requires a rebirth of the adventure of learning and an affirmation that learning is a process of
guided discovery. It is our hope that we can help teachers to become energetic, empowered,
restless users of classroom laptops and other technologies. We offer our knowledge and help
inexpensively and to small groups, focusing upon a core of "learning for teaching" content that
can be immediately used in the classroom.
Least Tern, About Least Tern, http://www.leasttern.com/WhoAre.html#why (last visited Feb.
21, 2010).
29. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 7.
30. Id. at 8.
31. Id. at 10-11.
32. Id. at 12-13.
33. See id.
34. See UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at xviii.
35. See id. at 40, 43.
36. See id. at 43.
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remember that they have this range of decision-making power-and a wide
variety in between.
These first four phases set the stage for the final decision making phas-
es.37 In phase five, faculty actually start to determine what changes, if any,
need to be made based on the evidence presented.38 For example, there may
be some "glaring" elements of the curriculum that are unnecessary repeti-
tions or areas of omission of coverage that the faculty can spot and revise
immediately. It is important to note though that this "low hanging fruit"
approach is not the end.39 This stage is followed up with phase six, which is
determining potential curricular changes that will "require long-term re-
search and development." 4 In this phase, there might be a longer, studied
consideration of integrating courses, interdisciplinary work or larger changes
in the structure that will require more research. 4' By going through the map-
ping program through this phase, a curriculum committee can lead a faculty
through the examination of their curriculum through evidence-based work,
rather than on the mere notions of faculty who may, or may not, call for
change based on personal experiences alone without a broader perspective on
the entire curriculum.42
The last phase in curriculum mapping is perhaps the most daunting in
terms of resources and commitment to ongoing improvements in the curricu-
lum-continuing the cycle of curriculum review.43 A school should set up an
appropriate cycle in which the process will reboot to ensure that faculty and
students remain on the cutting edge of curriculum innovation based upon the
most current data.44
It is also important to note that for some schools, the curriculum map
may serve only as an information source for faculty members.45 An effective
educator must know extensive information about the students, including how
to build on what students already know, and being able to prepare them for
where they will be heading. 46 Even if mapping is used for this basic purpose
of bringing faculty members up to speed on what is happening in their pro-
gram, that is progress in terms of benefits for their students. 47 However,
37. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 8-13.
38. Id. at 13-14.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 14.
41. See id. at 14-15.
42. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 14-15.
43. See id. at 15.
44. See id. at 15-16.
45. See id. at 17.
46. Id.
47. See JACOBS, supra note 10, at 17.
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educators may choose to take the process further, through phases five and
six.
41
An additional area for reform may be to identify possibilities to inte-
grate disciplines. 49 As Jacobs states, "merging concepts from two or more
disciplines can make for a powerful and lasting learning experience. 5°
Mapping can serve as a tool for effectuating that integration, to whatever
degree faculty members choose.51
Another area in which mapping may be useful is to ensure that assess-
ments of students are aligned with the goals set for student learning.52
Through mapping, assessments and learning can be correlated and checked
to see that what is taught is assessed, and vice versa.53
A final use of mapping is to help ensure that what is being taught to
students is timely and up-to-date.54 As faculty members review and share
their maps, they may incorporate the other practices--of seeking gaps and
eliminating unnecessary repetitions-to cull outdated materials or find op-
portunities to incorporate new materials in the field.55
It is important to note that all of these potential applications of the map-
ping process are within the discretion of faculty members. Rather than im-
posing some form of external control or mandate on faculty members, map-
ping can empower faculty to gain a more comprehensive and rich under-
standing of what actually happens in their schools and how best to deliver
their curriculum to their students.
I1. LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM REFORM TODAY
This article is not meant to provide a comprehensive summary of those
important changes and works, but merely to place our project into the context
of the voice of legal education curriculum reform today. It is well-
documented that, as a whole, law school curricula has been dominated by the
Harvard model set out by Dean Langdell and that, for many years, few
schools deviated from such a program.5 6 This case study model was the vast-
48. Id. at 13-15.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. JACOBS, supra note 10, at 22.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Mary Brigid McManamon, The History of the Civil Procedure Course: A Study in
Evolving Pedagogy, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 397, 399-400 (1998).
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ly dominant force in legal education. 7 However, since the 1960s, most
schools have made some changes, incorporating more legal writing and clin-
ical programs, as well as other changes. Many scholars today still believe
that the law school educational program has not yet reached the level of
reform needed.59
In recent years, however, the idea of revising legal education has gained
significant momentum. Many attribute the opening of the gateway to curri-
culum re-examination to the ABA task force created MacCrate Report,
which in 1992, recommended a variety of changes to legal education to en-
sure that schools were producing competent, ethical lawyers.60 Although it
was certainly not the first or only call for reform of curricula, it made one of
the largest impacts on the profession. At its core were "ten fundamental
lawyering skills and four professional values" which the report asserted
should be acquired by new lawyers, as well as urging an opening of the di-
alogue about law school curriculum and what is being taught.
Since the time of the MacCrate report, a few more works have had a
significant impact on discussions of curriculum in legal education. One such
resource, Best Practices for Legal Education, was developed from a Clinical
Legal Education Association project in 2001, and has become a source of
great discussion among faculties. 63 "This book provides a vision of what
legal education might become if legal educators step back and consider how
they can most effectively prepare students for practice." 64 The book draws
on resources, such as Educating Lawyers from the Carnegie Foundation for
the Advancement of Teaching, and has been instrumental in re-opening
many of the doors into curriculum examination initiated by the MacCrate
57. Id. at 400.
58. Gary S. Laser, Educating for Professional Competence in the Twenty-First Century:
Educational Reform at Chicago-Kent College of Law, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 243, 274 (1992).
59. Id. at 276.
60. Russell Engler, From 10 to 20: A Guide to Utilizing the MacCrate Report Over the
Next Decade, 23 PACE L. REV. 519, 519 (2003). The 414 page report was issued by the Amer-
ican Bar Association's Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, but the task
force was chaired by Robert MacCrate. Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10:
Assessing Its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. REV.
109, 113 (2001) [hereinafter Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10]. It is through his name
that the report is commonly known.
61. See John C. Weistart, The Law School Curriculum: The Process of Reform, 1987
DUKE L.J. 317 (1987) for a detailed discussion of the curriculum reform agenda to date.
62. Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10, supra note 60, at 113.
63. See generally ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION (2007).
64. Id. at l.
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Report. 65 Another such resource is Transforming Legal Education, which is
a "critical inquiry into the identity and possibilities of legal education, and an
exploration of alternatives to our current theories and practices of teaching
and learning the law." 66 This work advocates, among other points of view,
interdisciplinary approaches to reimagining the potential for legal educa-
tion 67
Law reviews have published articles urging the reform of legal educa-
tion or reflecting on this history. For example, in 2001, one author con-
tended that the mainstream law school curricula did not pay sufficient atten-
tion to "cultural and transnational dimensions" of the law, while offering
proposals to make some of those changes.68 Another author offers a demon-
stration of "what rhetorical study can offer to the study of law."
69
A current initiative from the ABA Section on Legal Education has con-
sidered outcome measures as a tool in the accreditation process.7 ° In July,
2008, a Report of the Outcome Measures Committee was published, the re-
sult of a charge to "determine whether and how we can use output measures,
other than bar passage and job placement, in the accreditation process.''7I
The committee gathered information about approaches used by other accre-
diting agencies and also examined the law schools' approaches. 72 Ultimate-
ly, the report made the recommendation that the ABA accreditation standards
should be reexamined and reframed to "reduce their reliance on input meas-
ures and instead adopt a greater and more overt reliance on outcome meas-
ures." 73 That is, evidence should be paramount in the process.
Outcome measures in this context mean judging the accreditation of law
schools by concentrating on "whether the law school has fulfilled its goals of
imparting certain types of knowledge and enabling students to attain certain
types of capacities, as well as achieving whatever other specific mission(s)
the law school has adopted. 74 This is in contrast to the current system,
65. Id.; see also WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR
THE PROFESSION OF LAW (2007).
66. PAUL MAHARG, TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION: LEARNING AND TEACHING THE
LAW IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at ix (2007).
67. See id. at 14.
68. Mark L. Jones, Fundamental Dimensions of Law and Legal Education: A Theoreti-
cal Framework, 26 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 547, 550-51, 559 (2001).
69. Marianne Constable, On the (Legal) Study Methods of Our Time: Vico Redux, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1303, 1305 (2008).
70. See Catherine L. Carpenter et al., Report of the Outcome Measures Committee, 2008




74. Id. at 3.
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which some maintain is paying too close attention to what resources a law
schools are investing in to achieve their goals.75 An outcome-oriented ap-
proach would alter standards such as Standard 302, which addresses the
areas of learning in which a law school should engage.76 Such a change in
the process by which law schools are evaluated for their accreditation cer-
tainly would have an impact on the curriculum and affect the delivery of it at
any school.
Another program, the Institute for Law Teaching and Learning, which is
co-sponsored by the law schools at Washburn University and Gonzaga Uni-
versity, has as one of its goals "student-centered curriculum reform., 77 It
offers resources, consulting, and workshops to assist law schools in working
on their curricula.78
One such resource available to schools on the website is its "Chart of
Legal Education Reform," documenting law schools and their proposed or
adopted reforms.79 Sixty-one schools are listed as engaging in some type of
curriculum reform, ranging from integrating IL courses, to expanding legal
writing, to creating special programs to address certain skills.80 It is likely
that not all law schools have reported for inclusion in this chart, so more in-
stances of reform may be occurring, such as the one currently at NSU Law.
In March 2009, the Legal Education Analysis and Reform Network
(LEARN) report was sent to all deans. 81 The LEARN is comprised of ten
law schools working with the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching to "promote thoughtful innovation in law school curriculum, peda-
gogy and assessment." 82  The schools' involvement began with working
75. See Carpenter et al., supra note 70, at 3.
76. Id. at 18. Ten other professional areas of learning were evaluated, including "allo-
pathic and osteopathic medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, pharmacy, psychology, teach-
ing, engineering, accounting, and architecture," and all accrediting bodies for these areas
apply standards based on outcome measures. Id. at 20. For example, the ABA has added a
rule regarding the relationship between the bar-passage rate of the student body and accredita-
tion. Id. at 16.
77. Institute for Law Teaching and Learning, Mission of the Institute,




81. See Posting of Mary Lynch to Breaking News: LEARN Report Sent to all Deans,
http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2009/03/06/breaking-news-leam-report-sent-
to-all-deans/ (Mar. 6, 2009) [hereinafter Posting of Mary Lynch].
82. LEARN: LEGAL EDUCATION ANALYSIS AND REFORM NETWORK, GENERAL
DESCRIPrION OF PLANNED PROJECTS 2009-2010, at 10, http://www.law.stanford.edu/display
images/dynamic/events media/LEARN_030509_lr.pdf (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) [hereinaf-
ter LEARN: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANNED PROJECTS 2009-2010]. The law schools are
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groups formed at an initial planning meeting.83 The first working group was
charged with examining ways that LEARN could help law schools nation-
wide examine their curricula for expansion to a wider variety of subjects and
learning environments. 84 The second group looked at means to communicate
reforms to faculty members nationwide, while the third was charged with
"examining the role that assessment plays in legal education. 85 As a result,
the groups have proposed projects for themselves that will help encourage
the process of curricula reform nationwide.
86
The following is the list of proposed LEARN projects: 87
1. "LEARN will generate and disseminate a report on law schools'
efforts to implement curricular and pedagogical reform."
2. "LEARN will create a website with a rich collection of teaching
resources."
3. "LEARN will conduct small teaching seminars and workshops for
law teachers."
4. "LEARN will design and operate a summer institute on law teach-
ing."
5. "LEARN will promote and facilitate rounds about teaching."
6. "LEARN will coordinate collaboration in course development and
teaching."
7. "LEARN will create a network for institutional leaders."
8. "LEARN will assess the use of interactive classroom technology."
9. "LEARN will assess the use of periodic written assignments and/or
examinations."
10. "LEARN will assess the use of monitored wiki-postings and list-
servs."
"CUNY Law School, Georgetown Law School, Harvard Law School, Indiana University
School of Law (Bloomington), New York University School of Law, Southwestern Law
School, Stanford Law School, University of Dayton School of Law, University of New Mex-
ico Law School, and Vanderbilt University Law School." Id. The report acknowledged that
other law schools are involved in curriculum reform and expressed the hope that the network
would grow. Id.
83. Posting of Mary Lynch, supra note 81.
84. LEARN: GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF PLANNED PROJECTS 2009-2010, supra note 82, at
10.
85. ld. at 10-11.
86. Id. at 11.




Nova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol34/iss2/1
CURRICULUM MAPPING
11. "LEARN will assess the modifications to the end-of-term letter or
number grade."
12. "LEARN will assess the use and assessment of simulations."
13. "LEARN will assess alternatives to the traditional bar examina-
tion."
It is clear that LEARN has a dynamic and ambitious plan to bring inno-
vation, reform, and discussion of curriculum to law schools nationwide.
NSU plans to bring its curriculum-mapping project to this dialogue.
In August 2009, the Southeastern Association of Law Schools held its
annual meeting.88 On one conference day, a workshop entitled "Curriculum
Reform Workshop," included panels dedicated to the third year, the first
year, coordinating curriculum reform and legal scholarship, and bringing a
global perspective to curricular reform. 89  Representatives from several
schools shared the innovations and the struggles to reach these new programs
at their institutions.9° For example, Dean Van Zandt of Northwestern Uni-
versity College of Law highlighted their accelerated two-year J.D. program,
while Dean Smolla of Washington and Lee Law School discussed in detail
their new third-year, practice-based program.9' The informal discussion on
these topics had a repeated theme-that the law school curriculum has been
stagnant, but that it has begun to change, and that many faculties find this
conversation of change difficult. In addition, while some schools discussed
interviewing focus groups or otherwise seeking some factual reason for mak-
ing changes, other representatives admitted that many decisions about which
courses were taught and when they were taught were largely based on anec-
dotal evidence, personnel, seniority, market forces, or other reasons. 9
88. Southeastern Association of Law Schools, 62nd Annual Meeting, August 2-8, 2009





91. Id.; David Van Zandt & Michelle Greene, Op. Ed., Stress Core Competencies, NAT'L
L.J., July 7, 2008, at 1. Some schools presenting curricular changes or talking about them
were Mercer Law School, Emory Law School, Indiana University School of Law (Blooming-
ton), Maurer School of Law, Elon Law School, and Loyola University, New Orleans College
of Law. See SEALS, Annual Meeting, supra note 88.
92. SEALS, Annual Meeting, supra note 88.
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The dean of Northwestern University College of Law proposed that
there were differing approaches to change in the legal curriculum. 93 The first
was that faculties add new or change substantive courses.94 The second was
that they add or change more technical, clinical, or experiential courses.95
The third was that law schools have worked with delivery innovations.96 The
fourth was that curriculum change has focused on competencies. 97 The two
major areas in which most participants on the panels and the audience re-
ported change were in adding courses in practical education and professio-
nalism. 98 But Professor Steven Friedland of Elon Law School, noted that
changes in law school curriculum have been "nibbling around the edges,"
and urged law faculties to communicate more with each other to consider
what model of legal education could really work in an institution."
Ours is not the only law school to engage in curriculum mapping.'0° At
that same 2009 SEALS conference, the Charlotte School of Law presented
information on its own curriculum mapping project, during a session on
"Measuring Educational Quality."'' They demonstrated their educational
outcomes and discussed their project.10 2 In 2007, the Charlotte School of
Law faculty committed to the principles set forth in the Carnegie and Best
Practices Reports, and then decided to build their curriculum based upon the
educational outcomes necessary to accomplish the law school's mission-to
produce practice-ready lawyers. 0 3 After working through these outcomes
and skills, they are now analyzing their results to determine what changes
may be made to ensure that their curriculum delivers these outcomes.
Our project is certainly not the only one focusing on studying and re-
thinking the law school curriculum, and several initiatives are discussed here.
However, what we believe makes our project distinctive is that we are advo-
93. Dean David Van Zandt, Northwestern Univ. Sch. of Law, Speaker at the Southeas-






98. See SEALS, Annual Meeting, supra note 88.
99. Professor Steve Friedland, Elon Univ. Sch. of Law, Speaker at the Southeastern As-
sociation of Law Schools, Annual Meeting, Invigorating the First Year and Other Required
Courses (Aug. 4, 2009).
100. See SEALS, Annual Meeting, supra note 88; see also Jerry Parkinson, Law School
News, 30 Wyo. LAW, Oct. 2007, at 41.
101. See SEALS, Annual Meeting, supra note 88.
102. Id.
103. See Charlotte School of Law, Academics, http://www.charlottelaw.edu/academics/
default.asp?PageID=-25 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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cating and detailing for others, a process for schools to use an evidenced-
based analysis of a curriculum, without having a specific reform agenda.1"
We are currently evaluating our curriculum to see what students are actually,
in reality (and not on paper) experiencing-and will use that knowledge in
our future curriculum planning.
IV. THE PROJECT AT NSU LAW
As stated, the NSU Law project did not arise because we were dedicat-
ed to curriculum reform per se-such a statement would imply that we were
committed to making changes and were seeking a tool that would accomplish
them. Instead, we were seeking curriculum evaluation, or self-reflection. As
discussed earlier, we were formally led to the idea of curriculum mapping
through working with a consultant who specializes in curriculum and instruc-
tion. After our initial research into curriculum mapping revealed the intrica-
cies of such a process, we quickly realized we were in over our heads and
decided to hire a consultant.105
We then learned that the first real step in a successful curriculum map-
ping project may require a shift in perception and understanding of curricu-
lum by those who teach it."° Like many other law schools, many of our fa-
culty held two common ideas about curriculum-first, what one teaches in
one's classroom is private and a matter of academic freedom, as long as it is
within generally accepted bounds, and second, owing to the model set out by
Christopher Langdell, certain law courses were stagnant beings that should
remain the same throughout the years.10 7 However, a curriculum mapping
process requires a change in these perceptions, and the understanding both
that what went on in our classrooms should become public so that we all can
learn from it, and that all courses, no matter how historical the subject mat-
ter, can and should be part of an ever-changing process.0 8
104. Other law schools may be engaging in curriculum mapping efforts, but our process is
quite detailed and moving quickly. See Parkinson, supra note 100, at 41. The authors note
that there is much literature calling for or proposing law school reforms in curriculum, howev-
er, these appear all to be based on theories and suppositions, rather than evidence-based map-
ping.
105. Several such consultants exist and are available to schools. See Curriculum Mapping,
http://www.curriculummappinglOl.com/CurriculumMapping.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2010). Law schools should consider that as mapping is new to legal education, any consultant
with which you work must be interested in being flexible and learning new methods for the
process to accommodate differences in the curriculum.
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Personally knowing a faculty member in the Department of Curriculum
and Instruction at the nationally ranked Neag School of Education at the
University of Connecticut made getting started easier at NSU Law. After
speaking with our consultant, who laid out the process and what it would
involve, the next step was to approach our dean and ask for funding for such
a project. Using information provided by the consultant, along with a plan of
what we would accomplish at the Law Center and a proposed budget, the
dean agreed to fund the cost of the consultant to get our project off the
ground.
The consultant, Dr. David M. Moss, arrived at the Law Center in Janu-
ary 2008. The two faculty members heading the project met with Dr. Moss
for nearly two full days, getting a crash course on the world of curriculum
mapping, including goals, procedures, and a new vocabulary. Most of the
second day was spent setting specific tasks by which our faculty could pro-
ceed.
It became clear that our main focus would be to establish a baseline da-
taset upon which informed curriculum decisions could be rendered. The data
collection would have three components and would be updated annually.
The first component of the data was the development and implementation of
a survey designed for recent law school graduates. The second component of
the data was to come from a faculty survey by which we could evaluate our
own thoughts and beliefs about our curriculum. The third, and by far the
most time-consuming and labor-intensive, was the curriculum mapping-
documenting-initiative. We decided that academic year 2008-2009 would
be a pilot year-to "test drive" both surveys and have a small group of facul-
ty work through the process of documenting the curriculum and resolve a
process by which larger numbers of faculty could join in with relative ease to
bring the project faculty-wide.
When these data sources-the student survey, faculty survey and docu-
menting-are taken together, this curriculum mapping initiative is a start to
offer the faculty the evidence required to decide whether it wants to revise
and enhance the law school curriculum from a "best practices" perspective.
A. Surveys
Through our initial meetings, we discovered that surveying our students
and faculty was an important part of understanding our curriculum. Yearly
questioning of graduates is a common practice in the education field to help
determine whether established programmatic goals were accomplished from
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the perspectives of both faculty and students.' °9 Our surveys were created in
an educationally sound process. Throughout the spring of 2008, we generat-
ed possible questions for both students and faculty, considering what infor-
mation we might find useful. Each set of questions was then separately sent
to our consultant who, in conjunction with his graduate students and col-
leagues studying curricular design, evaluated the questions for face validity,
educational usefulness, and made edits and suggestions. In the summer, we
first administered the student survey, followed by the faculty survey in the
fall.
At that point we had a "pilot" or draft survey. For the student survey,
we selected approximately ten third-year students-about to be graduates-
and recent graduates, and sent them the survey. We asked them to answer it
as they would if it were sent to them in its final version, and to separately
comment on the questions by highlighting anything they found confusing or
repetitive, or noting information that they thought or wished would be asked
of them. After sharing these results with our consultant, reviewing all res-
ponses, and making clarifications, the student survey was ready for imple-
mentation. Next, we repeated this process with the faculty survey. We used
additional members of the curriculum committee to provide feedback on the
faculty survey, and through this extended commenting process, produced a
final survey ready for dissemination to the entire faculty.
1. Student Survey
An integral element of any curriculum reform initiative is data derived
from student input. Such student input, in combination with our data, can
help us devise our goals by which we evaluate our documenting data. This
survey was implemented in August 2008, immediately following the July
iteration of the bar exam. The survey was administered online, on a volunta-
ry basis to our recent class of graduates only. It was primarily designed to
uncover the strengths and weaknesses of the curriculum from a student pers-
pective. The instrument was a combination of open-response and fixed-
response questions.
The survey was designed to reveal candidate background data, their
level of satisfaction with various law school experiences, their confidence in
their abilities in different areas of professional practice, their level of prepa-
ration for the bar exam, and their future professional plans. For example,
one set of questions specifically dealt with the use of technology in courses
at the law school. The aggregate responses from this section of the survey
109. See, e.g., NEAG SCH. OFEDUC., U CONN. 2007-2008 ANNUAL REPORT 122 (2008).
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will be critical in helping faculty consider ways in which technology should
be implemented in our curriculum.
It is anticipated that the survey will be administered to graduates on a
regular basis to establish trends over time as a routine element of the curricu-
lum mapping efforts ongoing at the law school.
Although the committee requested that we administer the survey
through an independent commercial website," 1 we were required by our uni-
versity administration to use the university's polling platform, Opinio. Al-
though we had excellent support from our in-house contact, the site expe-
rienced multiple problems, from not being available online the day we were
to receive a demonstration, to producing a collection of raw data-rather
than a report-that needed quite a bit of editing to be presentable.
Recent graduates were contacted by e-mail in June 2008, alerting them
of the survey's existence and asking them to complete it in August 2008 after
the completion of the Bar exam. In August 2008, recent graduates were con-
tacted with the link to the survey, and were given an explanation of the pur-
pose of the survey. Two weeks later, we resent the link, with a reminder of
the survey and of the anonymous nature of the information gathering. After
one more reminder early in the fall semester, we had enough information to
assemble a report.
We sent the survey to 256 recent graduates. When we closed the data,
we had 131 stored responses to the survey, including 89 completed res-
ponses, meaning that some students began the survey but only completed
portions of it. Thus the partial completion rate was 51% and the full comple-
tion rate was 34.7%. While not ideal, it is statistically significant enough for
us to examine the data. We attribute our completion rate to several factors:
1. Students have not been frequently surveyed at NSU Law. At some
institutions, all students are surveyed yearly, creating a culture of feedback in
which the students expect to participate.
2. Because the platform for completing the survey was an "NSU" plat-
form rather than that of an outside entity, there may have been some concern
about the anonymity of the responses.
3. Unlike many institutions, we did not offer any outside incentive to
complete the survey."' Many institutions invest a small amount of money in
giving a prize-such as an iPod or gift cards-for which all participants may
register and have a chance at winning.
110. The cost for a year's subscription for unlimited surveying was approximately $300.
111. See Allan H. Church, Estimating the Effect of Incentives on Mail Survey Response
Rates: A Meta-Analysis, 57 PUB. OPINION Q. 62, 63 (1993).
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We uncovered some general themes from polling our students. First,
we determined that most of our students described themselves as "moderate-
ly" or "very" satisfied with all areas of their law school experience regarding
learning, such as the overall learning environment, quality and relationship
with faculty, and the amount that they learned. This information told us that
with a generally satisfied student body, decisions about curricular change
should be refining and probably not sweeping.
Another discovery we made through the poll was that a majority of stu-
dents reported that they were getting similar messages from various faculty
they encountered about the curriculum. We asked students whether the mes-
sages about the curriculum that they received from faculty they encountered
throughout their law school careers, relating to difficulty of coursework, im-
portance of the Bar exam, and importance of ethics, among other areas, were
different or similar. The reporting that students were getting a fairly consis-
tent message helped us shape our upcoming faculty survey, as we went into
that process with the understanding that we seem to have a faculty actively
engaged in our curriculum. This evidence-based gathering of information
was far more useful to us than trying to guess what the impact of the faculty
on students could possibly be.
A further area in which we queried students was on their beliefs of how
prepared and confident they were after graduation regarding specific skills
taught throughout the curriculum, such as communicating verbally or in writ-
ing to a variety of audiences. We hope to be able to use this feedback as we
administer more iterations of this survey and bring the curriculum discussion
to the faculty on a larger scale.
One last set of data collected was regarding students' beliefs in how the
law center prepared them for the bar exam. As bar passage rates have be-
come the topic of discussion and concern among law schools, this informa-
tion can be very useful, when combined with the mapping, if the faculty
chooses to consider specific revisions to these core courses in the future.
2. Faculty Survey
The law school faculty survey was designed to reveal various perspec-
tives on the curriculum by those who are charged with implementing it. This
source of data may often be overlooked in a curriculum mapping project, but
was believed to be essential to provide the law school with a snapshot of our
collective experiences and beliefs about fundamental curricular and instruc-
tional issues in order to help us set our goals by which we could evaluate
data collected through the mapping. As noted, working with an external
consultant, the survey was created and piloted in the summer of 2008 and
implemented in the fall of 2008.
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The instrument was a combination of open-response and fixed-response
questions. Primarily designed to uncover our faculty's knowledge, attitudes,
and behaviors regarding issues underpinning the design and implementation
of the curriculum, the survey also sought to uncover how faculty allocate
their professional time, their overall vision for the trajectory for the law
school, and their beliefs about the relative importance regarding the educa-
tional mission of the law school.
Fifty-three faculty members responded to the survey, a response rate of
approximately ninety-five percent. For this survey, we used a commercial
web-based survey platform via the curriculum consultant, SurveyMon-
key.com. 1 2 While the platform produced data that was easier to use for re-
porting, we experienced some technical problems as faculty members tried to
enter certain kinds of data, such as fractions of hours spent on an event, in
response to a question that asked for a time commitment. The following is
some information regarding our faculty responses. Not every respondent
answered every question, as is reflected in the data below.
These questions were designed to reveal a variety of interests, expe-
riences, and attitudes. NSU Law has always informally designated itself as a
"teaching" school-a place where faculty members heavily concentrated on,
and are proud of, their focus on instructional design and teaching. The res-
ponses to the survey supported that assertion, as we discovered that as a
whole, our faculty members dedicate the majority of their time to teaching
activities, whether in the classroom or preparing for teaching. This scenario
was encouraging for proceeding with the documenting step, as we knew we
had a faculty engaged in the curriculum.
Second, the specific questions on curriculum gave us a picture of a fa-
culty who are not hungering for radical change, but who are open to discuss-
ing reasons why they might consider a change. A majority of respondents
agreed in some way that the curriculum currently met the needs of our stu-
dents, however, paradoxically, also believed that the curriculum needed im-
provement. Interpreting these conflicting signals led us to the conclusion
that the faculty believes our curriculum is solid, but that it could be better,
which is a positive frame of mind when undertaking a mapping project.
Lastly, because it was so important to head into a curriculum mapping
project with a cooperative and energetic faculty, one measure we wanted to
take was the overall feeling of the faculty. The survey generally showed us
enthusiasm and interest in being a part of a program that was doing good
things for students, and that was encouraging for the project to forge ahead.
112. SurveyMonkey, http://www.surveymonkey.conm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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B. Curriculum Mapping (Documenting) Pilot
With the stage set, the curriculum committee decided to begin the data
collection process of documenting the curriculum of the law school. How-
ever, as getting a law faculty on the same page has often been compared to
"herding cats," we decided that before we involved fifty-plus academics in a
joint activity, we wanted to "test run" the documenting of a law school curri-
culum. In addition, resources have advised that one specific discipline
should be selected to start the mapping process, rather than attempting all
areas at once.' 13 Programs starting curriculum mapping should be aware of
several potential pitfalls of the process. These include the fact that curricu-
lum mapping is a time-consuming task involving a lot of hard work, that
many faculty may not have clearly defined goals that they can articulate, that
many faculty may not be interested in the process, and even that teachers
within the same subject may not use the same vocabulary describing their
subject taught.14 These and other concerns were part of the reason we chose
to pilot the program, to work through some of these issues, so that we could
present to our faculty a real picture of how to accomplish this task.
For the fall of 2008, we planned a pilot mapping effort-a one-semester
"proof of concept" trial period which would potentially lead to a full-scale
project across key areas of the law school. Two sections of Contracts
courses and one section of Torts courses served as the context for the pilot
study in the fall of 2008.
The documenting effort that we were piloting used the first several
phases from Jacobs, designed to unfold at three levels." 5 The first level to
which we committed had individual instructors completing a "time sheet"
following each class."6 This timesheet is called the CourseMap process and
is designed to be reflective but not analytical. This form was designed to
capture the actual delivery of curriculum on a class-by-class basis, as op-
posed to the intended curriculum as outlined in the course syllabus. Such a
distinction is essential to produce an accurate database of knowledge, skills,
and habits of mind explicitly taught within the context of course work at the
law school. Schools also may make a projection map or pacing guide, which
113. See HALE, A GUIDE TO CURRICULUM MAPPING, supra note 1, at 113.
114. See Curriculum Mapping, What Is It?, supra note 17.
115. See JACOBS, supra note 10.
116. See infra Appendix A, B.
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is a tool that projects what will be covered in the future in a program, but a
curriculum map, at its heart, is a record of implemented instruction.
17
The second level of the mapping pilot is the generation of Micro-
Maps." 8 These maps are generated by faculty working together in a given
specialty area. The first stage in creating MicroMaps is to analyze the Cour-
seMaps from the entire semester with an eye toward identifying any incon-
sistencies and deviations from the intended syllabus. Faculty are not encour-
aged to "correct" or alter the differences between the CourseMaps and sylla-
bus at this point, but rather merely document them, if they exist.
Next in this level, faculty from a given program area come together to
discuss their documenting with the explicit aim of identifying and updating
their learning goals for the course or courses in the specialty area. As we had
two Contracts sections but only one Torts section, we continued through the
next steps with our Contracts CourseMaps. For purposes of this pilot, we
used the substantive Contracts law as tested on the bar exam as our learning
goals/guide for the course. We analyzed our course maps together to see if
any differences in coverage existed between the two sections of Contracts
taught, and also to see the two sections' alignment with the Florida and Mul-
tistate Boards of Bar Examiners' testing areas. While we did use this bar
exam testing outline as our goal by which to analyze our course map, it is
important to understand that a faculty member or group of faculty members
teaching any particular course could set their own goals for course coverage
and analyze their course maps on that framework.
No matter where or how the goals were set, this stage of analysis is full
of discussion and analysis by the faculty teaching that course who partici-
pated in the documentation. While our groups of faculty teaching the same
courses have met in the past, the discussions were freeform. By comparison,
in these sessions, our experiences documenting gave us hard data by which
to productively discuss the similarities and differences in our courses on the
same topic. Rather than merely an anecdotal sharing, the group creation of a
MicroMap guided the discussion, as we used evidence of actual teaching
practices that we gathered in the CourseMap. When done on a large scale,
the very process of collectively generating a MicroMap will offer some fa-
culty the first complete and accurate look at their own curriculum as it is
actually delivered.
117. See Curriculum Mapping, Curriculum Mapping Model, http://www.curriculum
mapping 101 .conCuriculumMapping.html#Curriculum%20Mapping%2Mode (last vi-
sited Feb. 21, 2010).
118. See infra Appendix C.
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It is important to note that "similar courses" for purposes of faculty dis-
cussion could be either "horizontal" or "vertical" within the curriculum. 19
For example, in the field of Contracts, horizontal analysis may include all
faculty who are teaching first-year Contracts, and a vertical analysis may
include all faculty who are teaching first-year contacts, UCC: Sales, Reme-
dies, and any other courses, in which data revealed that they shared common
doctrine. Horizontal discussions may be useful in a law school environment,
to keep professors teaching the same groundwork courses, apprised of what
students are building in their first level of education, while vertical alignment
can be very helpful to allow teachers to assess what substantive material or
skills were taught in previous courses in which students were enrolled, and
make informed decisions about whether such material needed to be reviewed
or whether such repetition was unnecessary.120 In other words, the oppor-
tunities are plentiful for faculty to group and regroup to analyze what and
how information is taught to their common groups of students.
Such a MicroMap marked the end of the pilot project, and a point at
which a larger-scale faculty participation was ready to be considered. A full-
blown mapping project at the law school would involve the third, and final,
level of curricular review once each specialty area completed their work at
the MicroMap level. Representatives from the various specialty areas could
come together to generate a MacroMap for the entire school. Such a docu-
ment would offer a year-by-year perspective on the law school curriculum in
its entirety. It would tell the unique curricular story of the law school while
offering faculty, administrators, technology support staff, and others an evi-
dence-supported position from which informed decisions could be made
about our curriculum. For example, with a working knowledge of the actual
curriculum in year one and newly refined objectives, faculty could plan for
learning outcomes in subsequent course work and clinic experiences to sup-
port those core concepts and ensure students receive the knowledge, skills,
and experiences in a coherent and well articulated fashion aligned with best
practices in legal education. Such a process would allow our faculty to work
as a coordinated body of professionals working toward a public and well
documented set of program goals consistent with the best practices of legal
education today.
119. See Teaching Today, A Curriculum Mapping Primer, http://teachingtoday.glencoe.
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C. Fall 2008 Experiences
With the general understanding of curriculum mapping, and after spe-
cific training and planning for the process, we began our pilot program in fall
2008. Three professors teaching two different courses-two Contracts, one
Torts-completed course maps during the semester and, through trial and
error, worked out a system for efficient documentation of time within the law
course framework. This accomplishment was time consuming, frustrating,
and yet, ultimately rewarding. We began with the concept that, as lawyers,
we were all familiar with the "time sheet" process.
The first step was that we set up a timesheet to document what and how
we taught in our classrooms.' 2' The original timesheet we created had five
columns. 2 2 The first was for time spent on an activity. We originally de-
cided to keep "lawyer-like" timesheets, dividing hours into tenths-by do-
cumenting in six minute increments, like many of us had done in law firms.
The problem we immediately encountered was that we had different defini-
tions of what an "hour" was in the classroom-for some of us, we taught in
one seventy-five minute block, with breaks or straight through; for others, we
taught in two-hour blocks, some with breaks and some straight through; for
others, a fifty minute class was an entire "hour." Because we could not agree
that sixty minutes was a true "hour," we quickly abandoned this method in
favor of just reporting the absolute number of minutes spent on an activity or
subject, rather than fractions of an hour.
The second column we created was a place to list different teaching ac-
tivities in the classroom via an activity code. This list of "activities" grew
throughout the pilot program, as we lived through the documenting process
and realized that our initial brainstorm of codes did not begin to cover what it
was we actually did in the classroom. Our list of codes initially included the
following:
ADM - Administrative matters relating to the class such as meeting
time, etc.;
LEC - Lecturing law;
SM - Time spent leading one or more students in discussion or syn-
thesis of statutory or case law through questions;
PRP - Professor reviewing practice problems; and
121. Our initial timesheet and our final product from the Fall 2008 pilot are included in
this article as Appendix A and B.
122. See infra Appendix A.
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SPP - Students independently working on review/practice prob-
lems. 12
3
But eventually, by the end of the fall pilot, it became the following list:
L - Lecture;
SD - Socratic dialogue;
SP - Student presentation;
SLA- Simulated lawyering activity; and
GA - Group activity, i.e., students doing something in groups.1
24
The next column we created in the original timesheet was a place for a
"Classroom Tool Code." A classroom tool was our idea of a way to docu-
ment if we used any technology in the classroom, so that we could track what
that use was, including both higher-tech, such as PowerPoint, video, internet,
as well as low-tech, such as merely writing on the whiteboard, which in
many law classes is not even used. Our list evolved to the following:
WB - White board;
PP - PowerPoint or similar presentation tool;
IC - Interactive computer activity; and
TV - Use of television, or computer, to show clip, movie or the like,
i.e., not interactive by means of technology.
25
The next columns we used to document our teaching evolved
through the piloting of the program. Originally, we only captured the subject
matter taught, but through the discussion and feedback process we had as we
were completing the documenting pilot, part-way through the semester we
added a column called "Skills Being Taught." We decided, after reflection,
that not all time spent in the classroom was exclusively dedicated to covering
a certain amount of substantive material, but rather to help impart certain
skills to students, that it was important to document this coverage as well as
the traditional substantive matters, and that more than one skill could be cov-
ered at once. Our list was as follows:
CA - Case analysis;
PS - Problem solving;
OA - Oral advocacy;
123. Id.
124. See infra Appendix B.
125. See infra Appendix B.
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LW - Legal writing;
DD - Document drafting;
S - Synthesis of the law from cases;
ST - Use and interpretation of statutes;
LS - Litigation skills;
N - Negotiation;
I - Interviewing;
MCT- Multiple choice test-taking;
ETT - Essay test-taking; and
BEP - Bar exam preparation.
For some of us, this column required the most thought into what we ac-
tually were doing in the classroom. As we set the goal of completing these
timesheets, almost immediately upon exiting the classroom, it was very easy
to think back and remember that you covered a certain portion of the syllabus
or the casebook. However, thinking about what skill students were learning
really required a careful consideration of the classroom time spent. We
found this to be one of the most valuable parts of the documenting as we
were thinking about our teaching on more than one level. We found that
even thinking about documenting skills that students learned in the class-
room made us more aware of this aspect of education, and encouraged us to
ensure that we were working with our students on skills as well as substan-
tive coverage. We all believe that our students benefitted from our heigh-
tened awareness.
As for covering the subject matter, we decided that rather than either
writing the subject matter in our own words-which may or may not coin-
cide among teachers on topics--or trying to evolve our own common lan-
guage of a subject matter, that we would use an objective, outside list of top-
ics from the course to unify what we covered in our documenting. For ex-
ample, in Contracts, both of the professors piloting the program began the
course with formation of contracts. However, if we tried to use our own
language, one of us might describe an entire four-week unit as "formation,"
while another might break it down to "mutual assent" and "offer and accep-
tance;" even further, to "offer" and then separately "acceptance;" or even
further, to "acceptance by conduct" or "bilateral acceptance." The permuta-
tions were too great to attempt to control. As both professors taught from the
same book, we also considered using the book's table of contents as a guide,
but we were concerned with the implications for the future, should the map-
ping project be utilized by the entire faculty, including others who may use
other textbooks for the same subject. We did not want to tie the document-
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We finally settled on using the topic of subjects from the Multistate Bar
Examiners' outline. This list had several benefits and drawbacks. The first
benefit was that it was universal-not only could all Contracts teachers even-
tually use this outline, but it also could be a resource that, as the program
grew, other faculty in other subject areas might draw on. Our colleague pi-
loting the Torts documenting also drew on the Multistate Examiners' outline,
with success. The second benefit to using this outline was that the list of
topics was comprehensive for the course. There were few, if any, topics we
encountered, and that we taught, which were not on the bar list. However,
there were some drawbacks to this list. First, the outline of topics and our
foci did not always match up. Places where we might have wanted more
detail in subtopics were grouped together, while in other places in the out-
line, there were extensive subdivisions of topics that were not relevant to us.
In addition, sometimes the terms used in describing parts of the law were not
identical to the terms we used in our classroom; however, that in itself was
part of our educational process of working together.
The list of topics, as per the bar examiners' outline, is included in Ap-
pendix A and Appendix B, as we used them in our timesheets. The subject
matter documenting became perhaps the easiest part of the course. We used
the outline numbering to quickly drop in the code of the subject matter,
again, keeping the list as part of our timesheet template for easy referral.
The last column we created was a free written space for any additional
information that we wanted to include. Sometimes this space was used for
further subdividing topics when the subject matter code did not allow us to
clarify exactly what it is that we taught. Other times, we made additional
notes about what we did, just to have the clearest record of our time spent in
the classroom.
Once we had finished our timesheets for the semester (one per class),
we had our own individual CourseMaps, and were ready to begin the next
phase. Through various sessions together, we took our two CourseMaps for
the Contracts courses and tried our hand at creating a MicroMap-a product
demonstrating the consistencies and inconsistencies between the individual
products. While this tool, in a more widespread project, would ultimately be
used as the basis of analysis by a group of faculty members to evaluate what
is taught and how it is taught, 26 we had no plans to carry it through that far
with the pilot. At this stage, we were simply creating the MicroMaps to see
what method might work for us in the law school environment and what in-
formation we obtained from their creation. We created a week-by-week Mi-
126. See UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at 53-54.
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croMap through the first several weeks of the course, and the result for week
one is presented in Appendix C.
To create this MicroMap, first we combined our timesheets onto one
form, in a week-by-week format. To do that, we listed each professor (in this
pilot, only two) one after another using the same template from our original
forms; but here, using a different color to enter the information for each pro-
fessor on the same form, so that we had a one-glance snapshot of each
week's activities-what the coverage of skills and content was for each pro-
fessor during the same time period-a detailed picture of how we had each
spent the minutes allotted to us in the Contracts classroom each week. We
completed four weeks' worth of these week-by-week combinations before
determining that this was a feasible and useful process. We also determined
that we could easily add more professors by extending the chart and adding
additional font colors.
From that point, we decided to further summarize the material and see
in what ways we could analyze it to get additional levels of understanding of
what was happening in the contracts classrooms across the sections piloted.
One useful format we developed was a person-by-person accounting only by
substantive coverage, included here in Appendix D. We found this summary
of coverage, using the original codes by which we did timekeeping, useful
and easily expandable for when others participated by merely adding col-
umns to the right, including each additional faculty member. A quick glance
at this document-which we only prepared through the first four weeks-
told us what was being taught in multiple classrooms in our first-year con-
tracts program. We completed a similarly formatted map for the skills taught
and found that equally as useful.
At this point, we felt confident that our methodology was sound, and
that the information we produced had the potential to be very useful in facili-
tating faculty discussions. When these exercises were complete, we truly felt
that we had accomplished a great deal by piloting this program. Our goal
was to work through the program so that we could present curriculum map-
ping to the faculty, demonstrate what it is and how it works, and, as a direct
result of piloting the program, tangibly demonstrate that documenting
courses was something that could be done.
Such results did not come completely without effort or challenge. The
first hurdle we crossed was merely remembering to complete the time sheets
as quickly as possible. Anyone who has tried to document the time spent on
a work project can appreciate that the sooner you document your time, the
more accurate the timesheet. However, it was not always possible to com-
plete them immediately. First, right after class is the time many students ask
questions or seek your time. Second, one professor ended class at noon and
had another class immediately again at 1:00 pm. In that hour, it was difficult
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to remember to complete the timesheet among the other things that needed to
be done. Another professor taught at night, and when the class was com-
pleted at the end of a very long day, staying longer to think about a timesheet
often was not possible.
Another difficulty was that we were constantly monitoring our time-
sheet and methodology, and adjusting it from the appearance in Appendix A
to the last product we used in Appendix B. We had dozens of conversations
weekly about our timesheets and made small adjustments-sometimes add-
ing as little as one code each week-and evaluating how these changes
worked out. This process made us very glad that we completed a pilot. Hav-
ing forty or more faculty members involved in working out the methodology
would have been problematic on two levels. 27 First, it would have been dif-
ficult to come to a meaningful resolution of issues with so much potential
input.1 28 Second, and probably more important, it could have been very dis-
couraging to a large group of faculty, many of whom might have been resis-
tant to the program, to be constantly changing the process as they were un-
dergoing it. 29 Instead of a potentially confusing ever changing task, when
speaking with the faculty, we could now present a procedure for mapping
that we could demonstrate worked, increasing confidence in the project.
Another reason that the pilot was challenging but ultimately rewarding, was
the complication in trying to produce a MicroMap for the first time, faced
with pages of timesheets and an uncertainty as to how to combine them. As
this was our first experience in creating a MicroMap, it was far easier to leap
to this next phase with only two CourseMaps, and through trial and error
produce a format that seemed useful. Had we struggled with more than two
CourseMaps, this process surely would have been more complicated to com-
plete.
D. Taking the Program to the Next Level
Once our pilot of documenting for the fall semester was complete, we
decided to take two steps to further the program. The first was to continue
the pilot through the next semester, implementing the lessons learned from
fall, and expanding it to a few new faculty members who were all teaching
Property.1 30 This continuation of documenting on a smaller scale would as-
sist us in ensuring that what we had accomplished in the fall could work for
127. See UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at 23, 25.
128. See id.
129. See id.
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other courses, as well as bring other faculty members on board to the expe-
rience.
The second step was to present curriculum mapping to the entire facul-
ty, which we did on April 1, 2009, via a lunchtime presentation. The presen-
tation had several parts. First, before the actual presentation, and with the
help of our consultant, we prepared a written summary of curriculum map-
ping and distributed it to the faculty to read in preparation for the presenta-
tion. This summary included both a basic introduction to curriculum map-
ping and an explanation of what we had been doing through our surveys and
fall pilot.
For the presentation, the two faculty members who had spearheaded the
pilot presented curriculum mapping to the remainder of the faculty, using a
combination of PowerPoint slides, lecturing, and handouts. One item that we
left out of the presentation was the results of our surveys. We were con-
cerned that the results would become the focus of the discussion rather than
the idea of curriculum mapping as a whole, and getting the faculty interested
in the documenting process on a larger scale. The results of the survey were
distributed electronically after the program.
After we presented our information, we opened up the floor to questions
and concerns. One significant concern by some faculty members was the
potential evaluation of faculty members based on the information they re-
vealed in the documenting process. The concern generally of those faculty
members under contracts which needed to be renewed, or of untenured facul-
ty members, was that the information they provided about what they teach
and how they teach it could be used "against" them in their renewal or tenur-
ing process. If other faculty members disapproved of their coverage or me-
thods, they may consciously or unconsciously include what they learned
through documenting to make such judgments about contracts or promotions.
Such concerns are not new and have been addressed by those in the
field.' 31 It is clear that this type of tension and potential embarrassment must
be resolved in order for the process to be successful.'32 These concerns come
in the context of understanding the overall relationship of teachers regarding
working together on curriculum. 133 The different types of relationships that
teachers' work related behaviors regarding what sharing encompasses have
been documented.' 34 The first is "parallel play" relationships in which teach-
ers function next to each other but do not share, nor wish to share, what they
13 1. See UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at 23.
132. See id.
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are doing with their colleagues.35 We found heading into our mapping
project that this scenario describes many law faculty, even those teaching the
same subjects. A second type of teacher relationship is "adversarial," where
teachers purposefully withhold information from each other, even though it
might be damaging to the student progress. 36 While we hope that we do not
have that situation on the faculty, the competitive nature of a promotion
could very well breed this type of behavior, thus leading to such concerns.
A third type, a "congenial" relationship among teachers, is one that is
"friendly on the surface," teachers interacting in superficially positive ways,
but not critically examining what they do or why. 37 This situation can also
describe a great deal of law faculty, and may also be fueled by the peer-
review process that we have in place in the law faculty. If you are only shar-
ing positive pieces of your work, your colleagues only can judge you on that
shared information. This may be a disincentive for many junior faculty
members to share their teaching on a critical level. But ultimately, our goal
is to instead have "collegial" relationships among our faculty. This type of
relationship is evidenced by teachers working together to advance everyone's
performance, with faculty "willing to sacrifice and learn anew" to improve
students' learning. 13
8
To reach this collegial stage, it is crucial that when critically examining
the curriculum, teachers focus on facts and data, and not on judging what is
in the data collection based on personalities, personal beliefs, or personnel
evaluation criteria.'39 Our dean was present at our mapping presentation and
strongly expressed that the information collected was not to be part of the
faculty review or renewal process. Despite that assurance, there were linger-
ing concerns that while a policy could be set to control that sentiment formal-
ly, it could not be controlled from being used informally.
A second concern by the faculty was the amount of time needed to doc-
ument courses. It is documented that "curriculum mapping requires more
time and effort during the first few years of implementation than in later
years when mapping becomes established and embedded in the academic and
social cultures."' 40 Each of the faculty members involved in the fall and
spring semesters piloting were quick to reassure colleagues that while re-
membering to complete the timesheet was occasionally an obstacle, the ac-
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139. UDELHOFEN, supra note 3, at 40.
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sor involved in the project independently concluded that while the first few
took a little longer, it took approximately five minutes to complete the time-
sheet after becoming familiar with the codes.
To ensure a smooth transition to a full faculty mapping project, it is im-
portant that we help the faculty fully understand why they are completing
this project. Teachers need to see that mapping can help improve student
learning, and thus can help with their own teaching.' 4' This knowledge and
understanding needs to happen early in the process to ensure success. 142 An
action plan for how the project is going to play out over a set period of time
can help to accomplish that goal.
143
One additional stumbling block that we encountered was the fact that
while curriculum mapping software has been strongly recommended, it ap-
pears that most is designed for the K-12 or undergraduate platforms.'" To
date, we have developed our own charts and forms to complete our Course-
Maps and MicroMaps. The next big step will be, when we have a significant
enough number of MicroMaps, to begin creating MacroMaps. We will need
to regroup as a pilot or committee in order to decide how to accomplish that
step.
After the presentation to the faculty, no formal decision or vote was
taken on the project, but with the dean's support and encouragement, the
project is going forward in the fall. At this point, the project will include the
professors from all sections of the three non-writing courses in first year-
Contracts, Torts, and Criminal Law. Two of the three courses are taught by
faculty who have piloted the program, and will be leading their colleagues
through it. Others from the pilot program will assist the professors in the
third class.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Curriculum mapping is an important tool and process to help a faculty
both to understand what they really do in their teaching, and to give them
evidence to help decide if they want to or need to make changes to make
their program as a whole the best that it can be. During our presentation, one
faculty member in support of the program analogized it to a "system analy-
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In addition, curriculum mapping is an empowering tool, helping all
teachers be leaders in the curriculum they deliver. 145 Because all teachers are
potentially leaders, they can look to each other to solve any problems togeth-
er as a team, rather than delegating that task.' 46
We believe that engaging in curriculum mapping will help us in a varie-
ty of ways, some of which have already have been accomplished. Our first
goal, which we believe has been accomplished, was to open a dialogue about
our curriculum. Before we started this project, we had an informal faculty
gathering in which we talked about whether to change the first-year curricu-
lum. There were conflicting ideas about whether to change-from there
being no reason to change to wanting to change-but for a variety of differ-
ent reasons. What we did not have, we discovered, was a great deal of con-
versation about what we were really doing in that first-year curriculum and
what we really wanted to accomplish. We believe curriculum mapping has
effectively started that conversation.
Second, we believe we are joining the growing community of legal edu-
cators who believe that a law school curriculum is not a static thing, dictated
by its own model of precedent. We believe that we have demonstrated how a
tool used in other areas of education can be used effectively in legal educa-
tion to help support the voice of reform with evidence-driven data.
In the future, we anticipate that curriculum mapping will help to contin-
ue this curriculum conversation, by providing evidence of where we are, and
by serving as a tool for analysis to help us determine where we want to go-
if we want to go. We are in for a long process of self discovery, but we are
now confident that we have taken steps to provide ourselves with the process
we need to succeed.
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Class Number 1 of out 27
SUBJECT ADDITIONALTIME ACTIVITY CLASSROOM DESCRIPTION OF
CODE CODE TOOL CODE MACSED CLASSROOM ACTIVITYDURING THIS TIME
50 Sm None I. A. Forma- Case analysis of first




50 ADM None Introduction Reviewed syllabus,
min to law rules, goals, methods
school and and role of students and
to this professor in this course
course
Curriculum Mapping Timesheet Codes
Time Codes: Division by Quarters of hour
.25, .5, .75, or I hour
Activity Codes: Choose the code which most closely describes the classroom
activity for that time period
ADM = Administrative Matters relating to the class such as meeting
time, etc.
LEC = Lecturing Law
SM = Time spent leading one or more students in discussion or
synthesis of statutory or case law through questions
PRP = Professor reviewing practice problems
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Classroom Tool Codes: Choose the code(s) for which classroom technology
used during that time period
WB = Whiteboard
PP = Powerpoint
DVD = DVD or video or other multimedia
Subject Codes
1. Formation of contracts
A. Mutual assent
1. Offer and acceptance
2. Mistake, misunderstanding, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, confidential rela-
tionship, fraud, undue influence, and duress
3. Problems of communication and "battle of the forms"
4. Indefiniteness or absence of terms
B. Capacity to contract
C. Illegality, unconscionability, and public policy
D. Implied-in-fact contract and quasi-contract
E. "Pre-contract" obligations based on detrimental reliance
F. Express and implied warranties in sale-of goods contracts
I1. Consideration
A. Bargain and exchange
B. "Adequacy" of consideration: mutuality of obligation, implied promises, and dis-
proportionate exchanges
C. Modem substitutes for bargain: "moral obligation," detrimental reliance, and statu-
tory substitutes
D. Modification of contracts: preexisting duties
E. Compromise and settlement of claims
1II. Third-party beneficiary contracts
A. Intended beneficiaries
B. Incidental beneficiaries
C. Impairment or extinguishment of third-party rights by contract modification or
mutual rescission
D. Enforcement by the promise
IV. Assignment of rights and delegation of duties
V. Statutes of frauds




1. Conditions of exchange: excuse or suspension by material breach
2. Immaterial breach and substantial performance
3. Independent covenants
4. Constructive conditions of nonprevention, non-hindrance, and affirmative coop-
eration
C. Obligations of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement of con-
tracts
D. Suspension or excuse of conditions by waiver, election, or estoppel
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A. Total and partial breach of contract
B. Anticipatory repudiation
C. Election of substantive rights and remedies
D. Specific performance; injunction against breach; declaratory judgment
E. Rescission and reformation
F. Measure of damages in major types of contract and breach
G. Consequential damages: causation, certainty, and foreseeability
H. Liquidated damages and penalties
1. Restitutionary and reliance recoveries
J. Remedial rights of defaulting parties
K. Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
IX. Impossibility of performance and frustration of purpose
X. Discharge of contractual duties
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Class Number 27 of out 26 (an optional extra class)
1 2 3 4 5 6
TIME TEACHING CLASSROOM SKILL SUBJECT ADDITIONAL
(MINUTES) METHOD TOOL BEING MATTER DESCRIPION OF
TAUGHT CLASSROOM
Acnvrrv
100 SD WB MCT Review Sample multiple
+ paper touching choice exam ques-
handout on most tions were used to
with mul- topics teach test-taking
tiple choice skills and review
questions course material
Explanatory CODES and notes:
Column 2. Teaching Method
L - Lecture
SD - Socratic dialogue
SP - Student presentation
SLA - Simulated lawyering activity
GA - Group activity, i.e., students doing something in groups
Column 3. Classroom Tool
WB - White Board
PP - powerpoint or similar presentation tool
IC - interactive computer activity
TV - use of television (or computer) to show clip, movie or the like,
i.e., not interactive by means of technology.
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Column 4. Skill Being Taught (more than one simultaneously is ok)
CA - Case analysis
PS - Problem solving
OA - Oral advocacy
LW - Legal writing
DD - Document drafting
S - Synthesis of the law from cases
ST - Use and interpretation of statutes
LS - Litigation skills
N - Negotiation
I - Interviewing
MCT - Multiple Choice Test-taking
ETr - Essay Test-Taking
BEP - Bar exam preparation
Column 5. Subject Matter
Reference will be to outline of subject matter by indicating the numbers
& letters of the section, e.g., I.B.2
Subject matter outline of CONTRACTS
1. Formation of contracts
A. Mutual assent
I. Offer and acceptance
2. Mistake, misunderstanding, misrepresentation, nondisclosure, confi-
dential relationship, fraud, undue influence, and duress
3. Problems of communication and "battle of the forms"
4. Indefiniteness or absence of terms
B. Capacity to contract
C. Illegality, unconscionability, and public policy
D. Implied-in-fact contract and quasi-contract
E. "Pre-contract" obligations based on detrimental reliance
F. Express and implied warranties in sale-of goods contracts
I1. Consideration
A. Bargain and exchange
B. "Adequacy" of consideration: mutuality of obligation, implied promises,
and disproportionate exchanges
C. Modem substitutes for bargain: "moral obligation," detrimental reliance,
and statutory substitutes
D. Modification of contracts: preexisting duties
E. Compromise and settlement of claims
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C. Impairment or extinguishment of third-party rights by contract modifica-
tion or mutual rescission
D. Enforcement by the promise
IV. Assignment of rights and delegation of duties
V. Statutes of frauds




1. Conditions of exchange: excuse or suspension by material breach
2. Immaterial breach and substantial performance
3. Independent covenants
4. Constructive conditions of nonprevention, non-hindrance, and affirma-
tive cooperation
C. Obligations of good faith and fair dealing in performance and enforcement
of contracts
D. Suspension or excuse of conditions by waiver, election, or estoppel
E. Prospective inability to perform: effect on other party
VIII. Remedies
A. Total and partial breach of contract
B. Anticipatory repudiation
C. Election of substantive rights and remedies
D. Specific performance; injunction against breach; declaratory judgment
E. Rescission and reformation
F. Measure of damages in major types of contract and breach
G. Consequential damages: causation, certainty, and foreseeability
H. Liquidated damages and penalties
1. Restitutionary and reliance recoveries
J. Remedial rights of defaulting parties
K. Avoidable consequences and mitigation of damages
IX. Impossibility of performance and frustration of purpose
X. Discharge of contractual duties
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APPENDIX C
WEEK BY WEEK MICROMAP
Week-by- Week MicroMap
Program Area: Contracts
WEEK NUMBER SUBJECT ACTIVITY CLASSROOM ADDITIONAL
# OF MATTERS CODE TOOL CODE DESCRIPTION
MINUTES
55 --- LEC --- Overview of
50 LA SM WB Course and





50 --- ADM --- Introduction to
50 I.A. SM --- Law school




















SUBJECT CODE RBB DMC
(MINUTES) (MINuTES)
Introduction to Contracts and Course 50 55
1. Formation of contracts 50 50
A. Mutual assent
1. Formation of contracts 590 350
A. Mutual assent
I. Offer and acceptance
I. Formation of contracts 50 20
A. Mutual assent
3. Problems of communication
and "battle of the forms"
I. Formation of contracts 40 80
A. Mutual assent
4. Indefiniteness or absence of
terms
II. Consideration 70 45
A. Bargain and exchange
11. Consideration 0 50
B. "Adequacy" of consideration:
mutuality of obligation, implied
promises, and disproportionate
exchanges
I. Consideration 210 100
C. Modem substitutes for bargain:
"moral obligation," detrimental
reliance, and statutory substitutes
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STANDARDS FOR MEDICAL CAUSATION EXPERT
TESTIMONY UNDER FRYE: IS IT "GENERALLY
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will take a comparative look at the two dominant and wide-
ly accepted common law evidentiary standards applied by courts nationwide
* Nicole Saqui received her B.A. from Florida Atlantic University and is a J.D. candi-
date at Nova Southeastern University. Nicole would like to thank the Honorable Robert B.
Carney of the 17th Judicial Circuit of Florida, Broward County Court, for his inspiration and
guidance in selecting a topic for her article. She would like to also acknowledge the hard
work and dedication of each of her fellow members of Nova Law Review. Lastly, Nicole
would like to thank her family and friends for their continued love and support.
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in order to determine the admissibility of expert testimony, specifically, tes-
timony relating to medical causation. This article will analyze how these
different standards are applied in various jurisdictions and will also analyze
Florida's approach, which follows the initial standard which was set forth in
Frye v. United States.' In 2007, the Supreme Court of Florida, in Marsh v.
Valyou,2 explicitly held fast to the adherence and application of the Frye. test
in Florida courts for the admissibility of medical causation expert testimony.3
However, many seem to believe that the substance of its decision seems to
say otherwise.4
In an apparent effort to "to limit the admission of opinion [testimony]
based on so-called 'junk science' or pseudo science,"5 the Supreme Court of
Florida held in Marsh that expert testimony is subject to the stringent stan-
dard that was set forth in Frye, which requires the "general acceptance" in
the relevant scientific community of the theory or methodology upon which
the opinion is based.6 However, the dissent, in its opinion, diverged from the
majority's rationale and pointed out that, although the majority claimed to be
adhering to Frye, the fact that it found the expert evidence as to the medical
cause of the plaintiffs condition, which had not been generally accepted by
the relevant scientific community to be admissible is in complete contradic-
tion with the Frye standard.7
This article will, in general, provide a synopsis of the current approach
as to admissibility under Florida law and also provide insight as to the me-
thods that have been adopted by other jurisdictions. Section 1H of this article
will provide a brief history as to the two different widely accepted common
law standards for the admissibility of expert testimony that have been set out
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decision in Frye, as well as
the United States Supreme Court's subsequent decision, decided seventy
years after Frye, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
8
Section III of this article will take an in-depth look at Florida's ap-
proach under the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh. Section IV
of this article will then take a comparative approach, analyzing other juris-
dictions' approaches regarding the application of their adopted standard to
1. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
2. 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
3. Id. at 547.
4. See id. at 559-71 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
5. Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 264 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
2009).
6. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
7. Id. at 559-60 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
8. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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medical causation testimony, under each of the widely accepted Frye or
Daubert standards. This article will also discuss the federal courts' approach
to expert testimony admissibility. Section V of this article will offer support
as to why the Supreme Court of Florida should either explicitly deny the
Frye standard and adopt a new standard of admissibility or adhere to the
Frye standard by revisiting its reasoning in Marsh in order to clarify Flori-
da's approach as to medical causation testimony.
This article will further explain the critical need for the Supreme Court
of Florida to clarify its decision in Marsh because, as its decision is set forth,
many seem to believe that Florida is currently without a clear common law
standard for admissibility for medical causation expert testimony.9 Current-
ly, more than three years after the court's decision in Marsh, there is still
uncertainty as to the standard that should be applied in Florida.' °
This article will conclude by finding that the Supreme Court of Flori-
da's decision in Marsh has many questioning whether Frye is, in actuality,
the standard that is used in Florida." This article will also point out how
some of the standards for admissibility are used in other jurisdictions and
whether they could provide a clear and logical analysis for the Florida courts
to follow.
II. THE FRAMEWORK OF COMMON LAW EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
A. The Dominate Standards
The majority of the states have adopted one of the two most commonly
recognized common law standards "for determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence in court."' 2 These standards have enabled the courts to
apply a common law standard in order to determine whether scientific expert
testimony should be admissible in court and ultimately heard by a jury. 3
The theory behind both of the standards is to keep "scientifically unreliable
testimony from reaching the trier of fact,"' 4 but the approach that is utilized
9. See E. Kelly Bittick, Jr., Out of the Frye-ing Pan... ? The Florida Supreme Court
Limits Frye Challenges to Medical Causation Testimony, 27 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 8, 8
(Spring 2008).
10. See Andries, 12 So. 3d at 264-65 (overturning the trial court's decision that the un-
supported evidence is subject to Frye and is inadmissible).
11. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 8.
12. Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R. 5TH 453, 480 (2001).
13. See id. at 479-80.
14. Julia Luyster, Frye and Daubert Challenges: Unreliable Options vs. Unreliable
Science, 26 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 29, 29 (Spring 2007).
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under each different standard in order to satisfy this common purpose is con-
siderably different. 5
I. Frye v. United States: The "General Acceptance" Standard
Frye was the first case to set forth a widely accepted common law stan-
dard for determining the admissibility of scientific evidence and was there-
fore adopted by a majority of the states and by the other federal courts. 6 The
issue on appeal in Frye was whether the expert testimony as to the results of
a systolic blood pressure deception test made upon the defendant should be
admissible in a court of law.'7 The court, in a citation-free decision in Frye,
held that in order for an expert to testify as to a scientific principle or discov-
ery it must be well-recognized and must have gained "general acceptance"
within the specific "field in which it belongs."' 18 The court set forth the
"general acceptance" standard as follows:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to de-
fine. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduc-
tion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gener-
al acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
19
Under this standard the trial "judges are to survey relevant scientific li-
terature, not for substantive content, but to determine the level of acceptance
within the scientific community.' 20 "General acceptance is determined by
considering 'the quality, as well as quantity, of the evidence supporting or
opposing a new scientific technique." '' 21 The "general acceptance" test was
adopted and applied by a majority of the states and federal courts and was
the dominant standard for over seventy years; however, after taking into con-
15. Id. Compare Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D. C. Cir. 1923) (requiring
the evidence to be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community), with Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (requiring the evidence to be both
reliable and relevant as provided for under the Federal Rules of Evidence).
16. See Lustre, supra note 12, at 453.
17. Frye, 293 F. 1013 at 1013-14.
18. Id. at 1014.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20. Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *6 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1998) (quoting State v. Hummert, 933 P.2d 1187, 1196 (Ariz. 1997)).
21. Id. (quoting Hummert, 933 P.2d at 1196 n.5).
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sideration the enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence 702,22 the United States
Supreme Court took a new approach as to the admissibility of expert testi-
mony.23
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: The Gatekeeper
In the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert, the Court
ruled that the standard set forth in Frye "was superseded by the [enactment]
of the Federal Rules of Evidence" 24 and in light of such determination, the
Court established a new common law standard to be used in order to deter-
mine whether novel scientific evidence should be admissible. 25 The standard
under Daubert looks at the relevancy and reliability of the evidence that is
proffered instead of its "general acceptance" and is described by the Court as
being a more liberal standard.26 The Court set forth its two prong standard
stating:
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence
does not mean, however, that the Rules themselves place no limits
on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence. Nor is the
trial judge disabled from screening such evidence. To the con-
trary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but
[also] reliable.27
Although the Court ruled that the Frye standard was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Evidence, it noted that a common law standard could never-
22. FED. R. EvID. 702 (amended 2000). The current version of Rule 702 reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
Id.
23. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585, 587 (1993). "[Petitioners]
contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
We agree." Id. at 587; see also Lustre, supra note 12, at 481.
24. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
25. Lustre, supra note 12, at 481.
26. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587 (defining relevant evidence "as that which has 'any tenden-
cy to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."' (quoting FED. R.
EvID. 401) (amended 2000)).
27. Id. at 589 (emphasis added).
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theless serve as an aid or give guidance as to the application of the rules.28
The Court pointed out that there is nothing in the text of the relevant Rule of
Evidence that requires "general acceptance" as a factor the court must con-
sider when determining whether the scientific testimony offered by the ex-
pert is admissible in a court of law.2 9 Because the standard under Frye ex-
clusively looked at "general acceptance" in determining the admissibility of
scientific expert testimony, and the Rule of Evidence did not establish a
standard resembling the Frye test, the Court held that Frye should not be
applied in the federal courts.30
The Court further stated that even with the displacement of Frye, there
are still limits on the admissibility of scientific expert testimony, and it is the
job of the trial judge to "ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evi-
dence [that is] admitted is not only relevant, but [also] reliable."'" This is the
central theory of the standard that is now applied by the federal courts and
any state that has adopted the Daubert standard.32
The Court determined that the Rule of Evidence placed an obligation of
"gatekeeper" upon the trial court judge by interpreting the very text of the
rule which clearly proposes a degree of regulation on all scientific evidence
provided by an expert witness before it can be considered admissible.33 The
Court specifically analyzed the terminology used in the rule in order to make
the determination that: "the requirement that an expert's testimony pertain to
'scientific knowledge' establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability," and
the requirement "that the evidence or testimony 'assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue' . . . goes primarily to
[the requirement of] relevance., 34
The Court listed four non-exclusive factors that a trial judge acting as
"gatekeeper" could take into consideration when determining the reliability
of the expert's testimony: "(1) whether the theory or technique can be tested;
(2) whether it has been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the technique
has a high known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory has
28. Id. at 587-88.
29. ld. at 588.
30. Id. at 588-89 ('The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and
their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony."' (citing
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988))).
31. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
32. SeeLustre, supranote 12, at 481.
33. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
34. Id. at 587, 590-91. "[I]n order to qualify as 'scientific knowledge,' an inference or
assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Id. at 590.
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attained general acceptance within the scientific community. ' 35 The Court
noted that "general acceptance" is one of the factors that can be considered
by the trial judge when determining the reliability of the evidence proffered,
but it "is not a necessary precondition" as it is under Frye.36 Under this stan-
dard the trial court is viewed as a "gatekeeper," and any and all scientific
evidence must be considered in light of the "relevancy standard" set forth in
Daubert in order to determine its admissibility. 37
1I. FLORIDA'S APPROACH
The Supreme Court of Florida expressly adopted the Frye standard for
the admissibility of scientific testimony in Florida courts38 to be applied
"when an expert attempts to render an opinion that is based upon new or
novel scientific techniques."39 After the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Daubert, the Supreme Court of Florida reaffirmed its adherence to the
Frye standard and did not adopt the approach taken by the United States Su-
preme Court in Daubert.4° However, the Supreme Court of Florida held in
its decision, United States Sugar Corp. v. Henson,4 1 that "[b]y definition the
Frye standard only applies when an expert attempts to render an opinion that
is based upon new or novel scientific techniques. 42 The court also noted
that the Frye inquiry "must focus only on the general acceptance of the
35. Id. at 593-94; Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999);
see Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("[T]he test of reliability is
'flexible,' and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case."); see also Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir.
1999).
36. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594, 597.
37. See id. at 589, 591.
38. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 546 (Fla. 2007) (citing Bundy v. State, 471 So.
2d9, 18 (Fla. 1985); Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195 (Fla. 1989)).
39. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002).
40. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547 (citing lbar v. State, 938 So. 2d 451, 467 (Fla. 2006)
("Florida courts do not follow Daubert, but instead follow the test set out in Frye."); Brim v.
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) ("Despite the federal adoption of a more lenient
standard in [Daubert], we have maintained the higher standard of reliability as dictated by
Frye."); Hadden v. State, 690 So. 2d 573, 578 (Fla. 1997) ("Our specific adoption of that test
after the enactment of the evidence code manifests our intent to use the Frye test as the proper
standard for admitting novel scientific evidence in Florida, even though the Frye test is not set
forth in the evidence code."); Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 829 n.2 (Fla. 1993) ("We are
mindful that the United States Supreme Court recently construed Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence as superseding the Frye test. However, Florida continues to adhere to the
Frye test for admissibility of scientific opinions.")).
41. 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002).
42. Id. at 109.
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scientific principles and methodologies upon which an expert relies in ren-
dering his or her opinion" and not on the general acceptance of that expert's
conclusion.43
A. The Admissibility of Medical Causation Expert Testimony
A district split between the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal,
involving the applicability of Frye as to the admissibility of expert medial
causation opinion testimony set the stage for the controversial Supreme
Court of Florida's decision in Marsh." The Second District was the first of
the districts to address this issue in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Johnson.45 In this case, the issue was whether the expert's testimony
stating that trauma, experienced from plaintiffs car accident, caused plain-
tiff's fibromyalgia was admissible under Frye when the scientific community
had not reached a generally accepted understanding of what causes fibro-
myalgia.46 The parties agreed that there is an established association between
trauma and fibromyalgia but that the cause of fibromyalgia is still "unknown
to medical science."' The court found that experts based their opinions
upon their clinical experience, the plaintiff's medical history, and the recog-
nized "association between trauma and the onset of fibromyalgia. ''48 The
court based its ruling of admissibility of the expert's testimony on the ac-
cepted theory of "differential diagnosis", rather than ruling on the lack of
causation evidence between trauma and fibromyalgia.4 9 The Second District
held that because the experts for the plaintiff based their opinions of causa-
tion on the theory of differential diagnosis, which is not a "new or novel
scientific test or procedure," that it was therefore properly admitted.5°
43. Id. at 110; see Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995) ("In utilizing the
Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of
both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle
to the facts of the case at hand." (emphasis added)).
44. See Bittick, supra note 9 at I 1-1 2.
45. 880 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
46. Id. at 722.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 723.
49. See id. (citing U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 787 So. 2d 3, 19 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2000), affd, 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002)).
Differential diagnosis is the standard scientific technique of identifying the cause of a medical
problem by eliminating likely causes until the most probable one is isolated. This technique
has been found to have widespread acceptance in the medical community, to have been sub-
jected to peer review, and to not frequently lead to incorrect results.
Henson, 787 So. 2d at 19.
50. Johnson, 880 So. 2d at 723.
[Vol. 34
175
: Nova Law Review 34, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2015
2010] FLORIDA'S APPROACH: IS IT "GENERALLY ACCEPTED"? 523
Just over a year after the Second District's decision, the Fifth District
ruled on a very similar issue in Marsh v. Valyou, 5' but did not adhere to the
reasoning of the Second District court and certified a district conflict.52 The
issue in Marsh was very similar to that in Johnson in that it involved the ad-
missibility of expert testimony relating to whether trauma could cause fibro-
myalgia. 3 The court noted that the Supreme Court of Florida has distin-
guished between medical causation testimony that is derived from "studies
and tests," which is subject to Frye, from that of "pure opinion testimony,"
which is based upon the "expert's personal experience and training," which
is not subject to Frye.54
The court explained that the overwhelming majority of the courts that
have considered this issue under Frye or Daubert have held that the "causa-
tive evidence linking trauma to fibromyalgia is inadmissible because of the
plaintiffs inability to demonstrate a general acceptance in the relevant scien-
tific community of a causative link between the two. '55 The expert, in the
court's opinion, did not show sufficient evidence that medical science has
accepted the proposition that trauma causes fibromyalgia.56 Without this
showing, the expert's testimony cannot be admissible as "pure opinion" and
is inapplicable under Frye because in order for the expert to come to a con-
clusion it requires the reliance on an underlying assumption, "that trauma
can cause fibromyalgia," which has yet to be generally accepted in the scien-
tific community.
57
1. The Supreme Court Settles the District Split
The Supreme Court of Florida accepted review of the Fifth District's
decision in Marsh which certified conflict with the Second District.5 8 The
court, in a split decision, approved the Second District's decision in Johnson,
and quashed the Fifth District's decision in Marsh.59
The court found that the causation testimony as to the trauma and fi-
bromyalgia was not new or novel because the testimony and opinions prof-
fered were based on the expert's diagnosis, reviewing the patient's medical
history, physical examinations, the expert's personal experience and pub-
51. 917 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
52. See id. at 323, 329.
53. See id. at 314.
54. Id. at 320.
55. Id. at 323.
56. Marsh, 917 So. 2d at 325-26.
57. Id. at 327 (emphasis added).
58. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 544 (Fla. 2007).
59. Id. at 545.
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lished findings, as well as, engaging in a differential diagnosis evaluation. 60
The court relied on numerous cases that stand for the position that medical
causation testimony is not subject to Frye "'when it is based solely on the
expert's training and experience.-' 6' The court further analyzed that the un-
derlying methodology for the expert's opinion testimony was based on diffe-
rential diagnosis, which has been repeatedly held to be a "generally accepted
method for determining specific causation. '62 Because differential diagnosis
is not a "new or novel" method, the opinion that is reached by the expert
based upon this methodology was found not to be subject to Frye.63
a. Did the Majority Get It Right for the Wrong Reasons?
Justice Anstead concurred specially agreeing that the expert testimony
at issue is admissible; however, he did not join the majority opinion because
of his belief that the adoption of Florida's Evidence Code, similar to the Fed-
eral Evidence Code, supersedes the Frye standard. 64 Justice Anstead, relying
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert and previous Flor-
ida case law,65 expressed issue with the majority's adherence to Frye when
the court has failed to explain "how Frye has survived the adoption of the"
Florida Evidence Code, which similar to the federal rule, does not mention
Frye or the "general acceptance" standard. 66 He further reasoned that the
legislative intent for adopting such a rule of evidence was to have courts
"apply a straightforward relevancy test to expert evidence" and the Frye
standard does not comply with such intention of the rule.67 Some of the low-
er courts in Florida have confronted the issue that they believe exists with
Florida's continued adherence to the Frye standard and have reached the
same conclusion as the United States Supreme Court in Daubert because the
60. Id. at 548.
61. Id. (quoting Cordoba v. Rodriguez, 939 So. 2d 319, 322 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2006); citing Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 So. 2d 504, 510 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Fla.
Power & Light Co. v. Tursi, 729 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
62. Id. at 549.
63. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548-49.
64. Id. at 551 (Anstead, J., concurring); FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2009).
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understand-
ing the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by know-
ledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify about it in the form of an opinion;
however, the opinion is admissible only if it can be applied to evidence at trial.
FLA. STAT. § 90.702.
65. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 12.
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Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate a general acceptance require-
ment.
68
Justice Anstead pointed out that the identical medical causation issue
that was presented in Marsh has been resolved in other jurisdictions follow-
ing Daubert, and such courts have found that, although the causative medical
evidence may not be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community,
such testimony meets the more liberal standard and is found to be reliable
and relevant, therefore, making such testimony admissible in a court of law
under that standard. 69 The concurrence suggests that perhaps the Supreme
Court of Florida should find that the Florida Evidence Code has superseded
Frye and adopt the Daubert standard, which will enable the trial judge to act
as "gatekeeper" and analyze both the reliability and the relevance of the ex-
pert testimony proffered.7" Such an approach would be in line with the ac-
cepted approach of the federal courts and many other jurisdictions, as well as
adhere to the intent of the Florida Legislature.7'
Justice Anstead concludes by stating that he would have held that Frye
was superseded by the Florida Rules of Evidence and that the expert testi-
mony on medical causation would be found to be admissible after determin-
ing its relevance and reliability as required under the Code.72
b. Does the Dissent Have It Right?
Justice Cantero, in his dissenting opinion, did not agree with the majori-
ty's finding that the Frye standard would not apply to the medical causation
testimony, and as such, he approved of the Fifth District Court of Appeal's
reasoning in Marsh.73 The Frye standard requires that the "basic underlying
principles of scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested and accepted
by the relevant scientific community. 74 If there is not a requirement that the
underlying basis for the expert's opinion be generally accepted, then any
evidence offered would be admissible simply by stating that it is the "pure
opinion" of the expert, rendering Frye essentially useless.75
"Pure opinion" testimony is only that which is "based solely on [the ex-
pert's] experience and training" and it does not require reliance on some new
68. Id. at 554 (citing Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 86-88 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1983)).
69. Id. at 558 (citing Reichert v. Phipps, 84 P.3d 353, 364 (Wyo. 2004)).
70. See id. at 559 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
71. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 546.
72. Id. at 559 (Anstead, J., concurring).
73. Id. (Cantero, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 560 (quoting Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 272 (Fla. 1997)).
75. See id.
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or novel "principle, test, or methodology."76 If the deduction upon which the
expert's opinion is based requires reliance on anything but his own personal
experience, observations, or research, then his opinion is not "pure testimo-
ny" and the methodology upon which the opinion is formed is subject to
Frye.77
The expert opinion offered in Marsh is said by the plaintiff to be based
upon the expert's own experience and training, however, Justice Cantero
points out that the expert must have some basis for forming the opinion that
trauma is a plausible cause of fibromyalgia, and it is this scientific principle
of causation that must be subject to the general acceptance standard.78 Jus-
tice Cantero cites the reasoning of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in order
to further articulate his position regarding the requirements of "pure opinion"
by stating that:
[I]t is counterintuitive to permit an expert to ignore scientific lite-
rature accepted by the general scientific community in favor of the
expert's personal experience to reach a conclusion not generally
recognized in the scientific community and then allow testimony
about that conclusion on the basis that it is 'pure opinion.'
79
To permit such evidence into a court of law would allow an expert to testify
as to the specific causation of the plaintiffs injury without ever requiring
that opinion to be based upon the scientific community's general acceptance
of general causation, simply by saying that it is the expert's "pure opi-
nion."8° It would be impermissible to allow the expert to give his opinion
that trauma caused Marsh's fibromyalgia in this instance without first de-
monstrating that trauma can cause fibromyalgia by showing general accep-
tance of causation within the relevant scientific community.
8
'
The majority opinion found that the expert's testimony was also admiss-
ible because it was based upon "differential diagnosis," which is a "generally
accepted methodology for determining specific causation. 82 However, the
76. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 560 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
77. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 13.
78. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 561 (Cantero, J., dissenting). "This theory of general causation
does not become admissible simply because it is the opinion of some experts that trauma
caused Marsh's fibromyalgia." Id. at 562.
79. Id. at 562 (alteration in original) (quoting Marsh v. Valyou, 917 So. 2d 313, 327 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005), rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007)).
80. Id. at 563 ("Permitting an expert to testify that X caused Y in a specific case without
requiring the general acceptance of the theory that X can ever cause Y expands the 'pure
opinion' exception to the point where it swallows the rule.").
81. See id. at 562-63.
82. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 564 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
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dissent takes issue with this line of reasoning finding that the use of differen-
tial diagnosis alone is not sufficient to get around the Frye standard for ad-
missibility because "[d]ifferential diagnosis is not a wild card that can be
used to introduce novel scientific theories into the courtroom.
83
Before an expert can begin a differential diagnosis determination, which
is essentially the process of elimination, the expert must first determine what
the scientific general causes of the plaintiff's condition are before they can
be scientifically included or excluded as the specific cause of a certain condi-
tion.84 This means that an expert cannot find that something was the cause of
the plaintiff's condition in a particular instance without first demonstrating
that it could be the cause of that condition.85
The majority "obscures the fact that differential diagnosis assumes gen-
eral causation ... [and] give[s] the impression.., that any differential diag-
nosis will always be admissible as 'pure opinion' that is not subject to
Frye.86 If this were the case, there would be no end as to what an expert
could claim has been established though differential diagnosis if courts per-
mit testimony on the specific cause of a condition without first demonstrating
that the general causation of such condition is generally accepted by the rele-
vant scientific community.87
Since the expert witness in Marsh was unable to show general accep-
tance in the scientific community that trauma can be a cause of fibromyalgia,
Justice Cantero believes that the expert opinion testimony that trauma is the
83. Id. at 564-65.
84. See id.; Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
[D]ifferential diagnosis methodology assumes the answer to that general causation question,
and proceeds to deduce from that underlying assumption-together with other evidence
gleaned from a clinical examination, the patient's medical history, and any relevant tests-a
conclusion regarding whether the exposure or event in fact caused the illness in a particular
case. From this viewpoint, the general causation principle is the "thing from which the deduc-
tion is made," and therefore, in the words of Frye, it "must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."
Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
85. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
86. Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
87. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
To illustrate [the absurd results that could result] with an extreme example: a patient suffering
from depression sees a doctor because her arm hurts. She does not know why her arm hurts.
The doctor diagnoses a broken arm. The patient cannot tell the doctor how she broke her arm.
The doctor may, through performing tests and interviewing the patient, conclude that it could
not have been a car accident (the patient was not involved in a car accident) and it could not
have been playing sports (the patient does not play sports), but the doctor cannot then conclude
that it must have been depression that caused the broken arm-unless, of course, the doctor
can show that the theory that depression can cause a broken arm is generally accepted in the
scientific community.
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specific cause of fibromyalgia in this case is not admissible under the stan-
dard set forth under Frye.
88
IV. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: IS FLORIDA'S APPROACH "GENERALLY
ACCEPTED?"
In light of the strong split of opinion as to the admissibility of medical
causation testimony in the Florida courts,89 it is imperative to examine the
views and methods that have been applied in other jurisdictions that have
adopted one of the predominate common law tests, either Frye or Daubert, in
order to provide guidance as to what has become "generally accepted" in
relation to the admissibility of medical causation testimony.
A. The Approach of the "Frye" Followers
Many other jurisdictions have considered the issue as to the admissibili-
ty of medical causation testimony under Frye and have found that, unless the
underlying basis for the opinion was generally accepted, such testimony
would not be admissible. 90 The standard set forth in Frye explicitly states
that "the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."9' As Frye is commonly applied by courts, if the "thing from which
the [expert's] deduction is made" is based solely upon the expert's training
and experience, and only requires inductive reasoning to form the opinion,
then the testimony is considered "pure opinion" and is not subject to Frye.92
However, if the expert is relying on deductive reasoning to form his conclu-
sion, and it is based upon new or novel methods or theories, then the expert's
opinion is subject to Frye and is only admissible if the methods or theories
are generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.93
If the theory or method upon which the expert is basing his or her opi-
nion is in controversy or dispute within the scientific community, it shows
88. See id. at 565-66.
89. See id. at 568; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 880 So. 2d 721, 723 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
90. See, e.g., Grant v. Boccia, 137 P.3d 20,24 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
91. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).
92. Id.; see Luyster, supra note 14, at 29-30.
93. Luyster, supra note 14, at 29-30; see also Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d
1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000) ("If a new scientific technique's validity has not been generally ac-
cepted or is only regarded as an experimental technique, then expert testimony based upon the
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that there is a lack of conformity among experts in the field and throws into
question the validity of the opinion given by the expert being paid to give his
opinion in court.94 If the focus of the dispute in the community is over the
underlying principles upon which the opinion is based, the testimony would
not be admissible under Frye; however, if there was only dispute as to the
conclusion that was drawn from the accepted underlying principles, the tes-
timony would not be subject to Frye.95
In one of the most cited relevant decisions, Grant v. Boccia,96 the court
was faced with the identical issue that the Supreme Court of Florida was
presented with in Marsh, but took a much different approach and came to a
completely opposite conclusion. 97 The decision in Grant, which was relied
on by Justice Cantero in his dissenting opinion in Marsh,98 cited and agreed
with the reasoning of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal in Marsh,
and is in full agreement with that court's determination that medical causa-
tion testimony, which is not supported by general approval of the scientific
community, is subject to Frye and is not admissible. 99
In Grant, the plaintiff appealed the trial court's finding that the testimo-
ny of the plaintiff's expert witness-that trauma experienced as the result of
a car accident caused the plaintiff's fibromyalgia-was inadmissible because
the expert was unable to demonstrate that the theory that trauma causes fi-
bromyalgia is generally accepted.'0° The appellate court found that there was
not an abuse of discretion by the trial court because the evidence which was
proffered was not supported by the general community, and it is the type of
evidence which requires the expert to testify as to something that is not based
94. See Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *5, *7 (Ariz. Su-
per. Ct. June 1, 1998).
95. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Kuhn, 14 P.3d at 1183
("[M]edical expert opinion testimony that is controversial in its conclusions can support a jury
finding of causation as long as the doctor's conclusory opinion is based upon well-founded
methodologies." (alteration in original) (quoting Osburn v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908,
915 (5th Cir. 1987))).
96. 137 P.3d 20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006).
97. See id.
98. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
99. Grant, 137 P.3d at 24-25.
100. Id. at21.
[G]iven the clear disagreement in the relevant scientific community as to the cause of fibro-
myalgia, which conflict has also been recognized in other jurisdictions across the country, the
trial court properly concluded [that] the [plaintiff's] proffered expert testimony was subject to
the Frye test and was inadmissible. Until medical science determines with sufficient reliability
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solely upon his experience or training and is clearly at odds with the standard
under Frye.'
Courts that continue to adhere to Frye and have not adopted Daubert,
impose a heavy burden on the party attempting to admit the expert testimony
into evidence and require the evidence to be more than reliable because un-
der this standard "it is not enough that a qualified expert, or even several
experts, testify that a particular scientific technique is valid;" instead the par-
ty must prove that the technique is "generally accepted by the relevant scien-
tific community."
102
Because Frye is considered the more stringent test, and less liberal than
Daubert, courts that adhere to Frye do not find testimony which does not
strictly adhere to the "general acceptance" standard to be admissible in a
court of law. 10 3 To give such deference to the expert witness would defeat
the very purpose of Frye by allowing unverified and unreliable evidence into
the courtroom and would essentially turn the courtroom into a laboratory in
which "junk" or "pseudo" science would be admissible.'0" Because science
and evidence as to scientific tests or methods tend to be viewed by society-
and potentially jurors-as the truth, or more credible than non-scientific evi-
dence, such evidence could be given undue weight by a jury because of this
preconceived notion regardless of its acceptance in the relevant scientific
community.'05
"Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle
to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientif-
ic principles .... Several reasons founded in logic and common
sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors
tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when pre-
sented by 'experts' with impressive credentials." 106
101. See id. at24-25.
102. Lofgren v. Motorola, No. CV 93-05521, 1998 WL 299925, at *5 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
June 1, 1998).
103. Grant, 137 P.3d at 24 (Under Frye, the existence of "acceptance in the relevant
community as to the cause of fibromyalgia ... is necessary for admissibility of expert opinion
testimony that trauma following a car accident caused [the plaintiff's] fibromyalgia.").
104. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Grant, 137 P.3d at 22
(reasoning that the "relevant inquiry is the general acceptance by scientists, not by the
courts").
105. See Lofgren, 1998 WL 299925, at *5; Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d
1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that ajury is more likely than a judge to become "awe-
struck by the expert's mystique").
106. Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1178 (Kan. 2000) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting State v. Washington, 622 P.2d 986, 992 (Kan. 1981)).
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The predominate trend in jurisdictions that adhere to Frye-and Daubert
alike-is a refusal to admit into evidence expert testimony in which the un-
derlying basis for the opinion was not accepted and is unsupported by the
relevant scientific community. °7
The Supreme Court of Florida, unlike most other jurisdictions that fol-
low Frye, found that Frye did not apply to such unsupported medical causa-
tion testimony and admitted the expert's testimony into evidence.08 Such
determination appears to be inconsistent with the requirement of general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community, which is explicitly stated as
the requirement by the court in Frye." The very distinction between the
Frye standard and Daubert is that Frye is more stringent and requires general
acceptance of the experts' evidence before it can become admissible in
court." ° Although the majority opinion in Marsh explicitly states their con-
tinued adherence to Frye,"' the substance of its decision, in allowing the
unsupported and unverified expert testimony into court, completely contra-
dicts the very purpose of Frye."2
B. The Approach of the "Daubert" Followers
The majority of jurisdictions, which have considered the issue of the
admissibility of medical causation testimony, have resolved the question
under the Daubert analysis." 3 The predominant amount of the opinions ap-
plying the Daubert standard have found such medical causation testimony,
which is based on a theory that has not yet been generally accepted, to be
inadmissible.' 4 However, there are a few decisions in which the courts
found the testimony to be admissible when applying this more liberal test
and analyzing the reliability and relevancy of such testimony, rather than
analyzing the general acceptance of the experts' evidence."'
Although general acceptance is not a required predicate under the Dau-
bert standard, general acceptance by the relevant scientific community of a
proposition upon which the expert's opinion is based is one factor a court
107. See, e.g., Grant, 137 P.3d at 25.
108. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 551 (Fla. 2007).
109. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
110. See id.; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1992).
Ill. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 547.
112. See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
113. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Vargas v. Lee, 317
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may take into consideration when determining the reliability of such expert
testimony. 16 Most courts, traveling under the Daubert standard, found that
in order for testimony to be considered admissible, the opinion that is drawn
by the expert must be based on a scientific predicate for which there has been
established acceptance for such testimony to be considered reliable." 7  In
other words, there must be scientific support or acceptance in the relevant
community for the opinions proffered by the experts to be considered relia-
ble, and therefore, admissible in a court of law."8
In Black v. Food Lion, 19 one of the most heavily relied upon federal de-
cisions pertaining to the issues of the admissibility of medical causation tes-
timony under Daubert, the court found that unsupported expert testimony is
not reliable, and therefore, not admissible.120 This case involved a slip and
fall inside a Food Lion grocery store, from which that plaintiff claims caused
the onset of her fibromyalgia.12' The expert witness produced by the plaintiff
was also unable to show that the theory that trauma could cause fibromyalgia
had been generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. 12 2 The
court further expressed that the expert's opinion that the trauma from plain-
tiff's fall caused the onset of fibromyalgia failed all of the non-exclusive
factors to be considered under Daubert because the theory has not been veri-
fied by testing nor subject to peer review-it had failed to gain general ac-
ceptance within the relevant scientific community, and there was no potential
rate of error from testing. 123 The court reasoned that:
If medical science does not know the cause [of the medical condi-
tion], then [the medical expert's] "theory" of causation, to the ex-
tent it is a theory, is isolated and unsubstantiated. Even [the expert
has] recognized the limits of her opinion .... On its own terms,
[the expert's] opinion includes conjecture, not deduction from
scientifically-validated information. It also follows from the scien-
116. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993).
117. See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999).
118. See id.
119. 171 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1999).
120. Id. at 314; see Marsh v. Valyou, 917 So. 2d 313, 324 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005),
rev'd, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 2007).
121. See Black, 171 F.3d at 309.
122. Id. at312.
123. Id. at 313; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) ("Many
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tific literature that [the expert's] theory has failed to gain accep-
tance within the medical profession.
124
Because the testimony of causation was clearly unsupported by specific me-
thodology and lacked common acceptance in the relevant scientific commu-
nity, the evidence could not be deemed reliable under Daubert, and there-
fore, to find such evidence admissible would be an abuse of the trial court's
discretion. 25 It is important to note that a majority of the courts applying the
Daubert standard have reached a similar conclusion as to inadmissibility,
which is in line with the reasoning of the court in Black.
26
For courts adhering to the Daubert standard, it is important for the trial
judge, acting as "gatekeeper," "to keep unreliable and irrelevant information
from the jury because of its inability to assist in factual determinations, its
potential to create confusion, and its lack of probative value.' ' 127 Even under
the more liberal standard of Daubert, it is still critical for the court to disal-
low unsupported and unverified science in the courtroom.12 1 In order for the
trial court to properly "carry out its 'gatekeeping' responsibility, the court
has discretion both in deciding how to evaluate an expert's reliability and in
determining whether that expert's testimony is reliable."'' 29 However, "[t]he
inquiry is 'a flexible one,' and '[t]he focus ... must be solely on principles
and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.""' 3  An expert
witness is different from a lay witness in that the expert's knowledge and
opinion "cannot be based [upon a] subjective belief or [an] unsupported
speculation.' ' 3 1 The trial court's "objective is 'to make certain that an ex-
pert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal expe-
rience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that cha-
racterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.""1312
124. Black, 171 F.3d at 313.
125. Id. at 314.
In this case, neither [the medical expert] nor medical science knows the exact process
that results in fibromyalgia or the factors that trigger the process. Absent these critical scientif-
ic predicates, for which there is no proof in the record, no scientifically reliable conclusion on
causation can be drawn. [The medical expert's] use of a general methodology cannot vindicate
a conclusion for which there is no underlying medical support.
Id.
126. See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 571 (Fla. 2007) (Cantero, J., dissenting).
127. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 1999).
128. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
129. Maras v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 801, 806 (D. Minn. 2005) (cit-
ing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
130. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595).
131. Jones v. Conrad, No. CA2000-12-257, 2001 WL 1001083, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
4,2001).
132. Maras, 393 F. Supp. 2d at 806 (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152).
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A few of the courts applying Daubert have taken a different approach
from the majority of like opinions, and have found such unsupported medical
causation testimony to be admissible under the rationale that reliability "goes
to the weight of [the evidence] rather than to its admissibility," which is a
determination for the fact finder not the trial judge.1 33 However, the courts
which do not find such evidence to be reliable hold that the evidence must
meet the "threshold criteria" which is set forth in the Rules of Evidence, and
then "[o]nce that threshold of reliability is met, then any remaining issues of
credibility remain for the trier of fact." 13 4  It is "the judge, not the jury,
[whom] decides preliminary questions of fact under the rules of evidence
.... [W]hen evidence is offered as science or on technical matters, the courts
must assess its 'validity' [first] by referenc[ing] . . . multiple factors, before
any substantive testimony is given."'
135
Courts that travel under the liberal Daubert standard have also held that
an expert cannot rely on the accepted theory of "differential diagnosis" in
order to testify as to the specific cause of plaintiff's medical condition with-
out first demonstrating the acceptance of general causation. 3 6 "In the ab-
sence of such a foundation for a differential diagnosis analysis, differential
diagnosis generally may not serve as a reliable basis for an expert opinion on
causation . . . ."' However, a valid differential diagnosis test only satisfies
the Daubert standard if the expert can show the general causation of the
medical condition by reliable methods. 38 Scientific evidence is only to be
"deemed reliable if the principles and methodology used by an expert are
grounded in the methods of science." '39
133. Jones, 2001 WL 1001083, at *5; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d
1300, 1311 (1 1th Cir. 1999) ("The gatekeeper role, however, is not intended to supplant the
adversary system or the role of the jury: '[v]igorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropri-
ate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."' (alteration in original) (quoting Dau-
bert, 509 U.S. at 596)).
134. Jones, 2001 WL 1001083, at *5.
135. Sandra F. Gavin, No Second Chances: Best Practices for Expert Practice, 38
STETSON L. REV. 41,43-44 (2008).
136. See McClain v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1252 (1 th Cir. 2005). "[A]n
expert does not establish the reliability of his techniques or the validity of his conclusions
simply by claiming that he performed a differential diagnosis on a patient." Id. at 1253; see
also Clausen v. MN New Carissa, 339 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2003) ("'[1]t is... important
to recognize that a fundamental assumption underlying [differential diagnosis] is that the final,
suspected "cause"... must actually be capable of causing the injury."' (alteration in original)
(quoting Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1413 (D. Or. 1996))).
137. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1253.
138. See id.
139. Clausen, 339 F.3d at 1056 (emphasis added) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95).
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida in Marsh found that the
medical causation evidence was not based on a new or novel methodology
because the theory of the differential diagnosis is generally accepted in the
scientific community and therefore it was admissible."4 This rationale is
evidently at odds with the approach taken by most courts, even those that are




The Supreme Court of Florida was "unable to reach agreement on
whether and how to apply the Frye test," and the majority left many unans-
wered questions in its opinion. 42 These unanswered questions could pose
much confusion for the lower counts in conducting Frye hearings in order to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. 43 This confusion is evi-
dent in one of the most recent Florida decisions regarding the admissibility
of medical causation testimony, Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,'
in which the Third District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's finding
that the unsupported evidence was inadmissible because it was based on
novel and investigational methods.145 The appellate court reasoned that:
The fact that experts may disagree about an opinion or medical di-
agnosis does not transform an expert's opinion into a "new or nov-
el principle" in the second category of opinions, nor does that dis-
agreement preclude or limit admissibility. Rather, the resulting
"battle of the experts" creates an issue for resolution by the jury
146
The court found the evidence of causation to be admissible under the ap-
proach set forth under Marsh, because they reasoned that the disagreement as
140. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 549 (Fla. 2007).
141. See id. at 565 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
142. Bittick, supra note 9, at 13.
The approach the Florida Supreme Court took in Marsh ... appears to narrow the reach
of Frye with respect to expert evidence on medical causation, but leaves unanswered a number
of questions about how Frye applies in that context. It is also unclear how the court's ap-
proach squares with prior case law applying Frye, and leaves for further clarification the criti-
cal distinctions between Frye-testable opinion and "pure opinion," and between underlying
principles or methods and ultimate conclusions.
Id. at 14.
143. See id.
144. 12 So. 3d 260 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
145. Id. at 265.
146. Id. at 261.
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to the underlying basis of the opinion was merely a "duel of competing-and
admissible-pure opinions."'
147
However, an important distinction becomes whether the experts disag-
ree as to a conclusion, which formed from reliance on a generally accepted
principal or methodology, or whether there is a disagreement as to the relia-
bility or acceptance of principal or methodology itself.'48 If there is a disa-
greement in the relevant scientific community as to the reliability or accep-
tance of the principal or the methodology then that method is evidently not
"generally accepted" and therefore cannot be admissible. 49 Alternatively, a
disagreement as to an expert's conclusion which is based upon accepted or
reliable principles or methodologies is simply the expert's opinion and will
be admissible as long as it is based on an accepted or reliable principle or
methodology. 5 ° The "battle of the experts" only creates an issue of fact for
the jury to resolve when the disagreement concerns conclusions that are
reached by different experts who are relying on accepted principles and me-
thodologies.' 5' If there is a "battle of the experts" as to the reliability or the
acceptability of a principle or methodology it is not a question of fact, but
rather a question of admissibility for the judge to resolve. 52
The opinion in Marsh did not explain "where and how to draw the line
between [the] underlying methodology and conclusions in cases involving
issues of both general and specific causation.' 53 Nor did the court clarify
"how the distinction between general causation and specific causation im-
pacted its Frye analysis.' ' 54 Without such clarification, it could lead to much
confusion among the Florida courts.
55
A. Acknowledgement of Florida's Evidence Code
Florida's Evidence Code is essentially identical to, and was based upon,
the Federal Rules of Evidence. 56 However, the Supreme Court of Florida
has yet to address how Frye is still applicable in light of the rules of evi-
147. ld. at 265.
148. See Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1183 (Kan. 2000).
149. See id.
150. Id. ("The logical corollary of the Frye test's focus on the methodology rather than




153. Bittick, supra note 9, at 13-14.
154. Id. at 14.
155. See id.
156. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 554 (Fla. 2007) (Anstead, J., concurring).
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dence. 157 Many of the Florida district and appellate courts have addressed
the inconsistency in the rational of adhering to Frye since that is not the
standard set forth under the Florida Evidence Code.' 58
Part of Florida's Evidence Code requires that evidence be deemed in-
admissible "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."' 59 The legislature passed such a sta-
tute to ensure that the only evidence that reaches the jury is both relevant and
reliable in order to prevent prejudicing the jury with unverified and unrelia-
ble evidence.1 60  To allow medical causation evidence into the courtroom
without confirming that the underlying basis for the opinion is verifiable, is
in complete contradiction with the intent of the legislature. 6'
Because the Florida Legislature did not include terminology consistent
with the requirements under Frye, such as a "general acceptance" require-
ment, the continued adherence to Frye by the Florida courts is inconsistent
with the intent of the code.162 It has been suggested that the Supreme Court
of Florida should review the Florida Evidence Code and determine whether it
has superseded Frye.163
157. Id.
While [the Supreme Court of Florida] has continued to apply Frye in determining the admissi-
bility of scientific expert opinion testimony after the adoption of the Florida Rules of Evi-
dence, it has done so without confronting the fact that those rules do not mention Frye or the
test set out in Frye. Hence, unlike the United States Supreme Court, [the Supreme Court of
Florida has] never explained how Frye has survived the adoption of the rules of evidence.
Id. at 551.
158. See id. at 554.
159. FLA. STAT. § 90.403 (2009).
160. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 9.
161. See id. at l5.
162. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 554 (Anstead, J., concurring) ("Frye is not consistent with
Florida's code.").
163. See id. at 551, 554, 556. Justice Anstead certified the following question to be one of
great public importance:
HAS THE FRYE STANDARD OF GENERAL ACCEPTANCE WITHIN THE
PARTICULAR SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY, AS A PRECONDITION TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF NOVEL SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, SURVIVED THE ADOPTION OF
THE FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE? AND IF IT HAS NOT, DOES IT NEVERTHELESS
REMAIN A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN BALANCING THE PROBATIVE
WORTH OF THE PROFFERED EVIDENCE AGAINST COUNTERVAILING FACTORS,
AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 90.403, FLORIDA STATUTES?
Id. at 556.
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B. Frye or Daubert? That Is the Question
Although the Supreme Court of Florida has explicitly and adamantly
held fast to the Frye standard, the decision in Marsh appeared to take a more
liberal approach and the court did not require strict adherence to the general
acceptance standard as did other courts in jurisdictions that follow Frye.'64 It
is not clear how the court's decision aligns with the prior case law that has
applied the Frye standard nor has the court provided clarification as to the
distinction between pure opinion and opinion which is subject to Frye.165 It
appears as if the Supreme Court of Florida in Marsh really applied the liberal
standard under Daubert, instead of Frye, when they determined that "[a] lack
of studies conclusively demonstrating a causal link between trauma and fi-
bromyalgia.. . calls for further research [and does] not preclude admission
of the testimony."' 166 The court in Marsh continually referred to and relied on
the reliability of the evidence proffered and did not require the general ac-
ceptance of the causation theory in the scientific community, which is more
in line with the reasoning under Daubert.167
The question now becomes: Does Florida, in actuality, adhere to the
Frye standard after the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh?'68
VI. CONCLUSION
The determination of admissibility of expert testimony is a critical issue
for judges and trial lawyers alike; it is also one of much debate and confusion
among the courts. Because of the critical importance and the lack of certain-
ty that surrounds this topic in the Florida courts, it is imperative that the Su-
preme Court of Florida adequately address and clarify the standard for courts
to apply in determining the admissibility of expert testimony. Being that the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Marsh is clearly at odds with the
Florida Evidence Code and the majority of other jurisdictions adhering to
both Frye and Daubert,69 a clarification in the current law might mean that
the Court expressly reject Frye and adopt Daubert as the relevant standard in
Florida taking into account the Florida Evidence code, or perhaps re-visit its
reasoning in Marsh as to the application of the general acceptance standard
to medical causation expert testimony in Florida courts.
164. See id. at 564, 565, 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
165. Bittick, supra note 9, at 14.
166. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 550.
167. See id.
168. See Bittick, supra note 9, at 8.
169. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 570 (Cantero, J., dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 22, 2009, President Barack Obama signed a landmark federal
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regulate tobacco products and how those products are advertised.' The Fam-
ily Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act2 is considered the most
significant legislation in the last fifty years placing restrictions on the tobac-
co industry. The bill received overwhelming support from both parties.3 It
passed in the House of Representatives by a vote of 307-97 and in the Senate
by a vote of 79-17.4 By passing the bill, the Legislature and the President
"ensured that the landscape for cigarette manufacturers will look dramatical-
ly different in just a few years: no more candy-flavored cigarettes, no more
cool T-shirts or other marketing gimmicks, and no more sporting-event spon-
sorships." 5 Although the bill was received with strong support in Congress,
there are still concerns regarding the broad powers granted to the FDA under
the Act as well as First Amendment 6 implications.
In general, this article will provide an overview of the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act. Section II provides the historical
background of tobacco advertising and legislation in this country, and how
the FDA did not have the power to regulate tobacco until the passage of this
new tobacco law. Section III will closely examine the regulations imple-
mented by the Act and discuss whether the FDA has a questionable role in
regulating the tobacco industry. Some believe the FDA is not equipped to
handle the role of regulating tobacco, while others believe the Agency is
more than capable of doing so.
Section IV of this article will look at First Amendment issues that may
surface in the future with FDA regulations passed under the new law. The
first part of section IV will explain the four-step analysis the United States
Supreme Court formulated in order to determine whether commercial speech
is being violated under the First Amendment. The middle part of section IV
will discuss both total and partial bans on tobacco advertising and how they
relate to the new law. The latter part of Section IV will compare bans that
have been made on alcohol advertising in the past by providing synopses of
two important cases. Section IV will conclude with an examination of the
pending litigation by the major tobacco companies against the federal gov-
!. Melissa Healy, FDA Unfiltered; A Look at the New Tobacco Law; The Legislation
Extends Oversight but Bows to Economic and Administrative Reality, L.A. TIMES, June 29,
2009, at E3.
2. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat.
1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
3. Stephen Dinan, Tobacco Law Called a Loss for 'Special Interest'; Activist Approach
Cited as Obama Signs Landmark Bill, WASH. TiMES, June 23, 2009, at A6.
4. ld.
5. Id.
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ernment. Section V will begin by looking at the effects the law will have on
the tobacco industry and analyze whether smoking habits will be changed as
a result of the law. The latter part of section V will discuss the President's
current smoking habit and how he can be an important spokesperson for the
new legislation. The last section of this article will explain what kind of im-
pact the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Act will have, analyze
potential First Amendment implications that may arise in the future, and
suggest that other industries may be affected by similar legislation.
1I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The first tobacco advertisement is believed to date back to 1789, when
Lorillard Tobacco Co. placed an advertisement in a newspaper.7 In 1909,
cigarette packs began to include small trading cards.8 Soldiers during World
Wars I and II received free cigarettes, and in the 1940s and 1950s, popular
television shows were backed by cigarette manufacturers. 9 In the 1960s,
tobacco advertising began to dwindle as health risks associated with smoking
became clear.' ° "[1]n 1964, the U.S. surgeon general issued a report linking
smoking with cancer, yet as late as 1994, tobacco executives testified before
Congress that smoking neither caused cancer nor was addictive."" Anti-
smoking legislation has been a constant fight in the legislature lasting nearly
half of a century.' 2 Prior to the enactment of the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act, the FDA did not have the "authority to regulate
what goes into tobacco products."' 3 The FDA had first asserted its right to
regulate tobacco products in 1996 under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
7. Scott Olstad & Randy James, A Brief History of. Cigarette Advertising, TiME, June
29, 2009, at 14.
8. Id. ("The American Tobacco Co. includes small baseball cards with cigarette packs.




11. Charles Kochakian, Tobacco Law Makes Smoking Less Alluring: Cigarettes Will
Continue to be a Major Danger to Public Health, NEw HAVEN REG., July 10, 2009, at 4. "A
[1991] study shows that nearly as many 6-year-olds recognize Joe Camel as know Mickey
Mouse. The cartoon pitchman [was] retired in 1997." Olstad & James, supra note 7.
12. Jim Abrams, Tobacco Bill: Lifesaver--or Federal Intrusion?, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
June 13, 2009, at A6 ("President Barack Obama, struggling with his own nicotine habit, sa-
luted the bill, which he [signed]. He said, 'For over a decade, leaders of both parties have
fought to prevent tobacco companies from marketing their products to children and provide
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metic Act (FDCA), 4 but has not been able to do so until the passage of the
new bill.
5
Preceding the FDA's announcement that it would regulate the tobacco
industry, Congress averaged passing only one tobacco bill every five years.' 6
Following the FDA's claim that they could regulate tobacco, Congress aver-
aged passing one tobacco bill every year for five years. 7 "By the time the
Supreme Court vacated the agency's rulemaking, Congress had enacted li-
mited versions of most of [the] FDA's major initiatives, including programs
to reduce teen smoking, prohibitions on vending machine sales, and higher
excise taxes on all tobacco products and cigarette papers."' 8 In the 105th
Congress, Senator John McCain introduced the first of six comprehensive
bills "which had been proposed to end lawsuits brought by forty-one state
attorneys general against the tobacco industry."' 9 The FDA asserting its
right to regulate tobacco was found unconstitutional in the United States Su-
preme Court case of FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. °
Since 1971, broadcast advertising has been banned for cigarettes and lit-
tle cigars. 2' Another federal statute known as the Comprehensive Smoking
Education Act placed limitations on tobacco labeling and advertising. 22 Its
purpose was for Congress "to establish a comprehensive Federal Program to
deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship
between smoking and health. 23  Congress wanted to ensure that
"the public may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of
cigarette smoking by inclusion of warning notices on each package of ciga-
rettes and in each advertisement of cigarettes." 24
14. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006).
15. Healy, supra note 1.
16. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the "Major Questions" Exception to Chevron
Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (or Why Massachusetts v. EPA Got it Wrong), 60
ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 627 (2008).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 628 (citing C. STEPHEN REDHEAD & Joy AUSTIN-LANE, TOBACCO LEGISLATION
IN THE 105TH CONGRESS: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF S. 1415, S. 1530, S. 1638, S. 1889,
H.R. 3474, AND H.R. 3868, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (Aug. 19, 1988)).
20. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (2006).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1331.
23. Id.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1331(1).
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I. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE NEW TOBACCO LAW
A. Regulation Specifics
The main purpose behind the new legislation is to provide the FDA with
broad authority to regulate all tobacco products and how they are marketed.25
There are several critical pieces to the legislation that will create great
change for the tobacco industry. Warning labels on cigarette packages will
now have to cover fifty percent of the front and rear of the packages. 26 "The
word 'warning' must be included in capital letters., 27 Sports and entertain-
ment events will be prevented from having tobacco-related sponsorships. 8
Giveaways of nontobacco items will no longer be allowed with the purchase
of tobacco products. 29 "A federal ban will be imposed on all outdoor tobacco
advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds."3
Adult-only facilities will be the only places allowed to contain point-of-
sale advertising, and tobacco vending machines will disappear in all loca-
tions except those restricted for adults.31 If a retailer sells tobacco products
25. See Healy, supra note 1. The ten purposes granted by Congress to the FDA are as
follows:
(1) to provide authority to the Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products...
by recognizing it as the primary Federal regulatory authority with respect to the manufacture,
marketing, and distribution of tobacco products as provided for in this division; (2) to ensure
that the Food and Drug Administration has the authority to address issues of particular concern
to public health officials, especially the use of tobacco by young people and dependence on to-
bacco; (3) to authorize the Food and Drug Administration to set national standards controlling
the manufacture of tobacco products and the identity, public disclosure, and amount of ingre-
dients used in such products; (4) to provide new and flexible enforcement authority to ensure
that there is effective oversight of the tobacco industry's efforts to develop, introduce, and
promote less harmful tobacco products; (5) to vest the Food and Drug Administration with the
authority to regulate the levels of tar, nicotine, and other harmful components of tobacco prod-
ucts; (6) in order to ensure that consumers are better informed, to require tobacco product
manufacturers to disclose research which has not previously been made available, as well as
research generated in the future, relating to the health and dependency effects or safety of to-
bacco products; (7) to continue to permit the sale of tobacco products to adults in conjunction
with measures to ensure that they are not sold or accessible to underage purchasers; (8) to im-
pose appropriate regulatory controls on the tobacco industry; (9) to promote cessation to re-
duce disease risk and the social costs associated with tobacco-related diseases; and (10) to
strengthen legislation against illicit trade in tobacco products.
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 3(l)-(10), 123
Stat. 1776, 1781-82 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).





31. Abrams, supra note 12.
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to minors, he or she will face possible federal enforcement and penalties.3"
Cigarettes sweetened by candy flavors, "herb[s] or spices such as strawberry,
grape, orange, clove, cinnamon or vanilla" will be barred from purchase.33
These flavored tobacco products have been known to appeal to younger
people.34 "Light," "mild" or "low" cigarettes that give consumers the im-
pression that they are less harmful, will no longer be sold "unless the manu-
facturer can prove that [they] ... will significantly reduce the risk of tobac-
co-related diseases" when the cigarettes are smoked. 35  However, the FDA
will not have the ability to ban any class of tobacco products outright.
36
B. A Questionable Role for the FDA
Several industry experts criticized the bill and the role of the FDA in
regulating tobacco.37 Stanton Glantz, a professor of medicine and director of
the Center for Tobacco Control Research and Education at the University of
California, San Francisco stated:
"Most people in the field are not enthused about the bill. They
have real problems with the bill. I think the bill is a huge missed
opportunity for public health. The FDA's scientific advisory
committee will have three tobacco industry representatives on it.
They are non-voting, but I don't think that will matter. The fact
that they are there at all is a problem. I think people have grossly
underestimated how much trouble that will cause.",
38
Scott Raminger, President of the American Wholesale Marketers Asso-
ciation remarked, "We don't really think it's appropriate for [the] FDA to be




35. ld.; Healy, supra note 1.
36. Healy, supra note 1.
37. See Shari Roan & Shara Yurkiewicz, FDA Unfiltered; Experts Weigh in on the Rami-
fications; Industry Insiders and Academics Offer Personal, Professional Insights on the Law,
L.A. TIMIs, June 29, 2009, at E3.
38. Id. The author summarized an industry professional's opinion:
Because the legislation allows the Food and Drug Administration to appoint a scientific
advisory committee that will include representatives from the tobacco industry, Glantz says he
feels the FDA will be unable to accomplish far-reaching measures to control tobacco and re-
duce smoking rates. Moreover, he says, the bill minimizes the adverse economic effect on the
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complish anything except cost the taxpayers a lot more money. 39 Some
members of Congress believe that by letting the FDA give "its blessing to the
sale of [certain] tobacco products" and not to others, the FDA may lead
people to think that the approved products are safe.'
1. Too Much for the FDA to Handle?
Politicians who voted against the bill argued that the FDA does not have
adequate resources to handle the task.41 Senate minority leader Mitch
McConnell expressed his opinion on the FDA's role by commenting, "Man-
dating the FDA to regulate and approve the use of tobacco would be a distor-
tion of the agency's mission and a tremendous misuse of its overstretched
priorities. We should focus FDA resources on protecting the public health,
not burdening it with an impossible assignment. 42 However, some of the
seventeen senators who voted against the FDA regulating tobacco receive
significant campaign contributions from tobacco companies.43 Senator Sax-
by Chambliss opposed the bill because he feels that the tobacco industry
would be overregulated.'
Even without tobacco regulation, the FDA is already strained in carry-
ing out its other responsibilities such as ensuring "the safety of the nation's
food, drugs and medical devices. 45 Tobacco is not an item that the FDA is
used to regulating such as a medical device or food.46 The FDA does not
have any demonstrable health benefits to weigh against the risks that are
associated with tobacco use.47 Major cigarette manufacturer, R.J. Reynolds,
argued that instead of placing regulatory control on an already overburdened
FDA, "more emphasis should be placed on educating smokers" about the
dangers associated with smoking.48 Representative Henry A. Waxman ac-
knowledged that tobacco regulation is an unusual role for the Agency, but he
believes the FDA is the only agency properly equipped to decrease the dam-
age caused by tobacco use.49 In an interview, Representative Waxman
39. Id.
40. Healy, supra note I.
41. Halimah Abdullah, Senators Who Opposed Tobacco Bill Received Top Dollar from




45. Healy, supra note 1.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Dinan, supra note 3.
49. Healy, supra note 1.
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stated, "The FDA is the exact agency that should have that authority-it's a
scientific organization with regulatory powers. 50
2. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.5 was a critical United
States Supreme Court case that determined whether the FDA could actually
regulate tobacco. In 1996, "[t]he FDA determined that nicotine is a 'drug'
and that cigarettes and smokeless tobacco are 'drug delivery devices,' and
therefore [the FDA] had jurisdiction under the FDCA to regulate tobacco
products as customarily marketed. 52 The United States Supreme Court held
that "Congress has not given the FDA the authority" to regulate tobacco. 3
The majority looked at the FDCA as a whole and determined that Congress
did not intend to include tobacco products within the FDA's jurisdiction."
However, the dissent felt that Congress intended for the FDA to have
the authority to regulate substances intended to affect any function or struc-
ture of the body under the FDCA. 51 Justice Breyer proceeded with the fol-
lowing opinion in order to reinforce his statutory interpretation of the FDCA:
In its own interpretation, the majority nowhere denies the fol-
lowing two salient points. First, tobacco products (including ciga-
rettes) fall within the scope of this statutory definition, read literal-
ly. Cigarettes achieve their mood-stabilizing effects through the
interaction of the chemical nicotine and the cells of the central
nervous system. Both cigarette manufacturers and smokers alike
know of, and desire, that chemically induced result. Hence, ciga-
rettes are "intended to affect" the body's "structure" and "func-
tion," in the literal sense of these words. 56
If tobacco industry executives challenged the new Act under the holding
of Brown & Williamson, the statute would probably be upheld. The new
50. Id.
51. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
52. Id. at 127.
53. Id. at 161 ("[A]n administrative agency's power to regulate in the public interest must
always be grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.").
54. Id.
55. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that tobacco
products fall under the statutory language of the FDCA).
56. Id. at 162 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
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law, unlike the one in Brown & Williamson, has statutory language that pro-
vides the FDA with the power to regulate tobacco.57
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
A. Four-Step Analysis for Commercial Speech
The United States Supreme Court formulated a four-step test to deter-
mine whether First Amendment rights were being violated for commercial
speech.58 "The Constitution . . . accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression., 59 The four-step
analysis the United States Supreme Court provided is as follows:
In commercial speech cases ... a four-part analysis has devel-
oped. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity
and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted go-
vernmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly ad-
vances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
60
The new tobacco law prohibits and regulates certain forms of commer-
cial speech for the tobacco companies. 6' For example, "[a] federal ban will
be imposed on all outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools
and playgrounds., 62 Utilizing the four-part analysis from Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,63 the first
step is to determine if tobacco use is a lawful activity. 6' Tobacco products
57. See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 101(b), 123 Stat. 1776, 1784 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.).
58. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
59. Id. at 562-63 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456-457
(1978)).
60. Id. at 566.
61. See Family Smoking and Prevention Tobacco Control Act § 203, 123 Stat. 1846.
62. Abrams, supra note 12.
63. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
64. Id. at 566.
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are lawful because they are currently not banned by any law.65 As long as
the message the tobacco manufacturers provide is not misleading, then the
first part of the four-part analysis is met.66 The next step is to determine
"whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial '67 to restrict adver-
tising "within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds. 68 It can be argued that
the government interest is substantial because every day, 3500 young people
smoke for the first time. 69 Young people may be induced to smoke for the
first time due to advertising that is displayed near their schools.
If the first two inquiries yield a positive answer, then a court must de-
termine whether the regulation of the tobacco advertising "directly advances
the governmental interest asserted," and whether the regulation "is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. ' 70  Congress provided an
initial list of reasons in Section 2 of the bill to explain the substantial go-
71vernmental interest. In addition, Congress provided statistical information
in Section 2 of the bill to further expand on the substantial government inter-
est.72 If a court determines that the findings listed in Section 2 of the Family
65. Healy, supra note I ("The law prohibits the FDA from banning outright all tobacco
products or any class of tobacco products-such as cigarettes, cigars or chew.").
66. Cent. Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566.
67. Id.
68. Abrams, supra note 12.
69. Kochakian, supra note 11.
70. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
71. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, §§ 2(5)-
(7), (10), 123 Stat. 1776, 1777 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.). Some of Congress' reasons for restricting tobacco advertising are as follows:
(5) Tobacco advertising and marketing contribute significantly to the use of nicotine-
containing tobacco products by adolescents. (6) Because past efforts to restrict advertising and
marketing of tobacco products have failed adequately to curb tobacco use by adolescents,
comprehensive restrictions on the sale, promotion, and distribution of such products are
needed. (7) Federal and State governments have lacked the legal and regulatory authority and
resources they need to address comprehensively the public health and societal problems caused
by the use of tobacco products.... (10) The sale, distribution, marketing, advertising, and use
of tobacco products are activities in and substantially affecting interstate commerce because
they are sold, marketed, advertised, and distributed in interstate commerce on a nationwide ba-
sis, and have a substantial effect on the Nation's economy.
Id.
72. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act §§ 2(14)-(16), (23), (24), 123
Stat. at 1777-81. Some of Congress' reasons for restricting tobacco advertising are as fol-
lows:
(14) Reducing the use of tobacco by minors by 50 percent would prevent well over 10,000,000
of today's children from becoming regular, daily smokers, saving over 3,000,000 of them from
premature death due to tobacco-induced disease. Such a reduction in youth smoking would al-
so result in approximately $75,000,000,000 in savings attributable to reduced health care costs.
(15) Advertising, marketing, and promotion of tobacco products have been especially directed
to attract young persons to use tobacco products, and these efforts have resulted in increased
use of such products by youth. Past efforts to oversee these activities have not been successful
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Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act are adequate to further a sub-
stantial government interest, then it will be difficult for a tobacco manufac-
turer claiming a First Amendment infringement to prevail. Under the exist-
ing commercial speech doctrine, however, it is unclear how the United States
Supreme Court would rule on these limitations on tobacco advertising. The
tobacco companies are already arguing that the regulation is more extensive
than necessary because the existing ban on television and radio advertising
combined with this current ban on outdoor advertising within 1000 feet of
schools and playgrounds will make it "almost impossible to communicate...
'reduced harm' [tobacco] products. 73 An argument could be made that a
less extensive regulation would be to only ban any outdoor advertising with-
in a 1000 feet that faces and can be viewed by schools and playgrounds. For
example, if the advertisement is within 1000 feet of a school or playground,
but it faces a highway, that outdoor advertisement should not be banned.
B. Total Ban on Tobacco Advertising
There are currently no limits that the FDA can place on tobacco adver-
tising under the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.74
"The law gives the FDA broad authority to restrict marketing and promotion
'to the fullest extent permissible' under the I st Amendment. . . ."75 The lack
of limits on what the FDA can do "is certain to be tested in future court cas-
es."76 The United States Supreme Court has never been faced with a case
regarding a total ban on tobacco advertising.77 However, there are arguments
for a total ban on tobacco advertising.
78
in adequately preventing such increased use. (16) In 2005, the cigarette manufacturers spent
more than $13,000,000,000 to attract new users, retain current users, increase current con-
sumption, and generate favorable long-term attitudes toward smoking and tobacco use....
(23) Children are more influenced by tobacco marketing than adults: more than 80 percent of
youth smoke three heavily marketed brands, while only 54 percent of adults, 26 and older,
smoke these same brands. (24) Tobacco company documents indicate that young people are
an important and often crucial segment of the tobacco market. Children, who tend to be more
price sensitive than adults, are influenced by advertising and promotion practices that result in
drastically reduced cigarette prices.
Id.
73. Duff Wilson, Tobacco Firms Sue to Block Marketing Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009,
at B1.
74. Healy, supra note 1.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Martin H. Redish, Tobacco Advertising and the First Amendment, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 589, 609 (1996).
78. See id. at 598. Some of the arguments for a total ban include:
Smoking is an addictive habit that causes severe social harm by giving rise to serious, often
fatal illnesses in thousands of individuals every year. Government may exercise its regulatory
2010]
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Another justification for a total ban on tobacco advertising is that citi-
zens cannot be trusted to make their own rational judgments on the exposure
to truthful advertising based on a lawful activity.79 However, it may be ar-
gued that tobacco advertising is not truthful advertising at all. If a person
cannot be trusted to make life-affecting choices based on the open market-
place of advertising, then the government is justified in censoring the tobac-
co advertising that could lead to harm to that person. 80 This argument is at
odds with "the fundamental premises of both the First Amendment and the
notions of democratic theory which underlie our system.'
C. Partial Ban on Tobacco Advertising
A less controversial invasion of free speech is to place partial restric-
tions on forms of tobacco advertising. The Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act spells out certain forms of tobacco advertising that are
not considered a complete advertising ban.82 However, the broad authority
given to the FDA to restrict marketing and promotion raises concerns of fu-
ture total advertising bans.83 Although minors do not have the same level of
First Amendment rights as adults, tobacco advertising aimed at adults may
be restricted because minors may be exposed to that same advertising. 84
General restrictions on advertising near schools and playgrounds is constitu-
tional, but a complete ban on advertising simply because minors may be ex-
posed to it is unconstitutional. 81 "To allow such restrictions would be to re-
duce all of society to a community of children for purposes of the First
Amendment., 8
6
Another alternative to a total ban is "tombstone" limitations.87 These
limitations only allow the manufacturer to include the "name, price, and tar
police powers to prevent or reduce this harm. Government possesses the power to protect the
public interest by completely banning sale of tobacco products .... but government need not
take such extreme action. Rather ... [the] government may take the lesser step of allowing
sales to continue while prohibiting all promotional advertising of tobacco products. Because
... a reduction in advertising would reduce demand for the product, such a prohibition would
largely achieve the government's legitimate goal of curbing tobacco use indirectly by reducing
the public's demand for that product
79. See id. at 604.
80. Id. at 604-05.
81. Redish, supra note 77, at 605.
82. See generally Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No.
111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
83. Healy, supra note 1.
84. Redish, supra note 77, at 607-08.
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 625.
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and nicotine levels" contained in the product. 88 The Act's requirement that
warning labels on cigarette packages will now have to cover fifty percent of
the front and rear of the packages may be considered a "tombstone" limita-
tion.89 There are two First Amendment issues associated with "tombstone"
limitations: "(1) they interfere with a speaker's choice of method of expres-
sion, and (2) they stifle the expression of particular viewpoints." 90  First
Amendment issues that will be associated with the new tobacco law are im-
portant to note:
The First Amendment interests threatened by the regulation of to-
bacco advertising are considerably more substantial than many
have recognized. If the government is permitted to prohibit truth-
ful advocacy of a lawful activity because of fear that citizens will
make unwise choices, there is no basis on which to distinguish
government's efforts to do the same in other areas of public deci-
sionmaking.... [P]rohibition of tobacco advertising constitutes a
governmental exercise in mind control of its citizens-hardly a
course of action consistent with the letter, spirit or tradition of the
First Amendment right of free expression.91
D. Bans on Alcohol Advertising
The alcohol industry has also faced similar types of bans as the tobacco
industry regarding certain forms of advertisement. First Amendment issues
have been raised by those opposing advertising restrictions on alcohol prod-
ucts. The United States Supreme Court case of 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island92 set a precedent in determining whether certain forms of prohibition
on alcohol advertising were constitutional. 93 In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Schmoke,94 a city ordinance was challenged on First Amendment constitu-
tional grounds.95
88. Id.
89. Abrams, supra note 12.
90. Redish, supra note 77, at 626.
91. Id. at 639.
92. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
93. See id. at 485.
94. 101 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1996).
95. See id. at 327.
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1. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island
In 44 Liquormart, Rhode Island banned the advertisement of liquor
prices except at locations that were actually selling liquor.96 A Rhode Island
liquor retailer brought action against the State of Rhode Island, claiming that
the advertisement ban violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.97 The United States Supreme Court found that an outright ban
on all liquor advertising throughout the State of Rhode Island was unconsti-
tutional.98 The history behind Rhode Island's ban on alcohol advertisement
was provided in the case:
In 1956, the Rhode Island Legislature enacted two separate prohi-
bitions against advertising the retail price of alcoholic beverages.
The first applies to vendors licensed in Rhode Island as well as to
out-of-state manufacturers, wholesalers, and shippers. It prohibits
them from "advertising in any manner whatsoever" the price of
any alcoholic beverage offered for sale in the State; the only ex-
ception is for price tags or signs displayed with the merchandise
within licensed premises and not visible from the street. The
second statute applies to the Rhode Island news media. It contains
a categorical prohibition against the publication or broadcast of
any advertisements--even those referring to sales in other States-
that "make reference to the price of any alcoholic beverages."
99
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the constitutionality of
the statutes, and the court found in both cases that the statutes were not un-
constitutional.' °° The United States Supreme Court, however, followed the
four-step analysis for commercial speech from Central Hudson to make a
determination on this particular issue.' O' Justice Stevens, writing for the ma-
jority, opined that the Rhode Island ban was "a blanket prohibition against
truthful, nonmisleading speech about a lawful product."'' 0 2 When applying
the four-part test, the United States Supreme Court did not find that the blan-
ket ban on the alcohol advertising was effective in advancing the State's in-
terest. '03
96. 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 489.
97. Id. at 493.
98. Id. at 516.
99. Id. at 489-90.
100. See id. at 490-92.
101. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 500 n.9.
102. Id. at504.
103. Id. at 505-07.
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Although the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
does not impose a ban on all tobacco advertising, it "gives the FDA broad
authority to restrict marketing and promotion" in the future as long as First
Amendment rights are not being violated.'0° This broad authority under the
Act enables the FDA to create a total ban on tobacco advertising. If the FDA
were to implement such a total ban, First Amendment violations would prob-
ably be found in future court cases. The FDA would have to provide a tre-
mendous amount of statistical data and information to explain how a total
ban on tobacco advertising would be effective in advancing the govern-
ment's interest, and that the total ban is not more extensive than necessary to
serve the government's interest.1
0 5
2. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke
In Anheuser-Busch, there was a city ordinance that prohibited the
placement of outdoor advertisement featuring alcoholic advertisements "in
certain areas of Baltimore City.""°  Unlike the statute in 44 Liquormart,
which prohibited advertising throughout the entire state of Rhode Island, the
ordinance in this case was targeted at specific areas of the city where child-
ren were either at school or in their neighborhoods.'0 7 The main difference
between Baltimore City's ordinance and Rhode Island's regulation is that
Baltimore City's ordinance was targeted only at children who were not of a
legal drinking age.'0 8 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly em-
phasized that "children deserve special solicitude in the First Amendment
balance because they lack the ability to assess and analyze fully the informa-
tion presented through commercial media. ' °9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit utilized the
same four-part test from Central Hudson that the United States Supreme
Court utilized in 44 Liquormart."° When applying the United States Su-
preme Court's four-part analysis, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that Baltimore's city ordinance was not a violation of the
104. Healy, supra note 1.
105. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980).
106. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Schmoke, 101 F.3d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir. 1996).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 329 ("Baltimore's interest is to protect children who are not yet independently
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First Amendment.11 The court distinguished the holding from 44 Liquor-
mart:
Baltimore's ordinance expressly targets persons who cannot be le-
gal users of alcoholic beverages, not legal users as in Rhode Isl-
and. More significantly, Baltimore does not ban outdoor advertis-
ing of alcoholic beverages outright but merely restricts the time,
place, and manner of such advertisements. And Baltimore's or-
dinance does not foreclose the plethora of newspaper, magazine,
radio, television, direct mail, Internet, and other media available to
Anheuser-Busch and its competitors.
112
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act contains a section
banning "outdoor tobacco advertising within 1,000 feet of schools and play-
grounds." ' 13 This section is quite similar to the ordinance passed in Balti-
more City. The Act is targeting areas where children, who are not of a legal
age to purchase tobacco, are likely to be present. When applying the case
law from 44 Liquormart and Anheuser-Busch, it is likely that if a section of
the Act banned outdoor advertising where minors only happened to be colla-
teral from the advertiser's message, a court would probably find that section
of the bill to be an infringement on First Amendment rights.
E. Tobacco Companies File Lawsuits
On August 31, 2009, Reynolds American, Inc., Lorillard, Inc., and other
tobacco companies filed a lawsuit in Kentucky to block certain provisions of
the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.' 14 Tobacco com-
panies are primarily concerned that the law will prevent them from making
truthful statements about health risks associated with tobacco products."5
Floyd Abrams, the attorney representing Lorillard Tobacco Company stated,
"Tobacco is a legal product for adults, and the Supreme Court has said that
the industry has an interest which the First Amendment protects to commu-
nicate information about its products, and adults have the right to receive that
111. Anheuser-Busch, 101 F.3d at 330.
112. Id.at329.
113. Abrams, supra note 12.
114. David Kesmodel et al., Tobacco Giants Challenge U.S. Law, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept
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information."' 16 Mr. Abrams, who is a constitutional lawyer, expects the
case to proceed quickly." 7
"The 46 page complaint seeks declaratory judgments and injunctions
against the federal government and officials in the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration and the Department of Health and Human Services."' 18 Mr. Abrams
commented that "[tihe case will be about whether Congress has gone too far
about preventing tobacco from communicating with adults."" 9 The lawsuit
is not challenging the provisions that "address tobacco sales to minors."'2
Lorillard Tobacco believes that the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit "has been more supportive than . . . other circuits [concerning]
commercial speech issues." '' A district court judge in Kentucky has already
struck down certain provisions of the law.1 22 Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.
"ruled that the Food and Drug Administration can't block tobacco companies
from using color and graphics in their advertisements" and the tobacco com-
panies cannot be prevented from implying that their products are safer be-
cause they are regulated by the FDA.123 Reynolds American is considering
whether to appeal the judge's rulings that favored the government.' 24
V. THE TOBACCO LAW'S EFFECT
A. Effect on the Tobacco Industry
Although it is too early to determine the effects the new law will have
on the tobacco industry, experts have provided their opinion on the potential
impact. 25 Blake Brown, an agricultural economist who provides analyses
and educational programming for tobacco producers, understands factors that
affect tobacco demand. 26 Mr. Brown has worked with various "tobacco
industry and health advocates."' 127 Mr. Brown has provided commentary to
support his insight on where the tobacco industry may be heading:
116. Wilson, supra note 73.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Kesmodel, supra note 114.
120. Id.
121. Wilson, supra note 73.
122. David Kesmodel & Suzanne Vranica, Corporate News: Mixed Tobacco Ruling,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2010, at B2.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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"It's very hard to quantify the impact of regulations on the demand
for tobacco. But I would think there would be two effects as a re-
sult of this legislation. One is, over time, we will see a substantial
decline in cigarette consumption. I think the other potential impact
is that these regulations call for modified-risk tobacco products.
That will change the technology of the way cigarettes are made.
These technology changes would likely lead to less tobacco per
cigarette. So if you have a decline in the number of cigarettes
smoked, and you have a decline in the amount of tobacco used per
cigarette, I think that will have a substantial impact on demand for
U.S. tobacco.... The U.S. tobacco industry has been downsizing
for many years, and continued downsizing would be no surprise.
But the big question is how stringent these regulations will be.
There is a lot of leeway on what can be required. We won't really
know the impact until the regulatory agencies start to work on
this." 
28
Scott Ramminger, president of the American Wholesale Marketers As-
sociation, opposed the legislation due to the cost being driven up on tobac-
co. 129 Mr. Ramminger expressed his concerns over what may happen to the
cost of tobacco:
"In Canada and other places where draconian regulations have
gone in effect, it has basically driven up the cost of the product.
Any regulation imposed on any point in the supply chain is going
to drive up the cost of the product. You've seen states raise the tax
on cigarettes and the federal government has too. What it does is
create a great opportunity for organized crime and people interest-
ed in subverting the system to bring in bootleg products on the
black market. Cigarettes are very easy to make .... In California,
you've already had a problem with counterfeit cigarettes from
China. I understand what the intention of [the legislation] is, and
no one is going to quarrel with the idea that smoking is not really
good for you. But there are a lot of things that are not good for
you that adults choose to do. If an adult chooses to smoke, they
are going to find a way to smoke. It would be better for everyone,
including the proponents of the legislation, if cigarettes were pur-
chased through a legitimate business. Look at what happened dur-




130. Roan & Yurkiewicz, supra note 37 (alteration in original).
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Patrick Reynolds, grandson of the founder of R.J. Reynolds Cigarette
Company, publicly speaks out against tobacco. "' His only concern with the
Act is that the FDA regulation could remove the electronic cigarette from the
market. 32 An electronic cigarette delivers "vaporized propylene glycol and
nicotine solution without tobacco or smoke." 133 Mr. Reynolds emphasized
that "the cigarette substitute was very handy to me . . . in quitting smoking.
It's something to suck on and pretend you're smoking."'' 3  Recently, the
FDA tested the electronic cigarette products and found that there were toxic
chemicals, including antifreeze. 35 The FDA's Deputy Commissioner stated,
"Little is known about these products, including how much nicotine is there
and what other chemicals may be there.' 36 Although it is not clear whether
the FDA will ban electronic cigarettes altogether under the bill, the FDA did
say it is planning additional activities to address issues with the electronic
cigarettes. 13
7
Menthol, a gateway chemical for kids and young women with smoking,
will be exempt from the FDA's regulation. 38 Jeffrey Wigand, former vice
president for research and development for a major tobacco company, is
concerned about the exemption of menthol because it is a cigarette that major
cigarette manufacturers have targeted at African Americans for decades.
39
However, the FDA could still ban menthol under the mandate if it chose to
do so.' 4 Menthol is favored by twenty-seven percent of all smokers and
seventy-five percent of African American smokers.' 4' Mr. Wigand, who was
portrayed by Russell Crowe in the 1999 movie "The Insider," has become
"the tobacco industry's highest-ranking former executive to address public
health and safety."'' 42 Mr. Wigand was greatly opposed to Altria-formerly
known as Philip Morris-helping negotiate the structure of a bill that was
going to regulate them.4 3 The legislation only became possible when Altria





135. Matthew Perrone, FDA Finds Carcinogens in Electronic Cigarettes, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (W. Va.). July 23, 2009, at A8.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Roan & Yurkiewicz, supra note 37.
139. Id.
140. Healy, supra note 1.
141. Id.
142. Roan & Yurkiewicz, supra note 37.
143. Id.; Kochakian, supra note 11.
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ble. 144 In general, all new "tobacco products are unlikely to enter the mar-
ket," and several products that are already offered are "likely to be pulled."'
' 45
B. Will the Legislation Actually Curb Smoking?
"More than 43 million Americans remain addicted to nicotine in tobac-
co (indeed, 70% of smokers say they wish they could quit, and 40% try year-
ly). ' 146 Every day, 3500 young people smoke for the first time.'47 Tobacco
kills more Americans than AIDS, automobile accidents, cocaine, heroin,
homicide, alcohol, and suicide combined. 48 One of the FDA's new powers
is the right to require tobacco companies to release details of research con-
cerning the contents and health effects of their current and future products to
the public. 49 Americans will be more aware about the four thousand toxic
substances and sixty carcinogens found in tobacco products. 50 Health and
consumer groups believe that the bill and other anti-smoking efforts "can
significantly reduce the 400,000 deaths and $100 billion in healthcare costs
attributed every year to smoking in the U.S.'
15 1
Smokers in Washington, D.C. were split on whether the new bill actual-
ly matters.152 Reginald Little, a forty-seven year old government researcher,
thought the regulation was needed because consumers do not know what
exactly is in tobacco products. 53 Lionel Richardson, a twenty-six year old
electrical engineer, called the bill a good thing.154 He said the tobacco com-
panies' advertisements "make it sexy so kids think it's the cool thing to
do.' 55 However, there were smokers and non-smokers who did not feel the
bill was going to make a difference.1 56 A program analyst who smokes ciga-
rettes stated, "I already know it's bad for me, so I don't think knowing how
much is really in one cigarette is really going to make a difference."'' 57 A
forty-two year old non-smoking, financial analyst commented that the bill
144. Kochakian, supra note 11.
145. Healy, supra note 1.
146. Id.
147. Kochakian, supra note 11.
148. George F. Will, Burned by a Tobacco Bill, WASH. POST, June 18, 2009, at A23.
149. Healy, supra note 1.
150. Id.
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would lead to "'too much government control over personal lives [and] per-
sonal choices."" 5 8 Even though "the FDA will have the authority to adjust"
nicotine levels, it cannot bar nicotine altogether. 59 "As a result, the cigarette
companies [may be] gaining an even greater degree of governmental approv-
al for the sale of an addictive and deadly product."'"
C. The President's Habit
President Obama has his own occasional smoking habit that he has been
trying to kick since the election.' 6 ' The President conceded that the new leg-
islation that is targeted at helping children stop smoking could have helped
him when he was younger. 6 The President's smoking habit has been a kept
secret around the White House for some time. 163 Michelle Obama made it a
prerequisite for her husband to quit smoking before he entered the presiden-
tial race."6 However, there is still debate as to whether President Obama has
actually kicked his smoking habit. 165 On one hand, his wife claims that he
has quit smoking.' 66 During an interview with "60 Minutes," Mrs. Obama
claimed, "That's why he doesn't do it anymore, I'm proud to say... I'm the
one who outed him on the smoking. That was one of my prerequisites for,
you know, entering this race, is that he couldn't be a smoking president."'
167
On the day of the bill-signing ceremony, President Obama was asked by
a CNN reporter about the President's struggle with smoking, but the Presi-
dent provided no response. 68 At a press conference that same day, the Presi-
dent's Press Secretary answered, "He struggles with it every day. I don't
honestly see the need to get a whole lot more specific than the fact that it's a
continuing struggle.' 69 President Obama has admitted that he still struggles
158. Id.
159. Kochakian, supra note 11.
160. Id.
161. Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMEs, June 23, 2009,
at Al 5 [hereinafter Zeleny, Smoker].
162. Id.
163. Jeff Zeleny, For Obama, Tough Grip by Tobacco, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at A12
[hereinafter Zeleny, Tough Grip] ("It was, perhaps, one of the worst-kept secrets around the
White House. For weeks, the president's advisers have declined to say whether he had
whipped his smoking habit.").





169. Zeleny, Smoker, supra note 161.
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with his smoking habit. 7 President Obama stated, "You know, I don't know
what to tell you, other than the fact that, you know, like folks who go to
A.A., you know, once you've gone down this path, then you know it's some-
thing you continually struggle with."''
Mr. Obama has not been seen smoking publicly for years. In
2005, on his first day in Washington as a freshman senator, he
rolled down the window of an SUV and lit up a cigarette as he
rode from the Capitol Hill to a meeting at the White House. But
now that he is living at the White House, the scrutiny is far higher.
So where does he smoke? The wooded grove around the White
House swimming pool and tennis court is one place, according to
people with knowledge of the matter, who are not authorized to
speak about it. 172
President Obama can set a strong example to the nation's youth by rid-
ding the habit that the bill he signed intends to destroy. Although President
Obama is not "the first president to smoke cigarettes," there is more pressure
on him in an era where tobacco is "taboo."'' 73 "[I]mproving health care is at
the top of the president's agenda and a tough anti-tobacco bill has just
crossed his desk., 174 President Obama should not be embarrassed about his
smoking habit or why he keeps being asked if he continues to smoke. 7 5 The
President happens to be an excellent spokesman for the new FDA regulation
and should embrace the role rather than avoid it. 76 "Obama's personal diffi-
culty ... doesn't only reflect the formidable odds.., in overcoming nicotine
addiction. The [P]resident is living proof to the young people.., that even
the most disciplined among us can become hooked. He is the best conceiva-
ble advertisement to counter the tobacco industry's marketing machine."'' 77





175. See Marie Cocco, A Poster Addict for Tobacco Law, SUNDAY GAZETrE-MAIL
(Charleston, W. Va.), June 28, 2009, at C3.
176. Id.
The president should make public-service announcements describing his addiction to
cigarettes, which he began smoking as a teenager, and his so-far-failed efforts to completely
snuff them out. Because after all, if such a smart, smooth and incontestably successful man is
having such trouble quitting, what hope is there for the average American who has no worries
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act is the most
important piece of legislation in the last fifty years to place restrictions on the
tobacco industry. The FDA for the first time has been given the authority to
control what actually goes into tobacco products. 78 Although the new bill
was received with tremendous support in both the House and the Senate,
there is still debate as to whether the FDA is capable of handling this new
mandate. The FDA is still uncertain as to how to implement its newly
granted authority "over the advertising, marketing and production of all to-
bacco products in the U.S.' 79
The FDA's outreach could validate the views of those who stated that
the FDA was already overburdened and was not equipped to undertake the
task of regulating the tobacco industry. 80 If the FDA is asking the public for
their input on how to implement change under the new Act, then the FDA
may not be properly staffed with the people who should be making those
kinds of decisions. The FDA has reached out to the public with the follow-
ing statement:
We are particularly interested in comments on the approaches and
actions the agency should consider initially to increase the likelih-
ood of reducing the incidence and prevalence of tobacco product
use and protecting the public health .... Although the agency will
not respond to specific suggestions, we will consider them in es-
tablishing the new Center for Tobacco Products and in implement-
ing the [Act]. In the future, we intend to solicit public input on
specific issues.'
81
The FDA's role is both a blessing and a burden. On the one hand, the
Agency has the opportunity to dramatically affect the number of young and
older smokers that are affected by tobacco advertising and the contents of
tobacco products. "More than 43 million Americans remain addicted to...
nicotine"'' 82 and 3500 young people smoke for the first time each day.
183
178. Abrams, supra note 12.
179. Aaron Krivitzky, FDA Seeks Comment on New Tobacco Regs, LAWYERS USA (Bos-
ton), July 1, 2009.
180. See Abdullah, supra note 41.
181. Krivitzky, supra note 179 ("Comments can address a large number of issues, includ-
ing: federal, state, and local government collaboration; new product approval; product ingre-
dient disclosure; advertising and marketing of tobacco products; label statements and warn-
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However, the Agency also has an incredible amount of pressure to reduce the
millions of Americans who are addicted to nicotine, decrease the effect that
advertising has on young people, and lower the staggering number of deaths
associated with tobacco use. Some of the leading causes of deaths combined
do not even amount to as many deaths caused by tobacco."8
Furthermore, the FDA may face future litigation regarding constitution-
al issues with the regulations it passes. Prior tobacco and alcohol cases have
held complete bans on advertising that are both lawful and truthful in nature
may be found unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The law allow-
ing the FDA "to restrict marketing and promotion 'to the fullest extent per-
missible' under the 1st Amendment-a limit that is certain to be tested in
future court cases"-enables the Agency to make either complete bans or
partial bans on tobacco advertising.'85 Complete bans on tobacco advertising
pose a greater risk for a court to strike the regulation down as unconstitution-
al. Partial bans on advertising, such as those targeted in areas where children
are known to be present, suffer a lower chance of being found as unconstitu-
tional.'86
Congress could ban cigarettes; therefore it could ban tobacco ad-
vertising. Instead, tobacco advertising and promotions will be
even more severely curtailed. These restrictions merit a constitu-
tional challenge. Although commercial speech does not receive
full First Amendment protection, Congress should not be allowed
to effectively prohibit truthful communication about a legal prod-
uct. 187
So far, the FDA has not passed any regulations that completely ban to-
bacco advertising, but the new Act does contain provisions that limit certain
elements of commercial speech. If a court finds that parts of the new law or
future regulations passed by the FDA do not meet the criteria under the four-
step commercial speech analysis, then the provision or regulation will be
found unconstitutional. 88 The tobacco companies have already filed law-
suits against the federal government concerning the constitutionality of the
Act.
183. Kochakian, supra note 11.
184. See Will, supra note 148.
185. Healy, supra note 1.
186. See Redish, supra note 77, at 605.
187. Will, supra note 148.
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President Obama has a tremendous opportunity to be spokesperson for
the new bill. President Obama needs to take more of a public stance in ad-
dressing his tobacco addiction rather than avoiding it when asked about it by
the media. If young people can see how a tobacco addiction has become an
incredible life struggle for someone as important as the President, they may
reconsider trying tobacco altogether.18 9 Additionally, health care reform has
been at the top of the President's agenda, and he can set a great example by
completely getting rid of his smoking habit.
It will certainly take time before the new law starts showing dramatic
effects on tobacco use in this country. Furthermore, the Act demonstrates
that politicians on Capitol Hill are willing to ignore party lines in order to
pass legislation that may dramatically impact the health of American citi-
zens. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act could be
foreshadowing future legislation that will be passed in Washington to curtail
industries that are known to create health dangers for American citizens.
189. See Cocco, supra note 175.
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